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FREEDOM AND SERFDOM

AN ANTHOLOGY OF WESTERN THOUGHT

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FREEDOM AND SERFDOM

AN ANTHOLOGY OF
WESTERN THOUGHT

edited by
ALBERT HUNOLD



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ALBERT HUNOLD

Zürich

P R E F A C E

The summit conference in Paris, which collapsed before it had begun and which transformed what had been conceived as a momentous international gathering into a communist propaganda burlesque, has once again exposed to western eyes the true face of totalitarianism – and in a manner that has had a sobering effect on even the most ardent advocates of co-existence. It is to be hoped that this latest link in the chain of fiascos will put a curb on the eagerness of the protagonists of ‘appeasement’, and that the hour will be used to convince as wide a circle as possible that summit talks of this nature offer, as far as the West is concerned, no prospect of any positive results.

How, then, can we so influence public opinion in this western world of ours as to ensure that it will never again permit our political leaders to succumb to those onslaughts of political weakness which we have witnessed again and again at regular intervals during the course of the past twenty-five years? To think that this can be achieved solely by means of propaganda is an illusion, since, for the most part, those who mould or help to mould public opinion, and in many instances our intellectual leaders as well, are themselves ignorant of the real nature of totalitarianism and are therefore incapable of pointing out the ways and means by which a check can be imposed upon this ‘new Islam’ and a policy initiated that is worthy of the dignity and strength of our western civilisation and culture.

From the time of its inception, and particularly during the last five years, The Swiss Institute of International Studies has been concerned primarily with the fundamental problem of our western economic and social order. As the result of years of endeavour and in collaboration with authoritative experts on both sides of the Atlantic, a forum has been erected in Zürich in which, stone by stone, is being gathered the material for a solid foundation of our western way of life, the

very essence of which is freedom and the dignity of man. It quickly became apparent that without a deep and meticulous analysis of the moral and intellectual roots of our opponents' doctrine it would not be possible either to formulate a consistent and deliberate western policy or to erect a defensive front against subversion. Once the moral and intellectual principles of the totalitarian doctrine have been clearly grasped, there immediately arises the question of an effective counter-programme for the free world. If we can succeed in mobilising forces against the menace from the East and are able also to convince not only the authoritative circles but also the great masses of the free world, we shall have gone a long way towards ensuring immunisation against the blandishments of eastern totalitarianism.

Here, however, we at once run into great difficulties, for we have no united defensive front against the soul-destroying forces of totalitarianism. On the one side we have a doctrine that is comprehensive and self-confident; on the other, the anti-totalitarian camp, which finds it difficult to overcome all its internal differences and form a united and systematic opposition. The West is under the further disadvantage that, whereas western influence is reduced to a minimum in the hermetically sealed communist countries, for our opponents everything is made only too easy, for they know that in the democratic States public opinion constitutes an important element in the formation of political will. In a democratic State policy is no longer framed, as in the past, in the Cabinets and Chancelleries alone, and Governments are now compelled to pay very considerable attention to public opinion.

While in their own countries the totalitarian dictators suppress the emergence of public opinion in the most brutal manner, they shrink from no effort to influence in their own favour public opinion in our own western world. This infiltration, of which many are quite unaware, is conducted through the medium of the newspapers, press agencies, universities, schools, churches and trade unions. The network of subversion takes many and varied forms, and its ramifications reach deep into the institutions and organisations of democratic society. It can with justice be said that the progress made by communism is attributable less to the convincing character of its doctrines than to the intellectual confusion which these disruptive forces have

caused in the western camp. A further factor which operates to our disadvantage is the fact that in our democracies the role played by the mass of uprooted humanity is becoming increasingly important, and the problem of control and guidance of the masses still seems to be far from being solved.

To all these burning questions an answer is given in this volume, *Freedom and Serfdom*, which contains a selection from the best contributions of world-renowned social economists, sociologists, philosophers and exponents of the political sciences, published for the first time in the English language. It is at this very moment that a work such as this, dedicated to the moral and intellectual struggle against communism and an analysis of our own democratic institutions, is of particular and urgent importance. For it is imperative, surely, that we should use to the best possible advantage the relatively short time vouchsafed us by the sobering effects of the Paris conference, before our opponents succeed once again in lulling us into a sense of complacent security. The purpose of this volume is not only to make a contribution towards the scientific clarification of some of the burning problems of the age, but also to instil a sense of urgency and vigilance, particularly in the younger generation, and to imbue them with courage and an eager readiness to fight for the ideals of the western world.

CARLO ANTONI

Rome University

FREEDOM INDIVISIBLE

In Italy, in the years between 1937 and 1941, there raged a spirited controversy, which was followed with lively interest by the intelligentsia and, in particular, by the younger generation. It was an earnest discussion, which aimed at achieving some measure of clarity – a controversy conducted with integrity and decorum, such as Italy had not experienced for many years, and one to which the fascist regime and its official ethical code could never have given birth.

It was waged within the framework of that sphere of liberal thought which people at the time were striving to condemn as ‘obsolete’, and it was conducted by the two great figures of Italian liberalism, Benedetto Croce and Luigi Einaudi, the philosopher and the economist.

This controversy, which has not been forgotten to this day, has had important repercussions on Italian political life since the collapse of fascism. Not only was it responsible for the framing of the doctrine of the new Liberal party in Italy, but it also influenced the attitude of many of those intellectuals who have since formed, or at any rate reinforced, the directing caucus of the parties of the left. The point at issue is, indeed, one of universal significance. It is one of those fundamental questions with which the civilisation of our age is afflicted. Nevertheless it was discussed in a manner and with means that are consonant with our own particular traditions and which to a certain degree correspond to the character and genius of our nation. It centred upon the distinction which Benedetto Croce had drawn between liberalism and ‘liberism’ – a word for which there would appear to be no exact counterpart in any other language. The distinction Croce was drawing was that between political and economic liberalism – a differentiation to which we

attach so much importance because it is based upon the clear distinction between ethics and economics and because it affects our fundamental conception of the meaning of the term 'politics'.

As it always has done throughout the centuries of the past, Italian thought has once again shown that it was pre-eminently qualified to draw sharp distinctions between the various manifestations of the activities of the human mind, and the implementation of these distinctions has been regarded as a duty which no thoughtful, civilised and responsible man could avoid. In the past, Italian thought has been at pains to draw distinctions between the ecclesiastically religious and the worldly political ways of life, between right and morality, between morals and politics, between natural science and metaphysics, between fiction and philosophy. It has always championed the sovereign independence of each one of these various forms of activity vis-à-vis the rest of them; but in spite of the autonomy it has thus conceded, it has still succeeded in preserving a species of humanitarian harmony. In the grievous years during which Europe pressed onwards towards catastrophe, the two leading exponents of philosophic thought became conscious of an urgent need to define political and economic freedom and to examine the question whether the two terms, 'liberalism' and 'liberism', were not related to one another by the ties of some inevitable and determining factor.

Croce's attitude towards this issue was the outcome of a profound process of evolution of his own theory of politics. Initially, in the Machiavellian tradition, he regarded politics as an unavoidable conflict between forces and interests, which was waged outside the confines of the sphere of ethics and which framed its own rules as circumstances dictated.

Young Croce's leanings towards Hegel and Marx, Sorel and Treitschke, and the antipathy he expressed in 1914 against the outlook of the western democracies based upon natural law, stemmed from the fundamental distinction which he drew between ethics and politics.

While Croce has never abandoned this distinction, he has, as a result, among other things, of his struggle against fascist tyranny, certainly modified his opinions regarding the inter-relationship be-

tween the two terms. Whereas he had at first regarded politics as a conflict between forces, he later came to regard them as a dexterous, determined and practical weapon, to be used in the service of a higher ethical way of life, or, perhaps better, to be used in the service of the ethical conception of freedom. In this way he came to interpret history as 'ethical history', in which the paramount principle of freedom created, overthrew and modified political and legal institutions and thus unceasingly controlled and shaped world events. This it was that caused him, in his 'History of Europe in the XIX Century', to extol the religion of freedom as the religion of the modern world.

It was because Croce had placed freedom on so high a pedestal that he then became inclined to separate it completely from the economic plane and to sever any and every tie which might bind it with social or economic structures. From this there emanated his thesis that freedom – since freedom and economic systems were two fundamentally different and separate entities – could at will apply any one of a variety of economic systems without detriment to its own essential entity.

In the course of the discussion Croce stated that by this he did not mean that at any particular moment in history it was immaterial to which one of a variety of economic systems a nation turned. What he was striving to do, he said, was to establish the fact that freedom must be regarded as an immutable constant, a guiding star high up in the vault of heaven, while the liberal economic system should be regarded as something historically limited and relative. Assuming, therefore, that, in order to survive, freedom to-day had need of a liberal economic structure, this did not mean, he argued, that one day it might not equally 'require' a socialist or some other system. As will be seen, it would appear that the sole criterion is what freedom 'requires' at any given moment. But who, indeed, can deduce from current events what form this requirement is likely to take at any given moment in history? In Italy throughout the post-war years, among all the speeches, articles and political programmes published and advocating a vast variety of often fundamentally opposed policies, there has not been one that has not based its plea on 'the requirements of the moment'.

Correctly to understand this point in Croce's thinking, we must remember his constant aversion to rules of any kind. In his 'Aesthetics' he refused to grant any validity to rules in the realms of art. In the same way he banished rules from the moral sphere – conscience alone, he claimed, was in a position, in any given situation, to decide what course of action was moral and what was not. If this be so, then, in the ever-changing circumstances at any given period, political thought will find itself always face to face with the problem of having to decide whether any one particular economic system is to be preferred to any other.

Luigi Einaudi has no comparably categorical a theory with which to oppose Croce's thesis. The economist preferred to descend from the heights of philosophical speculation to the plains of empirical fact. On this level he regarded any discussion on the superiority of one or the other economic system as too commonplace and banal, and he went so far as to suggest that, in view of their ambiguity, the terms 'liberalism' and 'socialism' should be dropped. To strive to achieve a greater measure of social justice by means of the nationalisation of a few industries is a policy, according to Einaudi, that is common to Liberals and Socialists alike; in this process there are no measures which are right and useful always and for all time, but there is such a thing as a 'critical point', at which a sound and useful measure becomes transformed into something pernicious and unmoral. In Einaudi's eyes, any measure aiming at greater social justice or nationalisation becomes communist when it goes beyond the critical point, and is liberal in those cases in which, in sagacious self-restraint, it calls a halt before the critical point is reached.

There may well appear to be no great divergence between Einaudi's attitude and that of Croce. The latter relies on 'the requirements of the moment'; Einaudi refers to a 'critical point'. Nevertheless, Einaudi is more positive and less indifferent with regard to the choice of economic system than is Croce. The participation by the State in the economic life of which Einaudi speaks, however, is fundamentally different to the intervention advocated by all supporters of planned economy, whether they be simple planners or out and out Communists. These latter demand that the State should take over complete control of the economic activities of mankind and should

compel them to adopt, and to adhere to, a course of action desired and prescribed by the State. Of this type of intervention Einaudi is suspicious. He does not believe that the implementation of great plans and programmes could be thus achieved, and he feels that of the assumption of complete control of the whole economic process and the replacement of the mechanism of free market economy by the leviathan of State no good at all could come. There was, however, also a moral basis to his opposition, for he regarded the ideal of those who wished to see the State prescribe what was to happen as an ideal for loafers frightened of accepting responsibility and lacking in initiative and enterprise. The only form of State intervention which he accepts is of a purely formal nature and consists of the demarcation of the boundaries within which a man would be free to work and live as he wished.

It is obvious that in this controversy regarding the two systems the essence of the point at issue was not the correct selection of the 'critical point', but the choice between two diametrically opposite systems. A further point that is clear is that Einaudi, obviously, does not regard the making of a choice between the two systems as something of no moral consequence. In his view, the 'liberistic' system possesses the virtues of free enterprise, the acceptance of responsibility and the readiness to take a risk, while in direct intervention by the State he sees a danger of despotism, of domination by political dilettantes, and of preferential treatment for the inefficient and the work-shy.

At this juncture, Einaudi might well have called a halt without allowing himself to be drawn into further participation in a discussion on the compatibility of liberal political thought and the socialist economic system, since it was clear that to him the ethical principle of freedom did not stand *above* the sphere of economics, but was, on the contrary, closely related to the whole economic system. Instead of doing so, however, he pursued the subject, albeit from an empirical angle.

He conceded that cases had been known of communist societies, in which human freedom had not been suppressed, but had been promoted – as, for instance, in the case of congregations of monks, who had of their own free will renounced all worldly possessions.

He further admitted that freedom had not suffered under the benevolent initiative of an Owen, a Cabet or a Fourier, who had gathered around them men who, of their own volition, had wished to live and work together. Nor, indeed, did such a procedure appear to Einaudi to be in any way utopian, since it was from such beginnings that the Guilds' movement had sprung. What did, however, strike him as utopian was the idea that, in a land in which the State was the sole and absolute controller of all the means of production and of production itself, the political leaders (who, at the same time, had now become the economic controllers) would use their unlimited powers to protect and promote the freedom of the individual citizen. Finally, as regards political consciousness – i.e. that consciousness of the politicians, to which Croce proposed to entrust the decision as regards the most appropriate economic system to be adopted – Einaudi could do no more than quote his own bitter experience of the economic blunders perpetrated by the politicians and of their general ignorance of economic affairs.

In international discussions during these years the impossibility of reconciling collective economy and political freedom had been pointed out by a whole host of writers and economists, among them Mises, Hayek, Robbins and Lippmann. From this spate of literature on the subject, Wilhelm Röpke's *'Die Gesellschaftskrise der Gegenwart'* reached Italy, and Einaudi at once wrote a detailed and most favourable review of the book.

Benedetto Croce was not the man to leave a new opponent like Röpke unnoticed for long. It is true that he praised the work for the intellectual merit of which it gave proof; but he was also anxious 'clearly to outline the principles involved and to preserve their appropriate purity'.

In his book, Röpke, it will be remembered, had sought a 'third way' between socialism and capitalism, and had sketched the broad outlines of a free enterprise, a free market economy, freed from the cartels, monopolies and privileges which 'traditional capitalism' had created in the name of the principle of 'laissez faire'. That, Croce objected, was not where the problem lay. The 'third way', he asserted, was not to be found in the creation of a third economic system on the same plane as the other two, but rather in a higher principle of

an ethical character – the principle of freedom. No method of an economic nature, he declared, had the right to control the lives and moral characteristics of human society. The politico-ethical system of liberalism, said Croce, was not, as Röpke maintained, bound to the system of free market economy, since this latter, in exceptional circumstances such as time of war, might well have to be suppressed, without any resultant harm accruing to the principles of liberal tenets; nor, he added, was there any point in objecting that this was a special case, since special cases and exceptional circumstances can intervene in our lives at any moment – and, indeed, do so often enough.

In the years immediately following the second world war, when the new Parties in Italy were in process of formation, Croce elevated this thesis to the status of the fundamental principle which, in the teeth of all controversy, governed all his political actions. Since he had accepted socialism as an economic system to which, 'in certain circumstances', the liberal idea could have recourse, he somewhat hastily disassociated himself from the Partito d'Azione, that promising Party which had been born in active conflict against national socialism and fascism, and which sought to bring justice and freedom into harmony and on *one* plane; nor did he hesitate to criticise the attempts being made to create a 'liberal socialism'. All he did was to refer to the principle of freedom which, he said, stood on so high a plane that it was well able to absorb and incorporate within itself all those demands normally grouped together under the generic heading of 'social justice'. Croce then came forward as the founder of a new Liberal Party, in the political programme of which he deliberately refrained from including any economic programme, and which to many of the younger intellectuals appeared to be a Conservative Party, poorly equipped to cope with 'the requirements of the moment'.

The Partito d'Azione, torn asunder to its very roots, was dissolved, and its fate was but a vindication of Croce's thesis. Many of the younger elements, however, who, at the time of the resistance movement, had gathered together with such ardent enthusiasm in that Party, now landed – not in the liberal, but in the communist, camp.

Röpke and the other economists took cognisance of Croce's thesis

either with repugnance or with surprise; nevertheless they refrained from attacking it on the grounds of principles. It is, however, on these grounds that I would like to re-open the discussion.

Let me at once make clear my own standpoint in this controversy. Croce's theory was based on a premise which the economists refrained from attacking on the grounds of principle, and their failure to do so at once placed them at a disadvantage. Croce's premise to which I refer is the premise that 'liberism' and socialism belong to the field of economics, and therein he is guilty of confusion between a system as such and the sphere of its application. If a State is interested in art or sport, its policy will not be concerned with art (or sport) as such, with artistic or sporting achievements and endeavours, but rather with the politico-ethical aspect; it will always be dependent upon the attitude adopted by the State towards art and sport and their value in the life of the nation and society.

In the same way, 'liberism' and socialism, concerned though they may be with economics, represent an outlook that is politico-ethical rather than economic in character – they are the outcome of two opposite philosophies, two different views upon the value and the essence of economic activity. The distinction between ethics and economics has been falsely handled, and instead of a co-ordinated relationship there has emerged a fundamental difference between political systems on the one hand and economic systems on the other, as though it were a question of an essential difference between these two systems.

In support of his thesis Croce, as I have already said, quoted the case of war, in which free market economy would be abandoned without any resultant damage to liberal conceptions. But the reasons which, in the liberal view, would justify the abandonment of a free market economy are certainly very different to those arguments upon which the fundamental conception of the socialists is based and which cause them to press for its permanent abolition. It was nevertheless on the question of principle that the difference became clearly apparent.

In the course of the controversy Croce recognised that not only were 'liberism' and communism basically two different and conflicting economic systems, but they also represented two fundamentally

different ways of life and ethical codes. Communism, he said, was founded upon materialism and the dialectics of Hegel, whereas 'liberism' was based upon the enlightened religions of 'the benevolence of Nature' and deism. Now that these philosophic religions had collapsed, Croce thought, there remained to-day nothing more than two different economic systems.

That socialism, in so far as it is not pure Marxism, is not in any way based upon dialectic materialism is a point which I need not elaborate. I am on the contrary of the opinion that the conceptions which constitute the fundamental bases of the two methods are not things of the past, as Croce theorises, but are two different verdicts on economic essentials in relation to life as a whole, which still exercise the minds of men. Beneath the materialistic-dialectical formulae, to which in melancholy reverence the Marxist intellectuals still adhere, there lives something very much more vital; and in 'liberism', too, there is something more genuine, more positive, still at work than merely the deism and faith in the benevolence of Nature that reigned supreme in the XVIII century.

Before I turn to an analysis of these truly vital impulses, I should like to re-examine more closely that concept of 'the exercise of political judgement', which Croce applies to the solution of the problem of selecting the right method. In this respect, as I have already mentioned, Einaudi has expressed doubts regarding the ability and competence of the politicians. That aspect, however, I propose to ignore and to speak here solely of the political consciousness of the ordinary citizen, which – even if it be only by the casting of a vote – to-day more than ever decides the issue of choice of method and, by so doing, of choice of Party as well.

Obviously, the situation is constantly changing and is sometimes without precedent, and rules and yardsticks are of no help. Even so, the exercise of judgement is not as independent an act as it may seem, but emanates rather from the corporate entity of our intelligence as a whole. The situation is by no means unequivocal, it gives us no straightforward indication of what our attitude should be, but the decision to which our scrutiny and assessment of it leads us is influenced by standards and principles, which emanate from our subjective outlook on life as a whole and from our religious

and philosophical beliefs. In the same way, with regard to economic problems there exists no completely detached ethical sense of judgement, which bases its decisions on the merits of any given situation, but rather a sense that is deeply rooted in its own principles.

'Liberism', which came into being as an economic science in England in the XVIII century, is primarily a philosophical discovery, notwithstanding that the text-books of philosophical history make no mention of the fact. In his well-known essay Croce demonstrated that the two 'secular' sciences that emerged in the XVIII century – economics and aestheticism – are to this extent related in that both involve a justification of the sentient faculties and, in order to survive, had to emancipate themselves from moral philosophy. In reality their relationship was originally much closer. The cult of the aesthetic emerged, also in England in the XVIII century, as the opponent of the 'rules' governing rational poesy and enthusiastically entered the lists in support of its great discovery – the fruitful genius of phantasy and creative 'originality'. Then it was that the attribute of creative power, which had hitherto been accepted as the prerogative of the Deity, was also conceded to the genius of man. This was a bold acknowledgement on the part of English critics and men of letters, which the philosophers accepted only very much later and with much reservation. Even to-day there are many who have not realised the fact, although the word 'creative' has in the meanwhile been taken into use in the everyday language and has become almost a commonplace.

Nevertheless, we find the same idea, though not, perhaps, so forcefully expressed, at the source of English economic science, at the beginning of Adam Smith's 'liberism'. This is the science which discovered the productivity of the human mind, the fertility of initiative, which, like art, knows no rules but its own. By acknowledging work as the basis of all merit, it extols the creativeness of economic activity. Thus, in the same way that aestheticism freed poetry from the shackles of the rules of versification, the new science of economics is now liberating the production of wealth from the restrictive bonds of companies and privileges and the *laissez faire* set-up of commercial policies. Even the principle of free competition, conceived on a mechanistic basis in the XIX century, found

an indispensable pre-requisite in this new conception of creative activity, which burst the bonds of traditional conservatism, gave impetus to bold technical innovation, opened up vistas of new opportunities, and led Britain towards the industrial revolution and beyond it, out on to the great highways of world trade. Why, even the myth of the 'invisible hand of Providence', which, according to these national economists, introduced a spontaneous, general harmony into all the undertakings of men intent solely on their own profit making, was only a naively optimistic way of expressing this same conception of the productivity of the mind, which has brought wealth and progress to the world.

In its extension to every kind of intellectual endeavour, this conception of human activity is the key to the modern concept of freedom. Freedom must not be regarded simply as an unbridled liberty of action with no external boundaries which it may not transgress at will, but as something positive, as a condition in which values can be created that would not be able to materialise under conditions in which uniform, external rules hold their paralysing sway. 'Liberism', however, is this philosophy of freedom applied to the economic activities of mankind.

Let us now turn to socialism. I have no desire to linger over the question of dialectic materialism, for although it is, admittedly, the official doctrine of the Communist Party, it is, in my own estimation, of little or no significance. What I do, however, regard as being still a potent force to-day is that 'rationalistic mystique' described by the French social philosopher, Rougier,¹ which, emanating as it does from the century of enlightenment, is older than the Marxist teaching and apocalypse, and which constitutes one of the most important components of our modern civilisation.

It concerns that scientific rationalism which the scientists have applied with such outstanding success in their subjugation of Nature. The endeavour to subjugate economic forces is a continuation of the efforts of science to gain control over the slumbering forces of Nature. Where the supporters of 'liberism' saw abundance and development, the rationalist saw nothing but the disquieting chaos

¹ Louis Rougier: *Les Mystiques Economiques*. Paris, 1938.

of a feverish and disjointed hither and thither, and he at once set about the task of introducing some semblance of systematic order. What to the former was creative genius appeared to the latter to be blind, irrational Nature. Voltaire praised Peter the Great of Russia as an ideal Prince, because he had ruthlessly compelled Nature to 'become more beautiful'. These intellectuals were in actual fact deriving a species of aesthetic satisfaction from the contemplation of geometric and mechanical symmetry.

Rougier further pointed out how this trend was capable of dazzling even the intellectuals of to-day, the heirs and successors of *les philosophes* of the XVIII century. To exploit this trend was, in their eyes, to make a contribution to progress, to the scientific and technical organisation of mankind, to the triumph of justice and human happiness – and to the eradication of crises and disorders, the squandering of the world's goods and the rapacity of the wealthy.

The basis of this belief, the tenets of which were formulated by Saint-Simon, the founder of socialism, is the infallibility of the supreme leader, who directs the whole mechanism from the centre. It is from this basis that the system derives, inevitably, its authoritarian character – in all things, including the spheres of ethics, religion and politics. Saint-Simon himself, obviously far more clear-sighted than so many of his successors, demanded that the supreme authority should draw up a new code of social ethics which, he maintained, was essential to the smooth functioning of the system, and his disciple, Auguste Comte, was contemplating the foundation of a new Church.

I do not propose here to make any comment upon the criticisms of Barone and Mises, which have proved that the enlightened and all-seeing leader inevitably gropes his way in the darkness, and that the triumph of rationalism is in reality the triumph of caprice, since such a leader could not be in possession of the market indices which he would need, in order to be able to estimate the combination of means required for the full satisfaction of any demand, or to assess the economic practicability of any given project. I prefer to confine myself merely to pointing out that initiative, which is denied to the people as a whole, is not of itself disavowed, but is acknowledged to be concentrated in the great genius of the leader, who

alone has the right to devise, to act and to create, in the same way as the queen-bee or ant, which alone possess the power to ensure the continuation of their species.

To this rationalist tendency in socialism must be added a more deeply-rooted and older ethical tendency. The motif of modern liberalism is not, as I have already said, the optimistic theory of the spontaneous harmonisation of individual interests, but the recognition of economic impetus as a thing of positive value, i.e., as something good. That means that this impetus has been set free from the condemnatory verdict which for hundreds of years the aesthetic view has been passing upon it. Economic activity is no longer portrayed as avarice or greed – both of them mortal sins – but as a virtue of industriousness, good management and initiative.

When the industrial revolution exposed the fatal repercussions that free competition could have on the living standards of the working classes, this ethical code suffered a severe blow. Socialism, however, did not content itself with the restrictions and reliefs proposed at the time by the liberalist, Sismondi, but resuscitated the old condemnation of economic impetus, which, in the nature of things, must be individualistic, if only because it represents the impulse of individual interest. This fresh condemnation was, indeed, couched in even more severe terms, since it castigated not only the sins of the mind – the worship, that is, of the golden calf – but also the sins against one's neighbours, the merciless enslavement and systematic exploitation of the poor and the weak. In its Marxist formulation, socialism assumes the guise of materialism and recognises the economic as the sole spur to which men respond; but in reality, as a social order it adheres solely to the principles of morality. It is a moral doctrine that is more rigid than Christian ethics, since not only does it aim at eradicating the profit of the individual, but also, by a radical reversion of the relationship between the individual and society, transforms all the economic activities of the individual into ethical activity on behalf of the community. But that is the aestheticism of the monastery and results in the elimination of all individual economic incentive. At the best, the individual will find his own interest in the interest of the community, but compulsory renunciation remains nevertheless the crucial factor.

This unlimited extension of the boundaries of ethics is, however, an offence against the human intellect and does injury to its being; consequently it is forced to assume all the characteristics of authoritarian discipline. In a communist State not only can the individual stake no claims, but in addition he has to work in the collective interest and by so doing to shed his own natural economic instincts, which have been branded as egoism.

The monastic communities constitute a unique type of human existence, for the simple reason that the sacrifice of all economic impulse is inherent in it. Even in a normal society there occur moments of heroic virtue and renunciation. But in the drab, everyday life in the sober world of labour and production, to suppress this impulse is to run the risk of robbing society of the incentives and potentialities to which it gives birth. When the sacred flame of enthusiasm becomes dimmed in the monotony of the daily round, it is replaced by the burdensome 'schooling' of propaganda; and when that no longer suffices, recourse has to be made to the merciless discipline of forced labour. The suppressed economic impulse then takes its revenge and forces the ethical ideal to transform itself into oppression. And that means that it ceases to be an ideal – and there then remains nothing but the Police.

It would be absurd to deny that the socialist ideal has not also made quite a considerable positive contribution to progress in the fields of poverty and labour; but as a principle and a method it is doomed to failure, because the economic impulse, no matter how strongly it be pushed aside and persecuted, always returns to the charge, because it is an element of life that is for ever irrepressible. The monk may well stun it into unconsciousness, but he cannot kill it, and even the collective forms of economy are in the end compelled to revert to it in the shape of special incentives, such as diplomas of honour, special rewards and preferential purchasing facilities.

In contesting that 'liberism' is an economic factor, I am not in any way rejecting the distinction drawn by Croce between liberalism and 'liberism'. Liberalism is an all-embracing philosophy; it affects every branch of human activity, and it strives towards a society in which all man's positive activities – art and the sciences, moral and religious life, family life and politics – are all equally respected.

In this corporate whole, 'liberism' represents that part which is concerned with man's economic activities. It is not, therefore, a distinction between a higher ethical principle and a less exalted economic instrument, as Croce suggests; nor is it a distinction between two different systems, as the national economists assume; rather is it the distinction between a part and the whole. It was doubtless this that Röpke had in mind, when he referred to the unity of society as the unity of all its component parts;¹ in this connection, however, Croce was able to retort that Röpke had furnished no proof of the existence of this unity. It must, of course, be admitted that contradictions occur in any society; but the one thing that, of itself, remains uniform and incontestible is the outlook which each and every one of us holds regarding our fellow men and which governs the ethical and political attitude we adopt.

Röpke's 'third way' is in reality a return to the one and only right way. Liberal principles on economics, which came into being as an act of protest against the privileges, shackles and regimentation of the Guild system and the mercantile theory, cannot tolerate the new forms of privileges and monopolies which have been built up in the capitalist economic system, and the fact that these manifestations are not the natural, inevitable outcome of the system itself, but have for the most part been artificially created by policy and legislation, only enhances the repugnance with which liberalism regards them. By demanding 'appropriate intervention' by the State with the object of restoring a free market economy more in harmony with the ideals of free competition, Röpke has reverted to these principles.

Now this intervention consists, as Einaudi pointed out during the discussion, of two main types – intervention for the removal of those obstacles which the State itself has created, and intervention to curtail those forces which may be termed natural forces and which adversely affect the full efficacy of free competition. In other words, it is a question of really putting men in a position to obtain goods by their own efforts, provided that they have the will and the requisite means to do so.

In my own country it is the urgency for this second type of 'appro-

¹ Wilhelm Röpke: *Civitas Humana*. Third Edition. Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlench-Zürich and Stuttgart.

priate intervention' that at once leaps to the eye. I fully realise that its implementation is a tricky business, that it will not be easy, that is, to pay due regard to the boundaries of what constitutes appropriate intervention, since it is not possible to lay down any precise definitions. It is in this connection that Croce's rejection of abstract rules acquires validity: the principle of freedom is not a rule, but a principle which is required to grapple with concrete cases and solve them. The difficulty of the task should nevertheless render it attractive to the liberal school of thought, for it is new tasks alone that are able to endue it with dynamic vitality.

Incidentally, it seems to me that it is the principle of freedom itself which demands this positive, appropriate intervention. Moral obligation, surely, places upon us the obligation not only of safeguarding, but also of actively promoting, freedom. A liberal State is not content with safeguarding the freedom of the Press, but joins with it in combating illiteracy, and, by insisting on compulsory education, is, indeed, also defending the freedom of the young. It is not possible in life to defend a value without at the same time developing it. The defence of free market economy includes the creation of favourable conditions wherever obstacles arising from inadequate education or physical disability are to be found. Therein lies the significance of certain 'social' demands in our present age, which I prefer unhesitatingly to regard as liberal demands, even though the Communists are also vociferous in putting them forward. But therein, too, very probably lay the meaning of Croce's thesis, and it certainly was the spirit of the *risorgimento*, the active, emancipating liberalism of Cavour; and in this spirit, or so it seems to me, it should be possible to bring the conceptions of these two great teachers, Benedetto Croce and Luigi Einaudi, into harmony.

HANS BARTH

Zürich University

THE RELIGION OF TOTALITARIANISM

It is, perhaps, natural that we should start off by posing a direct, pertinent and urgent question: Do we know exactly what we mean when we use the words totalitarian and total? What, in effect, is totalitarianism?

I can readily foresee that these questions will certainly give rise not only to surprise and derision, but even to bitterness and scorn. You ask what totalitarianism means, I can hear someone indignantly exclaiming, in this era of totalitarian States, in which concentration and extermination camps came into being and still flourish; in which whole nations or sections of a population have been uprooted by force and settled elsewhere against their will; in which millions have suffered the fate of becoming refugees with neither hearth nor home; in which individual and collective liquidation have become the hall-mark of a truly frightful state of outlawry and insecurity; in which frontiers have been demarcated with no regard whatever for history or culture; in which an imperialistically-minded hegemony hides beneath the cloak of a confederation for international peace and justice; where the very meaning of words has been plunged into an unsurpassable confusion, in which oppression means freedom, war means peace; in which, as a little-known but far-sighted French political philosopher of the XIX century, Maurice Joly, expressed it, the names are retained, but the things themselves have ceased to exist; in which the fostering among men of belief in the integrity of those who have neither the desire nor the intention to be honest is the ultimate refinement of deceit, so that, as the same Joly says, in his 'Dialogue aux Enfers entre Machiavel et Montesquieu', when the Government says it is a government devoted to peace, it means that a war is imminent, and when it says it will confine itself to use of the weapons of the mind, it means that it is about to resort to force

and compulsion. Is not the omnipotence of the State sufficiently obvious to render superfluous any question regarding the meaning of totalitarianism? Surely, it is sufficient to say that a system of government can be labelled totalitarian when, in addition to the State monopolies of foreign policy and the use of force for the maintenance of law and order, there also exist a State monopoly of intellectual, scientific, religious and ethical education and a State monopoly of control over the national economy – or, as the Russian Professor of constitutional law, Timashchev, at present working in America, has put it: ‘A society is totalitarian if the number of the auxiliary functions of the State is so high, that almost all human activities are regulated by it’.¹

This abstract definition seems, however, to be little more than provisional. The history of the philosophy of the State and society is at great pains to trace the origin of the idea of the totalitarian State via Hegel and Fichte, Marx and Saint-Simon, back to Rousseau, to turn its gaze next from him and his ‘Contrat Social’ to Hobbes and the Leviathan, and finally to point to Plato’s ‘Politeia’ and the Spartan urban State as the prototype and model of totalitarian ideology and practice; and the realisation that this is so necessitates at least a careful scrutiny of the question, from which will emerge the admission that so great a wealth of meaning has been attributed to the word totalitarian, that it stretches terminological elasticity to its very utmost limits. In reality, it does not stand the test of dissection, which, surely, is that an expression should define a corporate entity and should define it in its entirety. If, then, we feel compelled to admit the ambiguity of the word totalitarian, we cannot evade the obligation to seek some concrete clarification of it. Nor, moreover, must the fact be overlooked that it is quite reasonable to describe the States which fought in the first world war as totalitarian States. But in that case we must also concede that we describe them as such because, in a state of maximum emergency – war – they were compelled to enlist and make use of the whole strength of the nation for the attainment of a single objective. When the State suspended the constitutionally guaranteed rights of

¹ Totalitarianism, edited with an introduction by Carl J. Friedrich, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 1954.

the citizen and intervened not only in the economic, but also, by means of censorship and control of information, in the private lives of its people, it did so because it was faced with a genuine national emergency, which demanded the systematic concentration and co-ordination of all the material and intellectual resources of the people as a whole. The form of government that emerged was a dictatorship, whose object was to enable the community to survive a period of national emergency; and to do so, it was compelled temporarily to suspend all normal civic rights and, in particular, those rules which govern the expression of the will of the people.

The aim of the dictatorship was the salvation of the State; its object was to render itself unnecessary; once the threat had been parried, the suspended rights again came into force. An outstanding example of dictatorship is the militarisation of life which, thanks to its strictly hierarchical organisation, appears able to ensure complete and absolute unity of political will and intentions. Nor must the fact be overlooked that the era immediately following the war was fascinated by just this characteristic trait of a totalitarian State in war – by the idea, that is, of the radical militarisation of labour, or, as Trotsky once expressed it, by the idea of the subordination of the worker and the conditions of labour to the strict discipline of an army. We are anxious to understand the present. But to do so, we must also appreciate the past. We are faced, therefore, with the difficulty which confronts every attempt at historical appreciation – we move in a logical circle, because the whole is understandable only in terms of its components parts, while the latter become clear only within the framework of the former. The historian, Johann Gustav Droysen, described this circle with admirable clarity in his *‘Enzyklopädie und Methodologie der Geschichte’*. ‘There is no doubt’, he wrote, ‘that we only begin to understand that that is, when we realise clearly how it has come about. But we shall only find out how it came to be, if we examine it as meticulously as possible and see it as it really is. To regard the present as something that was created in the past and to be clear in our own minds how it came into being is only another way of expressing our comprehension of the present.’ Adhering to Droysen’s dictum, we must, then, ask ourselves wherein lie the pre-requisites to totalitarianism and how exactly are they

created? To formulate a definition of totalitarianism that is readily understandable, reasonably accurate, and as convincing as it is possible to make it, we must be clear in our own minds firstly with regard to the place and the circumstances in which the expression first comes to light as an intelligible concept, and secondly with regard to the functions it is called upon to exercise.

With this object in view, we must turn our attention to the thing which we call a social entity – that is, a State, a nation or a people. First and foremost, we must accept the premise that every social entity that comes into being does so as the result of uniformity of outlook among the members of which it is composed – unanimity of religious and moral convictions, unanimity of outlook upon human rights and the generally accepted customs, and unanimity, either definitely expressed or tacitly accepted, with regard to the rules which govern the formation of the communal will. A social community is a dynamic entity, which, like every other sentient and living thing, is always in a state of contention with itself and with the world around it, which is incessantly being called upon to act and to take decisions in the course of adapting itself to changing conditions, and which is constantly facing new situations to which its own creative genius has given birth. Since every social community is in constant contact with other communities of a like structure, those who are responsible for its prosperity and happiness must strive above all to mobilise all the moral and material forces of the community in order to be able to throw them into the scales in pursuit of the desired objective. All this is so obvious that it is hardly worth mentioning. It must not be overlooked, however, that hidden in what seems simple and obvious are specific and profound problems, which always come to light whenever a state of conflict arises. But a state of conflict arises whenever the unity of the community is in jeopardy; and that occurs when, for example, discord breaks out with regard to those ethical factors upon which the unity of the community is founded – when, that is, these factors are no longer being accepted unquestioningly as binding by all members of the community. It further occurs when differences arise with regard to the concrete application and significance of these factors. When a social community is exposed to exceptionally burdensome

hardship or finds itself faced with a wholly unexpected situation and is called upon to make the best of it, the very greatest demands are made on just those forces which are the guarantors of its unity. That is obvious. In times of crisis – and crises occur often enough in the history of every nation – it is essential, for the preservation of the community, that it should be able to fall back upon a unity from which all hesitations have been eradicated, which for better or for worse is inviolable and binding upon all, and which provides adequate justification for the employment of every available means for the preservation of the community. This inner, fundamental unity is, and must be, a matter of vital concern to all. At once the question arises – how can this unity be ensured and strengthened? Then there is the other, and no less important, question of the manner in which this unity, once the necessity for it has become apparent, can be achieved. What means thereto can be accepted as admissible? In other words, there arises the question of sanctions, in the widest sense of the term, namely, the whole range of moral, economic, political and civic repressive measures, the application or threat of which would, it could be assumed, ensure that members of the community would think and act in a specific manner. There then arises the question as to what constitutes the most comprehensive, the most unifying factor that is capable of binding men together and can therefore be regarded – since it can be assumed to be binding upon all – as the moral justification for the sanctions and repressive measures envisaged.

May I at this point be permitted to indulge in precise terminological definition and turn to the subject of integration factors? According to Rudolf Smends, integration factors are those factors which, it is assumed and believed, constitute, and must constitute, the uniform and common foundations of a social community. The idea of integration is based upon recognition that a social community owes its existence to, and has its being in, the fact that it is built up of and around the individual, that it is, as Ernest Renan says in his famous thesis, ‘Qu’est ce qu’une nation?’, a national poll expressing the will of the people, which repeats itself every day. This constant and concerted procedure constitutes the essence of a social community as an intellectual and spiritual reality. Integration factors are those things which

beget unity and render possible the emergence of a uniform and binding communal will. Integration factors are those things that give to a social community, which in reality takes its shape from the aggregate activities of its individual members, its inner solidarity and, with it, its power and infallibility. Normal social life acts primarily as an integrating force. The man who desires friendship must be prepared to fulfil all those expectations upon which the essence of true friendship depends. An integrating force is something that springs from the corporate experience of a people, their origins, their traditions and their language. Integration leads to the avowed acceptance of the rules of the game, to which all concerned adhere whenever it is a question of determining the will of the community. The acceptance of a social system of this kind, within the framework of which the will of the community takes shape, always precedes the moulding of the communal will itself. Religious cults and articles of faith, as laid down in the form of dogmas, possess an integrating force.

It would be fitting at this juncture to cast a glance at history. There can be but little doubt that history may be regarded as a struggle with regard to the integrating factors themselves, as a fight over what is to be accepted as an integration factor in a community, a State or a people, and sometimes, indeed, as a struggle over the predominant importance of one or the other of these factors. Integration factors all lay claim, justifiably or otherwise, to being of paramount importance. They strive to acquire priority and absolute, predominant authority, or at least to retain the right to establish their own order of precedence in any community. They possess all the characteristics of totalitarianism. At the same time it is obviously of very great importance to note that everything which lays claim to be regarded as an integrating factor shows a tendency to rely upon its own inherent and readily visible characteristics. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that anything which hopes to be accepted as an integration factor must, for preference, possess external characteristics which are readily recognisable. This is a corollary of the fact that integration factors are inclined to crystallise into institutions. Opinions and convictions, on the other hand, are not subject to such a process. It is easy to come to terms with

established and accepted practices and institutions, but not with opinions and inner convictions, although a definite attitude may well be the consequence of a conscious mind, conditioned by certain standards.

We may now be permitted to take a further step forward in our efforts to define the boundaries of totalitarianism. To do so, we must inevitably make reference to the caesura in the modern history of the western world which, I believe, contributed greatly to the emergence of certain definite and specific facets in the character of integration factors. I refer to the French revolution and those streams of philosophical thought of the XVIII century which intellectually paved the way for it. What I am trying to say is this: The XVIII century introduced new integration factors and – what is most important of all – it endowed them with a character which radically changed the whole structure of the problems of the social and civic order. That we are at times inclined to overlook the full significance of this metamorphosis is partly due to the fact that the political and intellectual changes brought about by the revolution and the philosophy of the XVIII century have become so much part and parcel of our own lives that we find it difficult to realise how important and unique they were. The opinion is also widely held that the political philosophy of the counter-revolution and the restoration was, after all, merely an expression of outlook by those social classes which, in the face of the irresistible and victorious advance of revolutionary ideas, had nothing to offer beyond a lament over the loss of their own power and influence, and whose opinion therefore could carry no weight. But setting aside altogether the fact that hatred, as well as blinding men, also makes them vividly aware of the weaknesses of their enemies, any unprejudiced examination of the writings of the critics of the revolution will convince one that they display an exceptional wealth of political insight and vision, a disregard of which will react only to the detriment of those who arrogantly feel justified in ignoring them. The best illustration of what I mean is afforded by a study of those contemporary writers who sought to discover the origin and essence of the revolution in order to be in a position to combat it. Many of the shrewdest observers of the revolution came prematurely to the conclusion that here

was a political and intellectual occurrence different in essence to any other metamorphosis that history had to offer. One must beware, wrote Antoine de Rivarol, for instance, of comparing this revolution with any other revolution in the annals of either ancient or modern history.

Wherein, then, we may well ask, lies the unique character of the 1789 revolution? The upheaval in France had at least this in common with the accepted meaning of a political revolution, that it entailed what Jean Mallet du Pan called '*le déplacement du pouvoir*'. When power in a State changes hands, that is revolution, which results in a change in the form of government; and it always occurs, inevitably, 'when the existing authority no longer possesses the power to protect the community against attack or lacks the courage to defend itself'. It occurs when the constitutional structure, which is the competent authority for the distribution of power, is no longer suited to the social and economic conditions of the time. A revolution in that case means the adaptation of the constitution to the true distribution of power in the community.

The French revolution differs from a political revolution, a straightforward alteration of the constitution, in two ways. In the first place, it was not the same as all the other revolutions that preceded it – an event, that is, which occurred in one particular country and was confined to one single people – but was of its nature an occurrence that might well lay claim to universal application. It was, as contemporaries were wont to say of it, cosmopolitical. If it lays claim to universality of application, it must then follow that it believed itself to be based upon principles of universal application, principles that were supra-national or – and this means the same thing – applicable to mankind as a whole. Secondly, it possesses an unmistakable likeness to the religious reformations which have taken place in the western world. To the contemporaries of the revolution, its revolutionary ideas, which were to determine the realities of life, and the revolution itself, appeared to be a new religion. And we find that a number of observers and critics, of widely divergent outlook and quite independently of one another, found themselves constrained, in giving their views on the essence of the revolution, to employ terms that belonged solely and exclusively to the domain of religion

and the Church. It is worth noting that Catholics and Protestants alike arrived at the same conclusion. When a member of the nobility declared that the aim of the revolutionaries was nothing less than 'la reconstruction du tout par la révolte contre tout', and that they had torn down the pillars of the world, it might easily appear to be the exaggerations of a judgement prejudiced by the outlook of his social position. But a closer examination of what is meant by 'the pillars of the world' leads readily enough to a realisation that even thinkers who were convinced of the need for a radical change in the political structure of France were not thinking merely in terms of the constitution and the monarchy, the privileges of the nobility and the Catholic Church. For these contemporaries, the revolution was a new cult and a new religion, but a cult and a religion in which the object of veneration had been transformed into something quite different to that which it had formerly been. As early as 1791, in his 'Thoughts on French Affairs', Edmund Burke wrote that the French revolution was not concerned merely with the removal of local anomalies or the adaptation of the political system to changed conditions. The present revolution, he maintained, seemed to be different in character and bore little resemblance to any revolution in Europe which had preceded it and which had taken place for purely political reasons. Rather, it was a revolution of doctrine and theoretic dogma. It bore greater resemblance, he said, to one of those changes that had come about as the result of religious convictions. Mallet du Pan comes to the same conclusion. To its adherents, the revolutionary doctrine, he wrote, was a genuine religion, and he compares them to a sect which makes common cause with all the adherents of modern philosophy throughout Europe. When he turns to describing the methods used by the revolutionaries to exert ideological influence, he, too, finds himself constrained to use expressions borrowed from the domain of religious and ecclesiastical life. The revolution seeks disciples, he says, it propagates its gospel, it disseminates a catechism, it indulges in missionary activities. The revolutionary system, says Mallet du Pan, is applicable to all nations. As a foundation it has maxims, to which adherence is possible in any atmosphere. We have seen, he continues, how the emissaries of the revolution catechise neutrals and combatants alike. 'Le

fanatisme d'irréligion, d'égalité, de propagandisme est aussi exalté et mille fois plus atroce que ne le fût jamais le fanatisme religieux.' Burke and Mallet du Pan compare the revolutionary ideology to Islam, and to them the wars of the revolution appear to be holy wars. The revolution, says Mallet du Pan, unfolds and propagates in the same way as Islam – with weapons and with ideas. In one hand it grasps a sword, in the other the rights of man. One of the main reasons why those in power in Paris decided to make war on the States of Europe was the hope of thus accelerating the progress of the revolutionary religion by conquest and by corruption of the people and the armed forces. The Jacobite convention, he says, has set up, at home and abroad, missionary stations for the propagation of its gospel, as before them the Jesuits did in America and China. And the attitude of the revolutionaries themselves towards their own doctrines cannot be more aptly described than through the medium of the language of religion. As early as 1789 Mallet du Pan declared: At a time when all malpractices are under attack, we must single out one abuse which, above all others, constitutes a threat to freedom and personal security. For some time, he continues, a certain class of writers have been regarding all their opinions as dogma, their conclusions as verdicts and their declarations as legal judgements. If anyone expresses different ideas, ventures to cast a doubt or suggests a modification, the savage voice of despotism is at once raised, maligning everything that dares to rise in opposition to it. The slightest demur is regarded as a crime against the natural laws. Those who escape censure or the sword fall victims to the murderous machinations of intolerance. With sword and hangman's noose in its hand, public opinion to-day dictates its proclamations. So much for Mallet du Pan.

In order to understand how it came about that the political theory and practice of the revolution was able to assume the guise of a religious faith,¹ it must be remembered that the philosophy of the XVIII century shrank from no effort in its endeavour to enthrone

¹ In this and subsequent paragraphs, the author is drawing from the ideas expressed in his thesis, 'Antoine de Rivarol und die französische Revolution', which appeared in Vol. 12 of 'Schweizer Beiträge zur Allgemeinen Geschichte', edited by Werner Näf, 1954.

reason as an absolute power. But once reason was acknowledged as an absolute theoretical idea, the assumption inevitably followed that there existed an absolute practical idea of reason which would tolerate no contradiction. That man's attitude is determined far less by things and events than by his assessment of them is a typical idea of enlightenment. From this it follows logically that enlightenment consisted of knowledge of things and their inter-relationship, and that by the use of this ability – by the exercise of reason, that is – it should be possible to break the yoke of purely political opinions and religious prejudices. To allow one's outlook to be determined by things and events is analagous to accepting the principles of things and the laws of nature as the criteria upon which judgement must be based. Since reason is the instrument of assessment, it should be possible to speak of an attitude based upon the process of reasoning. This, roughly, represents the line adopted by Helvetius in his work, *'De l'Homme, de ses Facultés Intellectuelles et de son Education'*, published after the author's death, in which he attributed to education unlimited powers for the improvement of the human lot. *'L'éducation peut tout.'*

Elle *'peut tout'* for two reasons – firstly, because, as Rousseau teaches, man per se is good and is spoiled solely by civilisation and the conditions of social existence. An alteration of these conditions in accordance with true principles could not fail to guarantee human happiness; and secondly, because the human power of reason is capable of recognising the validity of these principles. The same view, expanded later into a school of historical philosophy, is expressed by Condorcet, who sees a direct connection between the progress of the human race and the progress made in the rational, scientific comprehension of Nature and humanity. Only after a long struggle did this school of thought establish man's right, so long denied to him, *'de soumettre toutes les opinions à notre raison, c'est à dire, d'employer, pour saisir la vérité, le seul instrument qui nous ait été donné pour la reconnaître.'* This, it was claimed, would result in the emergence of a particular class of men, who would be less concerned with recognising truth than with propagating it and eradicating prejudice; and there would come into being an intellectual order, the self-appointed task of which would be the

destruction of political and religious prejudice. The spread of enlightenment and reason would mean that the whole people would eventually be merged into this intellectual order. La doctrine nouvelle, which strikes the last, decisive blow at the edifice of religious and political prejudice, in which only the interests of one single class or two sections of the population, the nobility and the clergy, but never those of the people as a whole, were concentrated, is 'la doctrine de la perfectibilité indéfinie de l'espèce humaine'; and it, in its turn, is indissolubly linked with 'le triomphe de la raison' – that is, the gradual evolution of reason, which is the true basis of perfectibility.

This philosophy relied upon 'la base inébranlable que les sciences lui avait préparée', and, according to Condorcet, it could be foreseen that a great political revolution must 'without fail' take place: 'Il fallait, ou que le peuple établît lui-même ces principes de raison et de la nature, que la philosophie avait su lui rendre chers, ou que les gouvernements se hâtassent de le prévenir et réglassent leur marche sur celle de ses opinions.' Condorcet personifies the ultimate conclusions of that process of reasoning which regards science as the absolute and certain guarantor of human happiness. 'Le seul fondement de croyance dans les sciences naturelles est cette idée que les lois générales, qui règlent les phénomènes de l'univers, sont nécessaires et constantes.' The immutability and universality of these laws, from the working of which it must be assumed that man and the development of his intellectual capacities are not exempt, permit us to predict events 'avec une assurance presque entière'. Since both Nature and man are governed by these laws, the idea that it might be possible 'de tracer avec quelque vraisemblance le tableau des destinées futures de l'espèce humaine' must not be lightly dismissed as 'une entreprise chimérique'. Nor does Condorcet hesitate to describe this future condition of the human species – the universal political order, as he calls it – as the inevitable result of a pre-ordained process: the destruction of inequality among nations, the expansion of equality within every nation, and a genuine perfecting of the human race. An analysis of the part played by the intellect in the history and development of human capability justifies the belief that 'la nature n'a mis aucun terme à nos espérances'. Since

there is no doubt that 'toutes les erreurs en politique, en morale, ont pour base des erreurs philosophiques, qui elles-mêmes sont liées à des erreurs physiques', it must follow that a scientific comprehension of Nature and the application of her methods to every sphere of life is all that is required in order to be in a position to formulate the laws of a universal political order, which will embrace all the peoples on the earth and be equally applicable to all of them. There thus emerges a rational absolutism, which claims to be the sole arbiter and mouthpiece of truth. When, therefore, the theorists of the revolution enunciate their theses as though they were dogmas which deserve and demand unconditional acceptance, when they proclaim the conclusions they have reached as though they were the utterances of some infallible oracle and do not shrink from wholesale condemnations, the whole process becomes elevated to the plane of a faith, a religious belief in science, which causes them to see in the laws of Nature, which they have discovered, also the laws that govern the political life of mankind. It is to this promise of a human happiness based upon the rational assessment of the laws of Nature, and to the use of the same means as a guaranteed and infallible guide to the same end, that the counter-revolutionaries gave the name of 'la religion philosophique'. It was no religion in the accepted sense, but in its conduct it seemed to incorporate all the salient features of religion and the Church. It is not surprising that to its contemporaries this manifestation should appear to be something new, which would inevitably cause not only strange, but even dangerous, repercussions. It was a complete break with the whole of their spiritual heritage. It was 'la révolte contre tout' to which Rivarol referred. It was the 'open disorder' into which many parts of Europe had been plunged, the 'general earthquake in the political world', as Burke diagnosed it in his 'Reflections on the Revolution in France'. This philosophical religion held out the promise that the social and constitutional structure of humanity would be rebuilt on a new foundation that would prove to be infallible, because it had been based upon reason and the laws of nature – la reconstruction du tout par la révolte contre tout. The novelty of this unbridled faith in science, which regarded knowledge as absolute in the domain of constitutional, social and

human order (when, surely, of its very nature, it must be limited and capable of improvement), can be fully appreciated only by comparing Condorcet's attitude, based on the rationalism of Descartes, with the works of that philosopher of the early XVII century who, thanks to his universality, was most highly esteemed by the encyclopaedists of the XVIII century – Francis Bacon. In 'Novum Organon', Bacon asserted with truly prohibitive emphasis that society and the State must not be ordered in accordance with the principles of rational, natural science, which gains for men the domination over Nature which they desire. Between the civic entity and the arts and sciences, he said, there exists a great difference. Society is based on authority, agreement, prestige and opinion, but not on proofs. The arts and sciences, on the other hand, should be filled, like the crucibles of a foundry, with the clamour of new methods and the latest advances. 'Atque secundam rectam rationem res ita se habet.' (i. 90)

The most important point in considering Condorcet is not solely his glorification of reason and science, but equally that thing which historical philosophy associates with the spirit of the revolution and of the XVIII century. And that is the belief that certain conditions of a universal historical nature emerge in the province of religious worship, that the finite lays claim to an absolutism which it cannot attain, simply because it is – finite. In other words, there emerge religions at the centre of which stand the natural and the historically authentic. Thus the people, as the aggregate conglomeration of the revolutionary-minded citizens, also attain the dignity of divinity. Never, declared Robespierre, do the evils of society emanate from the people. For the people, as such, are good. In order to be good, the people have but to prefer themselves as they are to that which they are not. The people as a whole are the sole arbiters of *la volonté générale*, into which '*la voix de la raison et de l'intérêt publique*' crystallises. It is perfectly obvious that here there has come into being a totalitarian integration factor, and it was in this sense that Robespierre later declared that the republican government conceded the right to claim social protection only to republicans. '*La protection sociale n'est due qu'aux citoyens paisibles, il n'y a de citoyens dans la république que les républicains.*'

The totalitarianism which developed at the time of the French revolution is most closely and indissolubly linked with the replacement of transcendental religion by a religion of immanence. No philosophy of the XIX century offers a more fruitful field for the study of the effects of this event than does the System of Positivism, the creator of which was Auguste Comte, a man inspired by an inordinate sense of mission. Like his teacher, Henri de Saint-Simon, who exercised an indelible influence upon him, Comte seeks an ethical and political system applicable to mankind as a whole. Saint-Simon himself adopted and used the philosophical heritage which Condorcet left in his 'Esquisse d'un Tableau de Progrès de l'Esprit Humain.' This philosophy, which, according to Saint-Simon, was revolutionary in the XVIII century and had to become systematically creative in the XIX, formulates the fundamental principles of a universal order, which culminates in an omnipotent apex. Human unity can be brought about only by an inner integrating force. For Comte, this force is a new religion, the very essence, the Grand Etre of which is humanity itself, which he regards as a living, corporate entity, embracing the past, the present and the future. This new religion is no religion in the accepted sense, since it rejects the idea of a Deity. But it adopts all the institutions of the Catholicism of the Middle Ages. It is no mere coincidence that the deepest and most enduring impressions made upon Comte were those made by Joseph de Maistre's 'Du Pape', a standard work on the Catholic restoration in France and Europe as a whole.¹

In Comte's 'Système de Politique Positive', for instance, we read: To-day, positivism takes over the vast structure of the Middle Ages

¹ The astonishingly profound and comprehensive influence exercised by Joseph de Maistre on Comte is best exemplified by the latter's treatise, 'Considérations sur le Pouvoir Spirituel' (1826). This work is nothing more than a 'positivistic' paraphrase of the structure and inter-relationship of the 'pouvoir spirituel' and the 'pouvoir temporel', as enunciated by de Maistre in 'Du Pape' (1819). Comte accepts in toto and without reservation the categorical tenets of de Maistre's social philosophy, with its radical subordination of the 'pouvoir temporel' to the 'pouvoir spirituel', which culminates in an absolute, sovereign, omnipotent and final authority. The importance that Comte attached to this treatment of the subject is proven by the fact that he incorporated it as an appendix to Volume IV of his 'Système de Politique Positive ou Traité de Sociologie, instituant la Religion de l'Humanité'. (Paris 1854.)

and, in favourable circumstances, unites it with an acceptable doctrine, so that at last the final structure of a truly universal Church becomes possible. Although its sovereignty must for the moment be confined to the western peoples and their descendants, its tenets are powerful and perfect enough to make it appropriately applicable to all parts of the inhabited globe alike.

Comte's philosophical and political System of Positivism is Catholicism without its Christian content. It is a spiritual and political order which possesses all the characteristics of a theocracy – but a theocracy without God. At its apex, therefore, stands a High Priest, endowed with absolute spiritual authority. Only by submission to '*une autorité spirituelle*' of this kind, declared Comte, can the greatest evil of the present day – the moral and religious anarchy of the new era – be overcome and the happiness of humanity assured. In his masterly treatise on Comte and his Positivism, John Stuart Mill has justly maintained that the positivistic clergy, with its infallible and therefore, in its ultimate instance, papist apex, has created 'a well organised system for the complete suppression of all independent thinking.'

The '*sociocratie finale*' – the ultimate sovereignty, that is, of human society as a whole, which, in accordance with the laws of evolution, must inevitably emerge – starts with the premise, as Comte endeavours to prove in his '*Discours sur l'Esprit Positif*', that in reality there is no such thing as the individual, but only humanity as a whole. For every individual owes both his intellectual and spiritual development and his chance to take his proper place in the social and economic sphere solely to the community. Everyone must submit to the sum total of possessions, both of spiritual and physical life.

The submission, by the individual, of both the past and the future to the judgement of his own critical faculties was regarded as intellectual and political anarchy, to which *l'esprit positif* felt itself called upon to put an end. No individual, therefore, must ever be given the right to arrive at conclusions of his own regarding the more important political and ethical aspects of life, because, as Comte says in his '*Catéchisme Positif*', he possesses none of the qualifications which would render him competent to do so. '*Absolute individualism*', which

gives every man the right to exercise reasoned analysis and to arrive at an independent conclusion as his conscience dictates, would result, in Comte's eyes, in the complete disappearance of all intellectual authority. This fundamental evil which, according to Comte, is the negative creation of Protestantism, must be exterminated, if human happiness is to be safeguarded. It follows logically, therefore, that in the System of Positivism there must be a dictatorial authority in the spiritual and intellectual world which corresponds to the dictatorial authority in the field of economics. This system can therefore be called totalitarian, because under it man's economic activities and his spiritual and intellectual activities are all uniformly prescribed and controlled by a supreme politico-intellectual authority. Neither Hobbes nor Locke, neither Hume nor Montesquieu, neither the great XVIII-century protagonists of a social philosophy based on natural laws nor Kant ever adumbrated a design by which a nation, a State or humanity itself could be deified and transformed into an idea possessing total character. It was left to Rousseau to endow '*la volonté générale*' with a mythical significance, as a concept that was the personification of justice and truth. In the XVIII century the way was opened for man to claim, in finite, secular-historical matters, an absolute authority, which the Christian religion had hitherto attributed to God alone. It is obvious that, fundamentally, it is of little import which finite entities are elevated to the status of the absolute. The XIX and XX centuries in any case show with unmistakable clarity that a State or a class, or even a nation itself, can be, and has been, subjected to this process of deification.¹

There is one further, last and noteworthy connection in which important conclusions can be drawn from the study of the French revolution, that grandiose, sinister and kaleidoscopic event, which holds the key to the comprehension of all the most significant political, ethical and economic changes that occurred during the XIX and XX centuries. It was Edmund Burke who realised that the wars of the revolution were conducted in a new way, quite apart from the fact that France was the first country to abandon the mercenary, in favour of a national, army. It is a horrible fact,

¹ In this connection, cf. Louis Rougier: *Les Mystiques politiques contemporaines et leurs Incidences internationales*. Paris 1935.

writes Burke, which cannot be disguised, that in skill and in preciseness of outlook the Jacobites are our superiors. They saw things rightly from the very outset. Whatever may have been the original motives which persuaded the statesmen to resort to war, they – the Jacobites – realised that in spirit and in its objectives it was a civil war. And it was as such that they waged it. 'It was a war between the partisans of the ancient civil, moral and political order of Europe against a sect of fanatical and ambitious atheists which means to change them all. It is not France extending a foreign empire over other nations; it is a sect aiming at universal empire and beginning with the conquest of France.'

The wars of the revolution assume the guise of civil wars only if one is prepared to accept a number of ideological hypotheses. A war is a civil war if one party – or State or nation, as the case may be – makes a claim which, it maintains, is partly or wholly recognised by the other party (or State or nation). To regard the wars of the revolution as civil wars pre-supposes that the civic entity and its absolute authority – in other words, its sovereignty – is no longer recognised as the ultimate expression of ethical and political reality. They can, therefore, be regarded as civil wars only if one adheres to the belief that they were being fought within the confines of a corporate entity and in a cause which evoked approval, explicit or tacit, both within and beyond the frontiers of the country concerned. This, however, implies an assumption that there existed already ethical and political forces which might well be considered to be integrating forces, working in favour of the establishment of a supra-national and international system. It is only when the eye is fixed upon the vision of a supra-national and international human community that wars between States assume the guise of civil wars. This at once pre-supposes that the individual must not be regarded as a citizen of any particular country, but that true citizenship is membership of an entity more comprehensive and higher than that constituted by any individual State or nation. But a corporate, unified entity of this nature is exactly what the revolutionary doctrine envisaged. It did not envisage simply the freedom and equality of the French people, but had its very being in the conviction that its claims were wholly international and cosmopolitical.

In France, as everywhere else, the privileged and the unprivileged stood facing each other in opposition. The revolutionary doctrine made deliberate use of those social anomalies which ignore national frontiers and are common to all nations alike. It is easy to see how, behind what must obviously have been an integral part of the revolutionary doctrine, there might also have been the elements of an ideological justification of an unequivocal desire for national power. That, however, does not mean that the doctrine had no need of that measure of fortuitous approval and recognition which manifested itself outside France. In this respect, therefore, Burke was justified in saying that the armed doctrine with which England found herself at war, 'has, by its essence, a faction of opinion, and of interest, and of enthusiasm in every country'.

The revolutionary doctrine refused to accept a vertical partition into sovereign States, but substituted instead a horizontal partition that ran diagonally through all the countries of Europe. Under these conditions, the war assumes the aspect of a struggle to ensure that unification upon which the revolutionary doctrine insisted and which was scorned only by the evil-minded and selfish rulers and the no less wicked exploiters of the existing order. The revolution, on the other hand, appealed to the people themselves. It relied on the tension that existed between the rulers and the ruled, and it did everything it could to increase that tension. Thus the wars of the revolution take on the guise of a war of liberation, with the interests and happiness of all the people at stake. For the avowed object for which they were being fought held out the prospect of the establishment of a political order of freedom and equality, which alone could ensure the true voicing of the popular will in all countries. That the wars of the revolution had a national objective, namely, the Rhine frontier, and that the Emperor Napoleon was striving to establish a Europe under French hegemony does not in the least alter the fact that these wars were labelled wars of liberation and in many places were accepted as such. In the same way, the theory of world revolution to-day is a tool in the service of Russia's imperialistic aims, exactly as the policy of encirclement before and during the second world war served as the pretext for Germany's bid for world domination.

The fact cannot be ignored that the idea of civil war, expanded to the proportions which it reached during the French revolution, had a profound effect upon the XIX century. It is true that the wars waged in Europe at that time were fought under the banner of the principles of national integration. In 1914, too, national slogans still won the day when opposed by cosmopolitan solutions. That the principle of national sovereignty took precedence over the supra-national had, in principle, been confirmed long before. Ferdinand Lassalle, the founder of the German Workers' Union, favoured a national socialism, at the heart of which a mighty, centralised government planned and directed the national economy – a government which would also consider the direction and promotion of national culture to be an integral part of its task. In 1891 Friedrich Engels wrote to Auguste Bebel: If Germany is attacked from the east and from the west, any and every means of defence is good. The survival of the nation and – for us – the maintenance of the position for which we have fought and its chances of survival will be at stake. But these concessions to the idea of national sovereignty and to nationalism as an integrating factor must not be allowed to disguise the fact that the Marxist doctrine of class warfare is precisely the same as the revolutionary theory of civil war and retains exactly the same ambiguity of meaning as the concept evolved at the time of the French revolution. To Marx, class warfare was simply a process that operated, and must operate, within the confines of a sovereign State. Side by side with his concept of class warfare he considers the possibility of regarding wars between States and nations as civil wars and of waging them as such, because the foundation of his ideology is the opinion and hope that 'proletariat' is more universal in appeal and mightier as an integrating factor than 'national sovereignty'. This ambiguity comes clearly to light in Engels. In the letter from which I have already quoted, he writes that the government must be supported in any war with a foreign Power 'provided that it wages the war ruthlessly and with every available means, including the weapons of revolution'. Now, to wage war with the weapons of revolution means to wage it as a civil war, which in its turn means that every effort must be made to ensure that the enemy is given no opportunity of establishing a closed

defensive front, and will therefore be compelled to expect to have to face treachery, sabotage and insurrection within his own territories. No one will deny that the second world war had all the characteristics of a civil war, since the unscrupulous employment by the totalitarian systems, bolshevism, fascism and national socialism, of any and every means to establish bases beyond their own frontiers and thus to ensure for themselves support inside enemy territory was a salient feature of their theoretic ideology and their methods of putting it into practice. Nor, I think, would anyone deny that this era of the cold war is an era of cold civil war, since the theory of world revolution pins its hopes on world-wide support and is anything but fastidious in its efforts to corrupt and weaken the ethical and political order of States from within.

It should not be difficult to summarise the results of our deliberations in a few sentences. Against the background of a widespread and profound deterioration in the power of the Christian religion and its Church to carry conviction, there has arisen – since the human need to worship still remains imperative, even when traditional beliefs and forms no longer command support – a possibility that the finite in Nature and history might be elevated to the status and dignity of the absolute and assume the authority which religion has hitherto attributed to God alone.

Hand in hand with the endowment of the finite with the authority of the absolute there came about the transformation of the Christian conception of salvation into a natural process, governed by the laws of nature or history. This metamorphosis was achieved at the cost of what may perhaps be called the functionalisation of man, by which I mean that man becomes regarded solely as a member of a superior institution or a cog in the machinery of an automatic process. But to treat man merely as a means to an end and not – in Kant's noteworthy phrase – as an end in himself, entails the renunciation of one of the most cherished tenets of western ethics – recognition of the infinite value of every human soul. At the same time, the functionalisation of man, within any economic class or State, inevitably entails the sacrifice of a fundamental principle which the American Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, rightly describes as being of the very essence of the Christian faith. It is the right to regard

all wordly authority with mistrust. Where this right does not exist, where no free and critical argument with secular authority is tolerated – where, that is, secular authority claims to be absolute and totalitarian, and man becomes merely the recipient of its orders – there can be no *Menschsein*, no real human existence that is worthy of the name. The ultimate justification for the existence of humanity is sacrificed if man is reduced to a function, either of a State or a class. That the prerogatives of man – the possession, that is, of individual freedom and the right of self-determination – can also be horribly abused is a fact of which our generation does not need to be reminded.

In the clash of ideas between the free world and totalitarianism it is the very fundamentals of life itself that are at stake, fundamentals for which, in the words of the Roman poet, we must be prepared to die rather than sacrifice them. The fronts are drawn up in battle array. And, as in every battle, fight we must – each and every one of us.

HANS KOHN
City College of New York

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE FREE WORLD?

At the end of the first world war, Oswald Spengler's 'Untergang des Abendlandes' attracted very considerable interest. By this he meant the collapse of the free world, as personified by the civic order of individual freedom in the modern western world. In opposition to it, he prophesied the inevitable and fateful rise of a community based upon military discipline, in which a strict, authoritarian leadership would direct the whole political, economic and spiritual life of the nation and everything would be subordinated to the aim of expansion and, ultimately, of world dominion. The rise of this new order, which, in essence, is, as Spengler rightly says, 'completely amorphous' and 'devoid of all prejudice and inhibition', would, he maintained, break 'the dictatorship of wealth and its political weapon, democracy'. The individual freedoms would be brushed aside as superfluous or pernicious. Man, it would be asserted, attains his true freedom by subordinating himself willingly and completely to a leadership, which knows what it wants, possesses the power to achieve it and promises to lead the masses to a glittering future.

Spengler's book does not, I think, owe its great popular success primarily to the imaginative boldness of his historical treatment or to his often brilliant characterisation and descriptions of the times and its movements, but rather to the fact that the book, and particularly its title, put into words a feeling that was already widespread on a subject that had often been treated before – namely, that we were living in an era of decline, that western civilisation has lost its soul in its quest for economic wealth and had degenerated into bourgeois mediocrity, and that, as at the time of the decline and fall of Rome, only a strong, new faith and young, virile and unimpaired civic forces could save the old and jaded world. From

their distorted vision of the hideous world of bourgeois democracy romantics and slavophiles, 'heroic' or 'artistic' men of noble stature and socialist well-wishers of humanity sought refuge in a legendary, enlightened past or a utopian future. Round about 1914 nowhere was this feeling stronger than in Germany and Russia. In both countries, leading thinkers were equally convinced that their people rejected the 'political democracy of the west', and that the most appropriate form of government for their country, and the one desired by the people themselves, was a national autocracy. In 1917 Thomas Mann wrote that the German and Russian nations were closer to one another than were the Russian and the western nations or the Germans and the Latin races. At a time when Germany and Russia were still locked in deadly conflict, he even professed to see in the similarity of German and Russian ways of thought the most hopeful prospect of a combined front against the west. 'What a close similarity there is between the outlooks of our two peoples – on 'Europe', on 'the west', on 'civilisation', on 'politics' and on 'democracy'. Have not we, too, our slavophiles and our *zapadniki*? If the spiritual and the intellectual should and could ever be made to serve as the basis for a political alliance between two great Powers, then Germany and Russia, surely, belong side by side. A rapprochement between them and an alliance in the future – that has been my heart's dream and desire ever since the beginning of this war. Nor is it merely a wishful dream; a reconciliation and an alliance between them is a cosmopolitical necessity, if, as seems probable, the coalition of the Anglo-Saxon world should prove to be a permanent institution.'

Two decades after Mann had written these words the downfall of the free world seemed certain. In Russia, in Italy and in Germany mighty and armed governments held the helm of the ship of State, making no secret of their contempt for, and their rejection of, western liberalism, and triumphantly proclaiming themselves as its successors. In 1937 the Russian regime had carried out a blood-bath among its own supporters of a magnitude unsurpassed even by oriental despots; and, far from being shaken thereby to its foundations, it emerged with a new strength that seemed to western eyes to be both unbelievable and sinister. When André Gide visited Russia

he was appalled by the Stalinist cult. Industrialisation and the campaign against illiteracy, both in full swing at the time, had led to no diminution in anti-western feeling, but had given added strength to a deep and mystic slavophile nationalism. Never since the days of Ivan III and IV had Moscow been so very much the third Rome. But the other Rome, too, was turning an insolently arrogant eye towards the west. On the eighth anniversary of the march on Rome, Mussolini addressed his fellow-countrymen in his usual theatrical manner. 'In 1950', he cried, 'Italy will be the only young country in Europe, and the rest of Europe will be senile and wrinkled. From every quarter men will come pouring in to gaze upon the miracle of the burgeoning springtime of the Italian people.' Two years later, he assured the Italians of the greatness of their own third Rome. 'To-day I tell you with a clear conscience', he said, 'that the XX century will be the century of Italian might, in which for the third time Italy will assume the leadership of mankind.' When, in 1936, the Italians succeeded in conquering, albeit with obvious difficulty, the primitive and unarmed Ethiopia, they were convinced that that they had struck a fatal blow at the League of Nations and the British Empire, the two hated and ridiculed champions of liberal thought and custom.

In the meanwhile, the Third Reich had entered the lists and laid claim to the leadership in the fight against the west. In the 1914 war Thomas Mann had seen 'a fresh outbreak, perhaps the most splendid of all and, as many believe, the last, in Germany's age-old struggle against the spirit of the west'. On that point, he wrote in 1917, there has been complete unanimity from the very beginning of the war. Be that as it may, Germany's war in 1914 against the west was neither 'the most splendid' nor 'the last'. Twenty years later came an even more splendid, and this time perhaps truly the last and final, struggle. Thomas Mann was no longer there to welcome it, but many thousands of the leading minds in Germany hailed it and saw in it the fulfilment of the German spirit in its fight against the democracy of the west and its bogus and pernicious freedom. Julius Petersen, who, under the Weimar Republic, had held the chair of German literature at the most famous of the German universities and who had made a profound study of Lessing, Schiller and Goethe, wrote in 1934:

'Now the morrow has become to-day; the feeling of despair has been transformed into exaltation; the ultimate goal draws nigh and now stands in the field of vision of the present. . . In the bowels of the nation's being all the forces of erstwhile yearnings are astir with fresh life, and the dreams in which the past lies cradled come forth anew into the light of day. . . The new Reich has blossomed, the promised leader, for whom we have longed, is here.'

Spengler died in 1936, full of fearful apprehensions regarding the outcome of a doctrine which he had helped to lead to temporary success – an apprehension similar to that which must have gripped the aged Bismarck, whose creation collapsed twenty years after his death. But to his contemporaries, Bismarck's Reich, founded upon the might of Prussia's sword and the strength of German economy, seemed to be invincibly powerful. Spengler, too, went lonely to his grave in Germany. His contemporaries believed that the era of the Caesars, which he had prophesied, had come. Was not the greatest of them all giving an edge to the German sword that was keener than ever before? Was not the German economy growing under the spirit of a new socialism to an ever greater strength – and that just at a time when crisis had caused the collapse of American capitalism and proved that a free economy system was just as dead as was any spontaneous determination to defend themselves in the League of Nations and the western democracies?

The absolute confidence in victory shown by the new movements which, after 1917, spread over all the countries of central and eastern Europe was not based solely on the fact that the apparently inflexible laws of both history and nature, and their own perfect comprehension of these laws, made victory certain; it was further strengthened by the spirit of supine resignation that permeated the free western world, which seemed only too ready to believe that it was senile and played-out and that the future belonged to the Caesars. After the first world war the free west was gripped by a feeling of crisis. Did it still possess sufficient strength of its own with which to assert itself and confront the powerful dynamism of the new movements and young nations? Was this not a crisis that was unique in character? Had not history perhaps already passed its judgement? Were those things – capitalism and imperialism, freedom of expres-

sion and parliamentary procedure – which seemed to have constituted the strength of the free west in the XIX century, still in a position to meet the requirements of the XX? Had they not become outworn and, indeed, perhaps ethically objectionable? Were not communism and fascism the legitimate fruits of the west? In contrast to the anarchy of modern life with its masses of humanity and classes devoid of all roots, the totalitarian movements, albeit it by brutal means, had brought unity and security, which offered succour and strength to the isolated and the lonely in a soulless and godless world. At the beginning of 1941 the doom of the free west seemed to be sealed. The whole of continental Europe, with the exception of two enclaves of Switzerland and Sweden, lay prostrate under the dominion of the dictators, Stalin and Hitler, Mussolini and Franco, each one allied with the others in different ways; and the freedom of the west had found a refuge in the small British Isles, its original home.

For Britain is the birthplace of the free world and of modern western civilisation. Freedom – in the sense of the rights of man and of the community, of liberty in thought and way of life for the individual, of untrammelled critical research and freedom of speech – is something very new and novel in the history of mankind. In comparison, communism and fascism represented a reversion to an older and in many ways *primaeval* form of human society – except as regards modern technical means, which they have filched from the west in order to use them against it. The idea that the west is ‘senile’ stems from the fact that western culture from the middle ages to the present day has come to be regarded as a corporate whole. In reality, however, there are three distinct and consecutive manifestations of western civilisation, all closely related historically, but all fundamentally different – the Graeco-Roman world, the Christian western world of the Middle Ages, which, founded upon the heritage of antiquity, flourished until well into the XVII century, and the modern world, which has expanded and modified the traditions of its two predecessors into a fundamentally new conception of life. For in the XVII century there began something completely new – not only, as Jaspers saw it, in the field of science and technology, but also in the concept of justice, ethics and human dignity. The

geographical centre of this development was no longer the Mediterranean, but the North Atlantic ocean, where, as a result of free mutual intercourse between Britain and North America, Holland and France, there came into being a new conception of culture and civilisation.

The new western cultural concept of freedom, which flourished most vigorously in the United States, the most westerly of its homes, where there were less remnants of the feudalism of the Middle Ages than anywhere else in the world, enabled the small British island kingdom to become the centre of a political and economic system which encircled the whole earth. It was not Britain's wealth, but the – to him – incomprehensible freedom of speech enjoyed by her people that made so profound an impression on Voltaire in 1726 and inspired him to such great heights of enlightened thinking. At the end of the XVIII century Kant and Schiller greeted the newly discovered dignity of man in words that will never be forgotten. In the course of the next two hundred years this new civilisation of freedom gave proof of a dynamic strength such as the previous great civilisations had never known. Wherever it penetrated, wherever it came in contact with rigid mediaeval societies, like those of Russia and Islam, of China and Hinduism, and began to incorporate them into its own free and open society, it enriched them and infused new life into old and often all but moribund civilisations.

Setting aside the brief era of Athenian glory, the western world had for the first time proclaimed that it was both the right and the duty of man to think and to use his critical faculties, to subject matters to proof by reasoning, rather than to rely upon the dogma of authority. Tolerance and the recognition of political and intellectual opposition as constructive partners in the search for truth and justice – (it was England's 'glorious revolution' of 1688 which first established these principles) – trust in man's intellect and his critical appreciation of its limitations, the endeavour to find a middle way, a constantly recurring compromise in any clash of interests – these were the fundamental ethical principles which were common to the free world of the North Atlantic and which radiated from it. Hand in hand with them went a humanisation of life, a relaxation in the severity of the criminal code, a new sensitivity as regards

cruelty, a new feeling of social responsibility, a rejection, on principle, of slavery and serfdom, which until then had been accepted by even the most humane religions and governments. It was in this free west that education and prosperity came to be regarded for the first time as the common rights of the greatest possible number, that the barriers between classes and social strata grew smaller and smaller; there was an unceasing revolution in progress, a restless striving after something better that never ceased. These were the salient features of this young and dynamic society.

The most striking characteristic in the United States was not the vast development of the machine, but, as Tocqueville himself observed, the revolutionary creation of a classless society and, consequently, of a system of education which was free of all class restrictions. What, in this connection, approached implementation in America in the XIX century was destined, as Tocqueville foresaw, to be taken up and carried on in western Europe in the XX. That is America's contribution to the common forward movement of the free western world. What Europe had been discovering since 1688, America had at her disposal from the moment of her inception, for it was only at about that time that America began to exist, and she had therefore been able to build exclusively on these foundations. In the British North American colonies of the XVIII century Britain's code of freedom had been transformed, under the influence of enlightened French rationalism, into the rights of man in a free society.

In contrast, communism and fascism represent not the fruits of the modern west, the outcome of natural evolution, but, as Berdyaiev says, a new 'Middle Ages', with its stratified, hierarchical and authoritarian order. They reject that all-pervading restlessness, that inquietude, as the French so aptly call it, of the west. Their ideal is not the hardly-won sense of personal responsibility of the individual, but a society in which each individual allows himself without resistance or demur to be absorbed for all time into a firmly cemented social structure. The surprising emergence, from communism and fascism, of rigid social strata, extremes of nationalism and the impatient gospel of action and force is not a proof of 'western decadence', but, on the contrary, of an inadequate 'westernisation' of those coun-

tries which have fallen victim to the new movements and have been brought by them into conflict with the free west.

The reason why at the present time this uncanny sense of crisis and impending disaster is so widespread is because to-day, for the first time, everything that happens anywhere carries the germ of potential world-wide repercussion, and because the XIX century had lulled the peoples of the western world into a sense of security and peaceful progress that was all but unique in history. (The only other example of a comparable century is that of the II century of the Roman Empire, which Gibbon, who knew not the XIX century, has described as the happiest era in the history of mankind.) There are other ages, of course, which were dominated by a similar feeling of crisis, and it would be interesting to collect evidence of its existence throughout the centuries – of antiquity, of the Middle Ages and more recent times and, indeed, even from the XIX century itself. The expressions of despair for the future of mankind, the complaints about the imperfections of social conditions and the moral depravity of man, would strike a very familiar note for the present-day reader; and quite an appreciable number of such expressions emanate from the very centuries during which the Christian faith flourished undivided in Europe, a period which has been extolled as the high ideal of purposeful life and intellectual self-confidence by religious writers from Novalis to the present day.

The intellectual of the modern west, with his restless, conscientious urge towards introspection, his refusal to hold God or fate responsible – or blindly to expect any assistance from either – his ever-ready inclination to criticise himself and the society in which he lives – traits that are at the same time both the cause of his despair and the source of his strength – believes that the reasons for the ‘collapse’ of the west are to be found in his own shortcomings and those of his fellow men. Of course there are many things in the west which are not good. How could it be otherwise? Theologians rightly maintain that all ages stand arraigned before the tribunal of God. All man’s work is imperfect. The religiously utopian conception of a coming age of perfect justice and impeccable social and personal life (which Marx, that typical sectarian of the XIX century, has secularised ‘scientifically’), is something that lies outside the bounds

of historical reality. It may well be that the citizens of the XIX century suffered from an excess of selfrighteousness and satiety unknown to other ages. But at the same time, the XIX century was more sensitive with regard to social anomalies than any other era and did its utmost to eradicate them, albeit often imbued with an exaggerated faith in the efficacy of charity and social aid. The free west passed on these earnest endeavours to enhance the dignity of man and to alleviate the suffering of humanity to other social communities in the world, and, under western influence, they, too, began to become conscious of this humanitarian concept, to which the age of enlightenment in the free west had given birth.

The attacks to which the free western world has been subjected during recent decades did not emanate from within, but from beyond its own periphery, whence the modern west had not penetrated, from communities the social structure of which was still pre-capitalist and to whose philosophy the freedom of the individual was something unknown. Marx completely misunderstood the essence of modern society. Thanks to a faulty assessment of transient conditions (which a study of Tocqueville would have enabled him to avoid), and his abstract and metaphysical approach to history, he came to regard class warfare as the essential factor in modern society. In reality, compromise and patience are its salient features, and class warfare is a relic of a pre-capitalist, feudal age and, in particular, of the armed uprising of the common people against the nobility. For this reason Marxism has never been able to gain a real foothold in the free western world, and the labour movements in Britain and Sweden are having the greatest difficulty in reconciling obsolete theoretical premises with reality. In Russia and Asia, the Marxist doctrine found it easier to adapt itself to the national traditions and the inherited social structures. Moreover the form of national State which emerged in the XVIII century in the free west had completely changed in spiritual and intellectual outlook by 1848, when it came to be adopted by eastern Europe and, later, by Asia. Communism, fascism, oriental nationalism – they all reject the principles of the free west, but they all make use not only of western technology, but also of western slogans and definitions, the meanings of which they have completely distorted and by so

doing have for many years succeeded in creating a truly dangerous confusion in the western world.

The free west gave proof of its strength both before and during the second world war. Contrary to all the hopes of class or racial clashes which their enemies had cherished, the social structures of Great Britain and the United States showed a staunchness of purpose unsurpassed anywhere in the world. Independent labour and free enterprise together produced, in both the peace and war economies of their countries, a higher standard of living than any achieved by any other social community. The free west is well on its way to gaining a new self-confidence and seeing the crises of the first half of the XX century in their true historical perspective. First and foremost, the west has become conscious of its unity. At a time when nationalism has gripped the minds of eastern nations with a virulence unknown in the western world, it has been steadily losing ground in the west. From the realisation of its own deeply-rooted, inherent forces the free western world is deriving fresh strength. It was a fatal error on the part of the Germans and the Japanese to believe in Spengler's prophecy of the downfall of the west and to put their faith so blindly in their 'youth', the solid impregnability of their social structure and the incomparable leadership that directed them. It would be equally tragic if the Russians and the Chinese were to delude themselves with similar beliefs.

WILHELM RÖPKE

Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales

THE FREE WEST

ITS OUTLOOK AND ATTITUDE VIS-À-VIS COMMUNISM

The thesis that the attitude and outlook of the free world vis-à-vis the communism¹ organised by Russia into a world Power is one of bewildered and, indeed, paralysing uncertainty and confusion of mind has already assumed the character of a commonplace among men of average discernment. This does not, however, detract in any way from the importance of the fact, for the absence of a clear-cut western attitude and outlook is one of the main weapons of the communist empire, a weapon so potent and threatening that the organisation of purely political and military defences against it have absorbed the energies of the free world to a degree that is most disquieting. It can, indeed, be said without exaggeration that the continued doubts in the west regarding the attitude with which it should confront world communism must be of as weighty significance as is the possession of the secret of the hydrogen bomb. However much the west may boast of its lead in this latter field of the purely military technique of destruction, the fact remains that in the struggle between decisiveness and vacillation, clarity and confusion of ideas, the west still remains, despite recent and undeniable

¹ The treatment in this thesis of communism as a cosmopolitan and more or less corporate entity, the centre of which is Moscow, may give rise to the objection that it does not accord due weight to the ever increasing independence of Peking. That this independence already exists to a large degree and will become still greater, is undeniable. But it would, to say the least of it, be very premature, and might become the cause of grave errors on the part of the west, to exaggerate its significance and to pin any hopes on it. For one thing, the common communist ideology, coupled with the common cosmopolitan front that results from it, is obviously far stronger than any potential internal tensions or deviations. The same can be applied to any consideration of Tito, particularly after the recent agreement reached with Khrushchev and Bulganin in Belgrade, not the least significant factor of which is the fact that it has reminded the world that Tito is a radical communist and therefore remains, ideologically, most closely allied to Moscow.

progress, far behind its opponents and therefore remains, as before, under a threat which menaces its very existence. Nor does the fact that the clarity and the decisiveness of the communist attitude are the embodiment of absolute evil alter the situation in any way.

But if this is really so, then nothing can be more important than that we should endeavour, with all the forces at our command, to make good these deficiencies in the intellectual field. It is a task which must be regarded as a bounden duty by every man in whose soul uncertainty has not yet reached that fatally paralysing stage in which he is no longer able to appreciate the significance and urgency of such an appeal, but seeks refuge in a spiritual neutrality and professes to see between the free world and world communism no difference great enough to justify a demand for all and everything he has to give and a united and determined resistance by the free nations of the world. One of the surest signs of an intellectual and moral neutrality of this nature is that its victims no longer even have the courage to admit allegiance to a 'free' world without turning the phrase into an ironical quotation. But the measure in which such neutrality of mind has progressed is synonymous with the degree to which the freedom of the world has become a lost cause and been delivered into the hands of the most 'unneutral' and most inexorably despotic system in the history of the world. If, with regard to world communism, we profess that we cannot differentiate between black and white, between good and evil, between plus and minus, then we are well on the way to falling victims to it and to finding out what it means to exchange those standards of thought and behaviour handed down and planted in our souls by thousands of years of tradition for the standards of a diabolical and despotic system, enforced at the muzzle of an automatic pistol.

II

Our confusion emanates from the fact that in world communism we encounter a phenomenon which, we remember, we have met before in the case of national socialism, namely, *the association of a totalitarian ideology with a specific nation and its political personification with a*

specific, national government, which claims to be the legitimate representative of that nation. The organiser, leader and spokesman of world communism is the Russian government, resident in Moscow, and no one can say with certainty the degree to which the Russian people accept it and identify themselves with it. And to indulge in surmise on the subject is as profitless in this case as it was previously in the case of Germany and national socialism.

The difficulty, exactly as in the analagous case of Germany, lies in striking a correct balance between the geographically localised and national connection and the world-wide, proselytising ideology, which bludgeons the intellect of a people and then uses them to the attainment of its own ends. To strike this balance, however, demands a full appreciation of what a totalitarian regime really is, and this it is that is lamentably lacking in the west, and particularly in those countries which have never passed through the harsh school of some form of totalitarianism.

The resultant mistake is, as a rule, an inclination to attach in one sense too little, and in another too much, importance to the national element in world communism. On the one hand, the specifically Russian element in an ideology that was born there and has thence developed into a world-wide menace has been both wrongly and inadequately appreciated. On the other, the essentially Russian guise that it has adopted causes us to neglect its specifically ideological and totalitarian character, which makes it impossible for us to apply to it the standards normally accepted in the west and to regard it as a national government like any other.

As far as the specifically *Russian element* of communism is concerned, it is a significant fact that it is a seedling which had need of the Russian soil, in the widest sense of the term, just as national socialism had need of the soil of Germany, to bring it to fruition. To that extent, then, a search for 'harbingers', 'blazers of the trail' and national 'pre-requisites' is both permissible and desirable. But to see in national socialism merely a continuation, in extremely exaggerated form, of a fundamental national characteristic – 'Prussianism', perhaps, or 'Romanticism' or 'militarism' – would be as false in principle as to interpret Russian communism as a new, albeit particularly savage, manifestation of the 'eternal Russian', the 'Tartar', and to

regard current aspirations to world-wide dominion merely as a new edition of Tsarist imperialism.

Little as may be the extent to which the rulers in the Kremlin have been able to rid themselves of national tradition, and great though their similarity, in certain aspects, may be to Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great – a similarity on which they rather coquettishly preen themselves – to regard them as the successors of these fore-runners would be a quite grotesque misinterpretation of their despotic system. It is not merely a question of degree, but of a vast difference in method, which an ability to differentiate between absolutism, despotism and even dictatorship on the one hand and the tyranny that has its roots in, and draws its strength from, the masses on the other – between Kemal Pasha and Stalin, Franco and Hitler – will help to make clear.

All this cannot be too strongly emphasised. There is, however, an additional aspect that must not be overlooked. While world communism, as organised by Russia, derives its greatest strength as an expanding and disintegrating force from the claim that it is the champion of radical social revolution, and to many naive-minded the claim seems to be not wholly unjustified, since it at least serves as a warning and an admonition to the free west, it is nevertheless a claim which must be rejected, refuted and contested with all possible emphasis. Incidentally, it is in this connection that the specifically Russian milieu must be borne in mind from which that element of communism which can be justifiably regarded as socially revolutionary must be so completely separated that in western eyes it loses all value as a yard-stick. Herein lies a specific reason for regarding communism as a Russian phenomenon – as the form, that is, in which, unfortunately for Russia and the whole world, this explosive material, which had accumulated through the course of centuries in a manner and within the confines of a social and constitutional system founded upon force, despotism and oppression, that are incomprehensible to western lands, and which required but a spark to set off a conflagration unique in the annals of history. To this extent, then, communism, as the darkest link in a sombre chain, has become a chapter of Russian history, a social catastrophe of unparalleled magnitude, in which the whole history of this strange

land – a story of suffering, misery, brutality and a contempt for humanity – culminates. We should be ignoring this essential fact if we were to concede to those who have been thrown to the top by the Russian explosion even the slightest vestige of a right to point out to the free world the way to social justice, or even to indicate general principles or to set an example, which indeed, we should not need to follow in all its radical entirety, but which we might welcome as a stimulus to our own ideas. How Russia settles *her own* social problems is entirely her own affair, but to regard that as a justification for the activities of social missionaries in other parts of the world, and particularly in the western world, is an arrogance for which complete ignorance of the world and its affairs is the only possible excuse. The free world in all conscience has its own unsolved civic and social problems, which it must solve in its own way and in accordance with its own civic and social traditions; and the only lesson to be learnt from Russian communism is the form which these solutions must not, in any circumstances, be allowed to assume.¹

At the same time – and this is difficult – it is equally important to realise that it is impermissible, unjust and, above all, unwise to regard the communism organised by the Russian government as being synonymous with ‘Russia’ or ‘the Russian people’. The extent to which a realisation of this fact is lacking in the free western world is proof that we are prone to overemphasise the Russian national

¹ From the vast field of literature on the subject one solitary example will suffice to give local colour to the above description of the Russian homeland. No less a person than Victor Hehn, whose name is revered by all as the author of one of the outstanding works on Goethe, recounts this harrowing story from his reminiscences of his banishment to the province of Tula. The incident occurred in 1857. A landowner suddenly found himself in urgent need of money and decided to sell the serfs on his estates for 30,000 roubles. The latter, to avoid being sold, offered him half the sum at once and the rest in instalments. The landowner accepted the money of these poor peasants and swore a solemn oath that he would not sell them. No sooner had he received the money, however, than he broke his word and sold them. When the serfs gave vent to their indignation, they were punished in a most horrible manner. (Victor Hehn: *De Moribus Ruthenorum. Zur Charakteristik der Russischen Volksseele, Tagebuchblätter 1857-1873*. Stuttgart, 1892.) Hehn also quotes the Curator of the university of Kazan, who, also in 1857, said: ‘Professors have no need of books, but must know their subject. Books are for students.’

element in communism in the one respect in which it is important not to do so, for it shows that the west still does not appreciate the true meaning of a totalitarian regime, namely, that it is imperialism which begins at home, a campaign of conquest, the first victims of which are its own people. The visible and horrible manifestations of this *'vertical' imperialism* – which is followed by an outward, 'horizontal' expansion with all the forceful inevitability of a law of nature – is an instrument of oppression that shrinks from no brutality and a machine for the enslavement of humanity that disdains neither lies nor bestial assault on the souls of men to achieve its ends; together they grip man like the twin jaws of a vice and, although they have certainly proved themselves to be indispensable to the regime, they also demonstrate incontrovertibly the gulf that separates the rulers and the ruled.

Since, however, physical oppression and spiritual subjugation merge imperceptibly into one another, it is not possible to say to what extent the nation, so long as it remains in the jaws of the vice, allows itself voluntarily to be used as the tool of its usurper government. No Gallup poll and no reportage can give us the answer, and those who regard the tension between the regime and the Russian people – and even more so that between the communist governments and the people in the satellite countries – as a fluctuating but ever present and potent factor can produce no figures with which to confront those who disagree with them; all they can do is to draw attention to the dissatisfaction which these regimes must inevitably evoke and to the sporadic symptoms of it that come to light. Not the least significant of these symptoms are the refugees, and the incredible dangers and difficulties which they have to overcome in making good their escape are only further proof of the severity of the conditions from which they have fled; at the same time they are themselves a living proof – though this has not always been appreciated fully – that a totalitarian regime of this kind, once more exactly as in the case of national socialism, thanks to its own vertical imperialism, robs patriotism of all meaning.

As long as Russian communism continues to use the Russian people as the instrument of its world policy, the nations of the free world, obviously, have no alternative but to defend themselves against

the instrument itself, as well as against those who wield it. 'Les nations victimes de sa déplorable obéissance', wrote Benjamin Constant in 1814 regarding France and Napoleon, 'ne sauraient lui tenir compte des sentiments cachés, que sa conduite dément. Elles reprochent aux instruments le crime de la main qui les dirige.'¹ To expect that the gulf between regime and people, kept as it is in constant and complete concealment by forcible means, can ever become apparent while these means still remain intact, would imply a naive and, to-day, unforgivable misconception of the nature of totalitarianism and the means of physical and spiritual control at its disposal. To expect anything of the kind – as the whole world did, of course, in the case of the Third Reich – would be all the more dangerous, in that the disappointment that would inevitably ensue could well lead to a similar misconception and to bitterness against the Russian people as such.

This is a contingency against which the free west, in spite of the undeniable difficulties, must be particularly on its guard – and in the case of the satellite countries must, of course, be even more vigilant. Indeed, the free world would be well advised, from the view point of both justice and political sagacity, to bear constantly in mind the gulf to which any totalitarian regime gives birth and which exists between the controlling communist organisation and the Russian people, and never to lose sight of the fact that in the latter they have a potential ally of considerable, if somewhat remote, possibilities. In the meanwhile, no effort must be spared to bring this to the knowledge of the Russian people and to burst the bonds of the physical and spiritual strait-jacket in which they are held captive. The anti-communism of the free west should be kept as free as possible of any form of Russophobia and should, indeed, be linked with an emphatic and well-merited respect for the riches of Russian culture, difficult though this latter may be made by the unceasing efforts of the communist rulers to use these riches as bait in the communist spiritual trap. The more persistent the effort made to present communism and Russian culture to us in one and the same package, the more it behoves the free world to spare no pains to re-separate them.

¹ Benjamin Constant: *De l'Esprit de Conquête et de l'Usurpation*. Chapter XIV.

III

In general terms, the mistakes which we have so far had to deplore have been due to the fact that the free world has been lacking in imagination in its conception of the totalitarian world and has again and again shown an inclination to apply to it standards that, in reality, are wholly inapplicable. It is a source of dangerous weakness to the free west that it thoughtlessly and persistently applies the '*pluralistic*' character of its social system – with its freedoms, its constitutional State, its diversity of form, its protection of the individual and the rest – to the *monolithic system of the east*, which is based upon exactly opposite principles, while Moscow in all its dealings with the west invokes the principle of plurality whenever it deems it advantageous to do so. For some astonishing reason the west allows itself time and again to be hoodwinked by this extremely obvious game, the rules of which are well epitomised by the well-known saying attributed to Louis Veuillot (1813-1883): 'Quand je suis le plus faible, je vous demande la liberté parce que tel est votre principe; mais quand je suis le plus fort, je vous l'ôte, parce que tel est le mien.'

Conforming to Veuillot's rules of the game, the communist State assumes that it will be treated as a normal State, whose confidence can be sought and with which normal treaties can be concluded. In the same way the communist parties in western countries demand the right to enjoy the privileges of a normal political party, while its programme adheres rigidly to the policy of a State which destroys these rights in the most brutal manner; again, in the same way, while Moscow reserves the right to influence public opinion in the free countries in any way it likes and to spread its propaganda in all directions, any attempt at counter-measures within the communist empire is punished as a capital offence. And even to demand that these rights should be reciprocal would be naive in the extreme, for to address such a demand to a totalitarian regime is tantamount to inviting it to commit suicide.

To anyone desiring to make a detailed study of the variations of this game, in which the west is always on the losing side, the controversy over the use of the atom and hydrogen bombs affords a partic-

ularly important and concrete example. As long as the west was in sole possession of this frightful weapon, it refrained from making use of its monopoly to destroy the communist empire (although it was used to give the coup de grâce to a Japan already ripe for capitulation). But from the moment when it had to be assumed that Moscow, too, possessed the weapon, there have been no grounds for assuming that Russia would not use it to establish their dominion over the world, had they not been held in check by the certain knowledge that the free west would not hesitate to use it in retaliation. The freedom of the world, therefore, and the freedom of those portions of it that have not yet been conquered by communism, are dependent upon a parity between the two parties, not only as regards *possession* of nuclear weapons but also as regards *determination to use them* should the need arise. Moscow, of course, is most anxious to break this stalemate and, working on the Veuillot principle, is exploiting to the full the fact that in the free west anyone can with impunity take part in the efforts being made to ban the use of nuclear weapons and is supporting these efforts with every means at its command.

The situation that has now arisen was recently described by an intelligent observer in the following terms: 'It is impossible to see how the mutual possession of atomic weapons can ensure peace or act as a deterrent to war, unless both sides make it clear that they are, in fact, prepared to use them. Consideration of the frightful consequences of their use does not per se constitute a deterrent, and any propaganda based upon a belief that it does, will re-act without any doubt in favour of the side which does not bother its head about any such humane considerations; it will, in fact, act not as a deterrent, but as an incentive to war. Even the British and French propaganda in the 1930's, completely justifiable though it was morally, re-acted in Hitler's favour and consequently as an incentive to war; and the Nazi propaganda realised this and made full use of it. In exactly the same way, every quite sincere pacifist movement is to-day being exploited politically by the totalitarian Powers, without the latter allowing it to interfere in any way with their own armament programme. There is no doubt that the horrors of a nuclear war would surpass the horrors of any war we have yet known. But to allow

our political decisions to be influenced by the thought of such horrors, while the other side remains completely unmoved by any such scruples, would be completely suicidal. That, and that alone, is relevant.’¹ This author, then, comes to the justifiable conclusion that it is not in the nature of the bomb, but in the nature of the enemy, that the problem really lies.

Not only do those commit a sin, who in the free world are striving – zealously, from motives that are inherently most laudable, but with a complete misapprehension regarding the nature of the enemy – to shatter, *by their own unilateral pacifism*, the delicate balance in the possession of nuclear weapons *and* the determination to use them should the necessity to do so arise. They are guilty also of failing to compare the horrors of a future war with the horrors of the communist world dominion to which their unilateral pacifism is throwing open the door. ‘If we divest ourselves of all possibility and hope of putting a halt to their further depredations, if we continue simply to ask ourselves what the Christian faith prescribes for Christians and to act accordingly, but refrain from asking what bolshevism prescribes for the disciples of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, if, by confining ourselves to a purely emotional contemplation of the frightful activities of a materialistic and brutal policy, we surrender God’s world in its entirety to a totalitarian dictatorship – then, indeed, we shall have forsaken our Christian world and have, in practice, handed it over to a power that will not for one instant hesitate to exploit our error to its utmost limit’.²

The fact, therefore, that the free world finds itself face to face with a totalitarian regime of immense potential strength condemns pacifism, if we extend Veuillot’s maxim to its logical conclusion, to being confined to the role of the lamb in the fable, whereas in reality we would wish it to be the wolf. While in the west the physicists, horrified at their own diabolical inventions, the philosophers and the theologians all urge the peoples of the earth to keep the peace and not to let the horrors of war become a reality, and these implorations are always and inevitably transformed into an appeal to the

¹ Klaus Dohrn: Das christliche Missverständnis, Forum (Vienna) July/August 1954.

² Ibid.

readiness of a free world, already hard-pressed for a decade and more, to make yet further concessions, we hear no humanitarian voice raised on the other side and urging its communist world to seek peace and reconciliation. Has anyone ever heard a Russian physicist or prelate imploring his government to abandon mere words and by deeds to allay the causes of fear and preparation for war in a western world that is longing for some such gesture – by liberating the plundered and horribly subjugated Baltic States, by really withdrawing from the satellite countries, by releasing at long last the east Germans from their communist prison, and by agreeing to a genuine peaceful *modus vivendi* in the Far East?

As long as we have to wait in vain for deeds such as these, as long, that is, as the communist empire continues to exist, the only effect of the warnings of western pacifists regarding the destructive powers of nuclear weapons will be to drive us forward with the inevitability of fate itself along a path at the end of which we shall be faced with a choice of two forms of disintegration of the world as we know it – either a surrender to communist world dominion or a third world war. As a force that seeks good and creates evil, western pacifism can do no more than reduce the possibilities before us to two, where previously we were hoping that we might find a solution in a third way – a delicately balanced equipoise for the time being, with wider possibilities for the future. This third way is at the same time the only sense in which ‘co-existence’ can be acceptable to the west, if it is not once more to fall victim to the crafty rules of the game, as Veuillot has enumerated them.

In the mere fact that the communist world knows full well that, if it uses the atomic bomb, it will immediately be exposed to certain retaliation in kind and the probability of mutual destruction, lies a certain guarantee that this frightful weapon will not be used. In view, however, of the latest development (the hydrogen bomb), and the imminent and threatening danger of the world-wide collective suicide which any dictator, sick in mind and heedless of the consequences, might unleash with it, there at once arises the urgent question whether it would not be possible, by means of effective international control of this devastating weapon, to create some sort of guarantee against such an eventuality? If an effective international control,

which the west has proposed many times, could be set up in agreement with Moscow, then the case of a weapon, the preparation, production and stock-piling of which, in view of the immense industrial demands evolved, even a totalitarian regime would find it extremely hard to keep secret, presents us with a task which need not be approached with that pessimism that normally characterises west-east negotiations. It does, however, pre-suppose that the communist governments would be ready to submit to unrestricted inspection in their own territories; and while in the west public opinion would ensure that the western governments would put no obstacle in the way of international control, there is no reason to believe that the envisaged unrestricted power of inspection that is essential would be accepted by the communist group. It is, therefore, all the more urgent that western physicists should address their warnings to the communist empire.

If the west is not once again to lose the game to communist cheating, an essential pre-requisite to any such world control of nuclear weapons would be that Moscow should not only agree, but should also furnish the most binding guarantees, that control over the production of these weapons would be as effective within the confines of the communist empire as in the free world, where the freedoms enjoyed render secrecy all but impossible. So far, however, Moscow has given but little sign of any willingness to accept control and still less to furnish the requisite guarantees. And as long as this remains so, the west would only be playing into Russia's hands if it were to take seriously the communist proposals for the abolition of nuclear weapons.

In view of the whole nature of the communist regime, it is very doubtful whether international discussion on the subject will advance beyond the present position in the foreseeable future. In this connection it must never for an instant be forgotten that throughout all the years since the end of the war the lead held by the west in nuclear weapons – a lead that was at first absolute and has now become merely relative – has alone been in a position to counter the enormous superiority of the communist empire in conventional land forces and so to bar the way to its further advance. For the fact that they are still at liberty to try and destroy this fragile equilibrium by

their campaign against nuclear weapons, the western pacifists have to thank a superiority in the very things which they themselves are striving to abolish. That they fail to recognise the illogicality of their standpoint is only yet another proof of how prone the west is to fall unsuspectingly into the communist trap.

Let us not for one moment forget that the west is being called upon to maintain its position in the face of an empire, the guiding principle of which is totalitarianism – against a system, that is, which subordinates everything else to the political aims of a State ruled by a group of fanatics, and which has been built on the foundation of a complete ‘politicalisation’ of every field of human thought and action. In contrast, the cultural and social ideals which the free west must strive to maintain link with the principle of freedom and the rights of the individual the further principle that State and politics are not everything and that in addition to the policy of a State there are other fields of human activity which must be allowed to preserve their independence. First and foremost among them is the economic field, and therein, too, the west must be on its guard against playing the game according to Veuillot’s rules.¹

While the communist empire, of course, regards and conducts its economic relations with the west in exactly the same way as it does its cultural and religious relations – solely as an instrument of policy, and of a policy, be it noted, that aims at world dominion – this fundamental principle of totalitarianism is so very contrary to all western ideas that the west has the greatest difficulty even in recognising its existence. This makes it all the more difficult for the west when it comes to regulate its economic relations with the communist world. This has recently become particularly apparent, for the free world has shown a great eagerness to succumb to the dangerous allurements – dangerous, of course, on account of the political *arrière pensée* that inspires them – of an extension of east-west trade.

This latest eulogy by Moscow of the blessings of international trade is something very remarkable. That the Kremlin, of all places, should embark upon a crusade against autarky, should raise the

¹ For a more detailed treatment of the subject, vide my article: *Der Handel mit dem Rotem Imperium*, *Schweizer Monatshefte*, May 1954.

standard of free trade and, as it were, deliver an Adam Smith or Ricardo lecture to the west on the blessings of an international distribution of trade is remarkable, because the Soviet regime has hitherto been as self-contained and as hostile to the world around it as can be possibly imagined. It has until now always been guided by the dogma of autarky and imbued with a most profound mistrust of world trade. Both are as old as the regime itself, and both emanate, logically, from its character as a totalitarian system that has felt itself constrained to remain as aloof as possible, both out of fear of the effects of spiritual and intellectual contact with the outside world, and out of consideration for the rigidity of its own planned economy.

The volte-face made by Moscow after Stalin's death therefore bears all the hall-marks of something completely unnatural and something that has been forced upon it. To delve into the hidden reasons which might explain it does not come within the scope of this thesis. Here it will suffice to mention just a few of the direct political aims which Moscow obviously hopes to achieve by it.

Firstly, the new role fits in admirably with Moscow's desire, which has obviously survived the removal of Malenkov, to persuade the west into believing in a profound change in Soviet intentions and behaviour, a change in which trade would take its place side by side with the sports teams, the corps de ballet and the theatrical companies which have flowed westwards in such profusion. Then again, this opening of the sluices of east-west trade is most admirably calculated to cause confusion and contention in the ranks of the west, since in this respect both their interests and the degree of their political acumen vary considerably. Above all, however, the move would seem to afford communism a splendid opportunity to mobilise the European countries against the alleged obstinacy of the Americans, which in any case has become a most effective slogan of a highly concentrated anti-American campaign.

Now few things expose more clearly the internal weakness of the west, to which we have repeatedly felt bound to refer, than the fact that in its appeal to open up the economic doors of the world Moscow can count upon the support not only of the collectivists of all types and grades, but also of the businessmen of the western world. While

for communism trade with the west is primarily an act of policy, for the west it holds the lure of a chance to do business. Moreover, while the economic system of the free world is still based, notwithstanding the socialist assaults upon it, on the proven principle that the laws of supply and demand and of competition ensure that private business is conducted, broadly speaking, to the public advantage, no similar automatic process can be found to be at work in the field of politics. Nevertheless, the habit of respecting business interests has induced the west mistakenly to lend an ear to the businessmen who are anxious to engage in trade with the east, without querying whether in this case the business interests do not clash with the country's political interests – interests which may well be vital to the country's survival.

It would, of course, be thoroughly unfair to blame the European countries and their business world for finding it hard to refrain, to the extent demanded by political exigencies, from doing business with the east. The traditional structure of their foreign trade and the fact that their national economy is far more vulnerable, because it is founded upon foreign trade, make it obvious that this trading is much more important to European countries, and, in particular, to those more adjacent to the communist eastern world, than it is to a country like the United States. The former can hardly be expected to curtail their trade with the east unless at the same time the United States accepts what is a bounden obligation and offers them and the like-minded Asiatic countries, especially Japan, compensation in the form of a liberal opening-up to them of the American markets.¹ In any case, this is a policy, as is well realised, which is in complete harmony with the United States' own interests, and it is a duty which the United States owes to the solidarity of the free world. This aspect is made clear, in the most vivid manner and on one of the most dangerously menaced fronts of the free world, by the case of Japan. Were Japan to be drawn into the cultural, economic and, finally, political orbit of the communist empire, which has now

¹ On the American side, this has been clearly demonstrated by J. Viner: 'The Role of the United States in the World Economy', incorporated in the compendium: 'National Policy for Economic Welfare at Home and Abroad', New York, 1955, pp. 199 et seq.

become her sole directly contiguous neighbour, it would be a catastrophe for the free world comparable only to that of the loss of China. To maintain the economic and social equilibrium of that almost impossibly over-populated island country even to a degree that would ensure that communist infection does not prove fatal is, in any case, a most difficult task, and it must be obvious to any averagely well-informed person that it can be accomplished – and then only to a limited extent – only if Japan is compensated for the loss of her traditional, but now communist, market of China by being granted access to the markets of the free world. If this is not done, there will be a grave danger that economic pressure alone will suffice to bring about an increasing rapprochement between Japan and China – to which can now be added a large and still expanding portion of Indo-China – a rapprochement about the ultimate outcome of which there can be little or no doubt. To do all in its power to save Japan from being drawn into the communist orbit, by means of a liberal commercial policy towards her, is therefore a political measure of world-wide importance to the self-preservation of the whole free world and, more especially, of the United States, both the most directly threatened and, from the Japanese point of view, economically the most important country of them all. If protectionist vested interests intervene and succeed in preventing the implementation of this policy, they will merely be furnishing yet another proof of that western weakness which we have already made so abundantly clear.¹

IV

There still remains the most important question of all: What line should the free world adopt as a counter to the power of communist propaganda? What are the ideals to which the western countries

¹ Charles B. Taft, brother of the deceased Senator and President of the Committee for a National Trade Policy, recently made the dramatic statement before a Committee of the House of Representatives that American protectionists were prepared to accept the risk of a communist Japan 'in order to preserve America's knit glove industry and the handkerchief lines in our textile mills'. (New York Times, February 8 1955.)

should adhere and with which they should launch their appeal to the masses, in an effort to combat the spiritual and intellectual exhortations of the east?

We shall, perhaps, arrive nearer to a correct answer to these questions if we start by examining the widely-held and, on the face of it, very reasonable view that the moral immunisation of the free peoples against the virus of communism can best be achieved by the use as a vaccine of *a progressive raising of the standard of living of the masses in terms of the ideal of maximum productivity and a progressive social policy*. But – will that really suffice?

I have used the word ‘suffice’ deliberately. For no one will deny that the prospects of resistance to the communist virus will, in specific circumstances, be increased by the raising of the material living standards of the masses. But we must not disregard the danger that lies in accepting this as a complete answer. The material standard of life in the free world is, of course, of great importance, but it is not everything and, beyond a certain well-defined, low level, it is not even the most important factor.

Even from the purely political point of view, it would be highly dangerous, and could possibly be fatal, to attribute to the ideal of maximum productivity and a high standard of living a priority so absolute and so over-riding, that even the relatively minor sacrifices essential to an efficient state of defensive readiness would become unacceptable. Of course the free countries must do all they can, by pursuing an economic policy that ensures maximum co-ordination and efficiency in the economy of the free world, to raise aggregate production to such a degree that material sacrifices which we must make in order to arm ourselves against the ruthless onslaught of the communist world are kept within reasonable limits. But a world which is not prepared to sacrifice some, and possibly the most highly-prized, of its material comforts in defence of its very existence and the most cherished values in its life is already doomed in any case. There comes a time when the man who is determined to retain both his liberty and his comforts loses both and deserves neither, and if ever there was such a time, surely, it is now. In the western countries, however, the system of taxation is more concerned with ensuring that the sacrifices demanded are distributed as justly

as possible than is, perhaps, desirable purely from the point of view of maximum economic efficiency.

There is, unfortunately, no lack of demagogues and social pacifists who maintain that in these circumstances the preservation of the well-being of the masses is more important than armed might, since the former is a better rampart against communism than the latter. In the fight against it – or so they profess to believe – butter and wireless sets are more important than cannon. Here we have two assertions in one, for what they are in reality saying is, firstly, that communism should be combated morally and not militarily, and secondly, that maximum moral stability is to be sought in the material well-being of the masses. But both assertions are worse than any obvious and downright error, since the element of half-truth which they undoubtedly contain tempts one to accept as true the utter falsity of the other half. A world Power that threatens us with both cannon and spiritual poison must be answered in kind, both with the grim roar of cannon and with the voice of moral and spiritual argument. Both are equally important. But even that does not suffice. Our moral and spiritual re-armament will not be brought about either by maximum production of butter and wireless sets or by an even distribution of them, but will emanate from an inner appreciation by the western peoples of the moral and spiritual values themselves which give meaning, nobility and impetus to western defence against oppression. And if we really believe that we shall first have to bribe the masses with butter and wireless sets before we can rouse them to a defence of these moral and spiritual values, then we are fighting in a cause that is lost from the very outset.

The free world is face to face with a gigantic threat from a communist empire, which spots and exploits to the full any military weakness with the eye and the ruthlessness of a hawk, and if the free world is to survive and preserve the peace, it must confront the communists with military forces of equal might – and it must be prepared to make the material sacrifices entailed in the raising of them. That, alas, is so obvious that those who dispute it leave us no alternative but to regard them as either singularly unintelligent or singularly evil-intentioned and demagogic. No less obvious and dangerous, however, is the mistaken idea that intellectual aversion to communism,

upon which everything ultimately depends and which, behind the armed forces, is the real mainspring of resistance to it, can be born of a philosophy of '*standard of life-ism*'.¹ Far truer and far more relevant is it to say that man lives not by bread alone, but – and the words of the gospel are singularly appropriate as they stand – 'by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God' (St. Matthew iv. 4); and these, be it noted, are the words that St. Matthew put into Jesus' mouth in answer to the man who challenged him to turn stones into bread.

By this I am not implying that the material welfare of the masses is not a significant factor in the armour of western defence – to do so would be foolish in the extreme; nor do I mean that the free peoples of the world should counter the poison of fanatical mass hysteria that has been instilled into their souls with a similar hysterical outburst, a tumultuous, hot-headed ideology or a volcanic explosion of mass passion. The very idea that the communist programme must be countered with a 'counterprogramme', supported by the roll of propaganda drums, is very akin to borrowing from the communist world – that world of programmes, myths, ideologies and positivist belief that things and men can be fashioned into any shape that seems desirable. Such an attitude conjures up the vision of the possibility of a 'counter-totalitarianism' against which the whole world must be on its guard; and it is extremely significant that it is some of the ex-communists (A. Koestler and others) who, apparently, find it particularly difficult to resist the temptation of a counterblast of this kind. What is far more important is that our actions should be guided by the consciousness of a calm, collected and steadfast belief in truth, freedom and justice, in human dignity and respect for life and its ultimate values, and should do all in our power to cherish and strengthen the spiritual and religious foundations of these values, which are the true and proper heritage of human existence and which give stability and protection to all of us. That is the vital point, and only if the free world lives according to these precepts or – as we must, unfortunately, prefer to put it –

¹ Translator's note: The author has coined this term in English and used it in the original German text.

re-learns to live according to these precepts, can it hope to survive the fiery test to which it is being subjected. But if it makes a high-gear'd raising of the so-called well-being of the masses its primary objective instead of merely a means to an end (and sometimes, possibly, a means that conflicts with the ultimate end), if it surrenders itself to this philosophy of '*standard of life-ism*', it will quickly be made to realise how true those other words of wisdom from the gospel are: 'What shall it profit a man if he gains the whole world and loses his own soul?' To do so would be to step into that domain of materialistic economy in the arid desert of which communism achieves its ultimate finality, but a finality linked, admittedly, with that pseudo-religious belief in the self-redemption of mankind in which the west must inevitably lag far behind the east.

Anyone who still believes that totalitarianism, that diabolical mixture of unbridled despotism and mass hypnotism for which morally irresponsible and spiritually homeless intellectuals coin the magic formulas, is the evil fruit of poverty has not the slightest conception of what modern totalitarianism means. It is to the social crisis of the present age, to the disintegration of the structure of society and its foundations, that the poison of totalitarianism has given rise. It flourishes wherever the good earth of ordered society and social consciousness has been washed away by social erosion, by 'Entbuergerlichung' and 'Entbaeuerlichung' – the destruction of the urban and rural social structures – and by 'proletarianisation'; it flourishes wherever men have lost their roots and their stability and no longer feel sure of themselves; it flourishes wherever men have been torn from the social fabric of family life, traditional environment, the circle of their friends and neighbours and other manifestations of communal life, and wherever, too, this process of disintegration goes hand in hand with a severance of all religious and spiritual roots. Totalitarianism – the last serious surviving manifestation of which to-day is communism – gains ground according to the extent to which men, as the victims of this deadly process of disintegration, suffer from a sense of inner frustration at the non-fulfilment of their destiny, from the laying in ruins of their whole existence and from the lack of the true and paramount non-material

aspects of decent human happiness. There is a vacuum in their lives, and somehow or other they try to fill it.

The only way in which to escape from this torturing vacuum is to indulge in the intoxication of politico-social ideologies, passions and myths, and it is here, after the collapse of national socialism, that communism to-day has its great chance. But does anyone seriously hope to be able to deprive it permanently of this opportunity by offering, as substitutes for ideology and the pseudo-community of Party, to fill the vacuum with motor cycles, radio and television sets, refrigerators and clothes on the hire purchase system – in other words, by pandering to unadorned, direct and unbridled material comfort? And what, pray, will happen, if sometime or other the vision of material comfort should recede even a little way?¹

A warning against attributing over-riding and absolute importance to the material welfare of the masses as one of the principal weapons of the west in the cold war is probably nowhere more appropriate than in the case of the under-developed countries.² Not only is the belief that the masses can be safeguarded against communism by a raising of their living standards clearly one of dangerous superficiality, since it gives over-riding priority to one sole, though certainly not unimportant, aspect and overlooks the moral, spiritual and sociological problems, which constitute the decisive factors. But to this, moreover, must be added the fact that the process of raising the standard of living by means of industrialisation, urbanisation and a general westernisation of society and its culture tends to be accompanied, from the outset and to a far greater extent than in the west, by a disconcerting disintegration of existing social structures and ways of thought. What then happens is illustrated

¹ In a west German report on youthful refugees from the eastern zone it was stated that these young men expressed the opinion that 'the west had nothing to offer, ideologically, equal in merit to the ideology of the east. A sense of vacuum and, in many cases, a certain feeling of disappointment that the all too rosy dreams of a 'golden west' had failed to materialise frequently aroused a measure of opposition in these youngsters, which in some cases caused them to return to the fold of the communist ideology from which they had originally fled'. (*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, February 15 1955.)

² I take the liberty of inviting attention to my study, 'Unentwickelte Länder' (*Ordo*, 1953 pp. 63-113), which deals with this in greater detail. Cf. also Albert C. Hunold: 'The Industrial Development of Switzerland'. Cairo 1954 *passim*.

with staggering emphasis by the example of Japan, where, under the post-war pressure of short-sighted victors, the disintegration of traditional outlooks and social structures proceeded at such a pace that the ground was prepared for the seed of communism with a thoroughness and speed which poverty and material destruction could never have achieved.¹ For the same reasons it is greatly to be deplored that the development of India seems to be guided more by the materialistic socialism of Nehru than by the humanistic wisdom of Gandhi.²

Particularly in the case of these underdeveloped countries, there is always a grave danger that those advantages which the free world can justifiably hope to wrest from communism by means of modernisation, technology and industrialisation will in turn be wrested from it by proletarianisation, urbanisation, intellectualisation, disintegration of family life and the abandonment of the traditional social structures and ways of thought; and that is something which we should be well advised always to bear in mind. The possibility that, in this process of 'development', the loss in things immaterial will outweigh the gains in things material is enhanced by the fact that the west, unfortunately, is inclined to make the mistake of somewhat arrogantly underestimating the adherence of these peoples to the heritage of their own civilisation and culture. By so doing we present communism with a trump card in the shape of unnecessarily wounded national, religious and cultural susceptibilities, instead

¹ In this connection, Emil Brunner: 'Japan Heute', Schweizer Monatshefte, March 1955 will be found to be a very well-informed and reliable source. Imagination boggles at the thought of what would have happened had the American progressives succeeded, after 1945, in bringing about the abolition of the Japanese monarchy.

² Ramswarup: Gandhism and Communism. New Delhi, 1955: 'Our intellectualised leftist conscience sees nothing but illiteracy, inadequacy and frustration around and hopes to remove these by the blue-prints of five-year plans. Gandhiji, on the other hand, brought a message of hope and suggested ways of improvement, not by destroying existing patterns but by bearing with them, by improving them' (p. 11). It would, admittedly, be unjust to overlook the most recent phases of Indian policy, particularly the 'Community Development Schemes', which give signs of a growing insight. Cf. Harry D. Gideonse: Colonial Experience and the Social Context of Economic Development Programs, in the collection: 'Economics and the Public Interest'. New Brunswick, 1955, p. 264.

of using this most praiseworthy devotion of a people to itself as a bulwark against communism, and honouring and fostering it as a potent weapon against the disintegrating and disrupting forces of material westernisation.¹

Although we have here registered our disagreement with the calamitous opinion that the cold war can be won by means of materialistic expediency and in terms of living standards and productivity figures, we must also protect ourselves against the misconception that we are under-estimating the value of these weapons and are proposing to pin our faith on the opposite extreme of purely spiritual asceticism. The importance of the weapons of increased productivity and a higher living standard for the masses is, of course, greatly enhanced by the fact that it is in just this respect that the free west, with its incomparably superior economic system, which leaves the individual creative urge free to combat the scourge of poverty, has the best chance of defeating communism whenever and wherever it is met. But this alone will not suffice, and the free world will be in jeopardy if it relies solely, or even predominantly, upon it. It must not be forgotten that the ultimate decision lies in the spiritual and moral field. In so far as efforts to increase material well-being strengthen men's will to resist in the decisive spiritual and moral

¹ F.S.C. Northrop contributes some noteworthy remarks on the subject in: 'The Taming of the Nations - A Study of the Cultural Bases of International Policy'. New York, 1952. He quite rightly points out that the thing which, in these countries - Iran, Egypt, Burma - is so often stigmatised as 'nationalism' is, indeed, nationalism in the accepted sense of the term as far as the westernised intellectuals are concerned; but with the broad masses there is in it a strong element of passionate and conservative devotion to their own religious and cultural traditions. We should do well to ponder over the fact that, as Northrop reminds us, Mao Tse Tung's troops entered Peking singing old Chinese folksongs - and by doing so roused tens of thousands to enthusiasm. 'Truly, it is not nationalism but the resurgence of indigenous culturalism that is sweeping the world. The secret of the Communists' success is that the Russians are aware of this development and have allied themselves with it everywhere' (p. 178). Cf. Harry D. Gideonse (footnote 2, page 80), and Eugene Stanley: 'The Future of Undeveloped Countries.' New York 1954, p. 384. Convincing evidence of the fact that communism, both in India and in the countries of the Middle East, is making less headway among the masses than with the middle classes and the intellectuals, will be found in M. R. Masani: 'The Communist Party in India.' Pacific Affairs, March 1951, and Walter Z. Laqueur: 'The Appeal of Communism in the Middle East.' Middle East Journal, Winter 1954/55.

sphere, they are of inestimable value. But we must also not forget that material comfort can also weaken and deaden susceptibilities and can distract men's minds from the things that really matter. The more we are inclined to overlook this truth, the greater is the need that we should be reminded of it.

The same applies to all those measures which, in the west, are demanded in the name of 'social justice' and 'social security'. It would be foolish to deny that much of what has been done in this respect – the land reforms in many of the under-developed countries, for example – and what still remains to be done, is well qualified to increase the powers of resistance of the masses to the spiritual and moral infection of communism. But the same sense of proportion and an appreciation of the order of precedence in our human values also warns us that there is a grave danger lest 'social justice' be misconstrued to mean the welfare State, equality and automatic provision for the masses by the State and lead to the unleashing of hatred, envy, jealousy, class warfare, resentment and unceasing discontent, that would cause the free world to fall like ripe fruit into the arms of communism.¹

¹ What remains to be said in detail on this aspect will, I think, be found in my book: 'Mass und Mitte' (Erlenbach-Zürich, 1950, pp. 54-85.)

DAVID McCORD WRIGHT

McGill University

AMERICA AND EUROPE

AN IDEOLOGICAL INCURSION

I

COMMONWEALTH-U.S. RELATIONS: ONE U.S. VIEW

When one is discussing among friends the subject of Anglo-American relations, it is tempting to escape into a few innocuous remarks about 'blood being thicker than water', pad with some humorous stories, and let the matter stand at that. But I feel sure that we must make a more serious effort to achieve understanding. And we do not understand a person's ideas until we know *why* he has them. So what I want to do briefly here is not so much to argue whether American ideas or policies are right or wrong – I don't accept all of them myself – but to explain *why* Americans have them.

In this connection I think English and indeed European ideas of the United States are too much shaped by cowboy and gangster movies. That is, the impression is given that we are an unthinking, immature, inexperienced and 'trigger happy' country. From this it is easy to jump to the idea that our beliefs don't have any rational basis at all but are merely the result of youthful combativeness, or, in a more hostile version, unthinking capitalist 'aggression'.

But let me sketch in some of the elements of a different and, I believe, more accurate picture. First of all the United States is not a young and inexperienced Government. We have, on the contrary, one of the oldest, most sophisticated and most mature political traditions in the world.

The American constitution has been amended often since 1789. But our machinery and tradition of government today have, I believe, far more in common with our original constitution of 1789 than, say, modern British government has with its machinery and constitution

as of 1789. And we are the direct inheritors of the whole English common law, so that, to give one example, the ownership of a whale washed up on our Pacific Coast a few years ago was settled by reference to thirteenth century English precedents relating to the disposal of 'Royal fish'. I do not wish to claim too much. All I am standing out for is – that we are not properly speaking a young or inexperienced Government. The precise relative age is a secondary matter. Again, concerning the 'sophistication' of our political tradition, we should remember that the American constitution was drawn up by a group very largely composed of highly educated classical scholars deeply versed in Roman and Greek history. And if you read the letters and writings of our 'founding fathers' you will find them threshing out many of the questions which still vex Europe.

Jefferson, for example, had a thorough understanding of the 'literal equality' versus 'paternalism' dispute and had worked out the synthesis of a fluid society and a fair chance a good century and a half ago. Likewise the need for social services to give a *positive* as well as negative meaning to this ideal was clearly recognized and implementation commenced in the United States some eighty years before, say, general public education was undertaken in Britain. The charter of the University of Georgia – oldest American State university charter (January 1785) – begins with what remains to this day one of the very best statements of the problem of democratic progress that I know of. True, we have often fallen tragically short of our ideal. But the ideal in any society is always something worked for – never attained.

Passing on, then, to the positive content of this American tradition and its meaning for modern Commonwealth-U.S. relations, a recent Canadian President of the American Economic Association has said that the only American orthodoxy is that there shall be no orthodoxy. Now, of course, like most epigrams, this is far too simple a statement. Nevertheless, it does convey an element of profound truth. For it is an absolutely basic idea in American life and the American constitution that disagreement is inevitable, even among noble and unselfish people, and that we most nearly attain peace by 'agreeing to disagree', not by imposing compulsory agreement. I will come back to this very important idea later.

The next important idea in the American tradition is the distrust of power as such – even the power of the majority. Our constitutionalists clearly recognized that, in the short run anyhow, the majority could be mistaken and unjust. They also held that power in itself was a drug capable of subtly corrupting the noblest of men. Therefore they sought to diffuse power, to limit its exercise and to make change in fundamental matters a deliberate rather than a rapid process. In other words, the (to me) politically adolescent tradition of the ‘good’ dictator (or the ‘good’ oligarchy) possessed of unlimited power which will personally fix everything up and usher in the millennium overnight has always been anathema to American constitutional ideas.

Thirdly, American culture, despite determined efforts to change it, remains as yet largely an activist, voluntarist culture. We have prized the joy of effort as such. We tend to be pragmatists. We tend to aim not so much at the attainment of a single unchanging pattern as at an ideal process of change. As one of our leading economists and philosophers put it, our aim is ‘not satisfaction but better wants’ and these ‘better’ wants do not just mean in American context (as is so often libellously said) more bath tubs or more washing machines. They mean also more art galleries, more municipal symphonies, more universities.

Finally it must be remembered that, again despite many efforts at change, America is largely held together by an often unexpressed but none the less profoundly felt community of religious ideals. There are not many countries left in the world in which, for example, Christian teaching is still taken so seriously by so many people.

Summarizing then, I have so far, first, submitted that the United States possesses a very mature and sophisticated political tradition. Next I have indicated four of the fundamental aspects of that culture: belief in the inevitability of disagreement even among the noblest of men, distrust of power, emphasis upon activity and change. These three aspects taken together have led one recent writer to speak of ‘The USA – the Permanent Revolution’.

But we do not just believe in *any* change. On the contrary, our ideas of progress are unofficially but deeply shaped and circumscribed by standards inherited from the Judaic-Christian religious and ethical

tradition. Next week I shall try to show how these four elements: agreement to disagree, distrust of power, activism, and Christianity, shape our foreign policies and our contacts with the Commonwealth. I shall especially refer to three main points: (1) our attitudes toward Communism and our loyalty programme; (2) our attempts to help Europe on to more federation; (3) economic relations.

II

AMERICAN COMMUNISM

The contrast between the ideology I sketched last week and that of Communist Russia is indeed profound: We distrust power and dictatorship. They believe in salvation through power and dictatorship. We believe disagreement in any society is inevitable and think that peace is most nearly attained by 'agreeing to disagree'. They hope to stamp out disagreement by total use of all methods and feel that peace can only come when all men agree with them – i.e. when the whole world is Communist. We do not think we can ever attain a world free from some conflicts and difficulties. They look forward to an ideal state of perfect anarchy. One could carry on the antitheses indefinitely. But those who think I am exaggerating should read Lenin's *State and Revolution* and contrast it with *The Federalist* or some of Jefferson's letters to John Adams.

I cannot here detail either Marxist or Communist teaching (the two terms are not the same). The main points however are twofold. First, if the Communists really believe what they say then they are and must be implacably hostile to any non-Communist country. Especially liberal-Socialist ones. This does not mean that in the short run they may not profess friendship or make treaties and keep them for some time. There is a quirk here in Communist teaching which often misleads the unwary. I mean the 'two stage' analysis.

All the Utopian and idealistic promises of Communism are for the 'eventual' 'Communist' phase whose beginning is (wisely) never dated. The first phase is the 'Socialist' phase during which anything goes. The present tyranny of Russia or China does not therefore (to their credit) necessarily mean any abandonment of their Utopian

aspirations. But on the other hand peaceful gestures made in the short run, equally, cannot be taken as indicating abandonment of the grandiose scheme for world conquest which is of the essence of Communism. Until very positive, practical and prolonged evidence of a genuine change of heart is forthcoming, most Americans think we would be very foolish to relax our vigilance. It must be remembered in this connection, also, that lying is an explicitly recognized and legitimate weapon for the Communist.

The second point to remember about Communism is that it is a world conspiracy for the destruction of free speech. Your trained Leninist-Marxist can think of no greater sin than tolerance. For the whole Utopian hope of Communism is based on the idea that if people never hear anything except what is 'good' (i.e. what the Communist party members think is 'good') then they won't have any bad ideas. The aim is not so much to raise good men, in the Christian sense of the word, as innocent men. People are not to resist temptation, but are rather to be situated so as never to be exposed to temptation. Now this means an absolute cultural and intellectual rationing and authoritarianism. Only the 'good' (as interpreted by the Party) is to be permitted.

Here is where our loyalty programme comes in. I want to talk first about general principles – not specific measures. Consider two paradoxical sounding statements: (1) 'the believer in continuing change can admit all changes except a change that makes further change impossible'; (2) 'the believer in tolerance can tolerate everything *except* the *end* of tolerance'. What I am trying to say may be exemplified as follows: Suppose I say I believe in tolerance. Suppose I am in Germany at the time the Nazis are seizing power. Suppose I am too tolerant to do anything to stop them. Would I really be believing in tolerance?

All these points have been considered many times in American history and from them has emerged our doctrine (enunciated among others by the great liberal, Mr. Justice Holmes) of the 'clear and present danger'. Applied to the Communists, what Holmes' doctrine would mean is as follows: the Communist himself who avowedly despises the very value to which he appeals, i.e. free speech, deserves no sympathy – but we protect him not for his sake but for our own.

In other words, we are so afraid of the dangers of suppression we do not even suppress attacks on free speech unless there is a clear and present danger.

The defence of tolerance by government suppression must therefore be almost a last ditch affair. But if there is a clear and present danger we would be traitors to free speech and traitors to tolerance if we did not act.

Now the trouble with the seizure of power by Communists is that it is an irreversible process, so far at least as peaceful means are concerned. It isn't like the Labour Party succeeding the Conservatives or *vice versa*, for both Labour and the Tories believe in certain rules among which are belief in genuine elections and belief in peacefully yielding power if one loses those elections. Not so the Communist. Once in power, always in power. He is like a man who makes sure the umpire will rule his way by tying him up and gagging him. He doesn't play the game.

Coming to the practical aspects of this problem, the trouble is that the principle of the 'clear and present' danger allows a wide range of discretion and plenty of room for disagreements in judgment. But there are two things I want to say. First: some of the apparent irresponsibility of U.S. statesmen, or in our bearing with some U.S. 'statesmen', is due to the fact that we, and they, know we are acting within a framework of government precisely designed to deal with and limit the demagogue and the popular panic. Let me give an example. I thought the recent U.S. Senate resolution 'out-lawing' the Communist Party was a bad, silly and useless act and I protested publicly.

But before that resolution or the subsequent law is really given full effect there will undoubtedly be an appeal to the Supreme Court. And I feel quite sure that if it survives the Court at all – which I doubt – it will be so emasculated as to be unrecognizable. Furthermore, my guess is that most of the Senators voting for the act knew this, and would not otherwise have voted as they did. It should be remembered that one of the sponsors of the resolution was the well known 'liberal' democrat Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota.

My second point is a purely factual one. There exists today in the United States no very serious barrier to the presentation of Marxian

thought. You can buy Marx' or Lenin's works in almost any town. If they are not on display they can be ordered. And you can read them in probably a majority of the public libraries. Hundreds of revisionist Marxists hold University positions without difficulty. The Communist Manifesto appears on the reading lists of most leading colleges. I have myself taught Marxian economics, using (among other things) the works of Lenin and Marx in three American Universities and for the last five years.

On the other hand it is equally a mistake to suppose that Right wing thought, more particularly in 'intellectual' circles, always has an easy time getting a hearing in the United States, or that 'character assassination' is a monopoly of the Right. As a strongly pro-capitalist economist, I have both suffered from, and observed, plenty of smearing and doctoring of the evidence – both personally, and regarding important points of economic theory and fact concerning capitalism.

Again, some (but of course not all) of the accusations of witch-hunting are based upon an almost ritual use of the word 'Communist' so narrow as to exclude even the most enthusiastic collaborator. This is a very delicate point and mistakes are inevitable. But let me use two examples to indicate the problem. Would it have been quite 100 per cent accurate to call Laval a Nazi? Would it have been quite 100 per cent accurate to call Quisling a Nazi? On distinctions as fine as these rest many of the disputes as to who 'was' a Communist. So I conclude: first, that America would have no quarrel with a purely national Communism. It is no business of ours how either the Russians or the Chinese choose to live, as long as they don't try to force us to live the same way. But most Americans do not believe there can be such a thing as a purely national Communism. And it is simply a fact that on the basis of their own public writings and speeches Communism is clearly a world wide conspiracy to destroy free speech and to rule the world. Most Americans, therefore, believe we would be foolish to relax our vigilance, or to cede strategic points before much more conclusive evidence of a change of heart is found.

Next, most of us admit there have been mistakes and abuses in our loyalty programme. But the great majority of Americans feel some

such programme is necessary. They feel – however mistakenly others may think it – that they are defending free speech in seeing that Communist activities do not become fatal.

I cannot discuss technical Marxian economics here, but I do want to say this much: the Communist or Marxian claim that their doctrine has a special scientific base is a demonstrable fraud. I am prepared to challenge any Marxist or near Marxist in England – or Europe – to debate his scientific claims with me. So long as he eludes or evades debate he is thereby confessing that he is afraid to test his ideas. This may sound dramatic, but there are times when truth must be stated rather firmly.

III

AMERICA AND EUROPEAN FEDERATION

Let us turn now from Communism to another topic: America's efforts to foster European federation. I read a lot today to the effect that the U.S. is so blindly obsessed by unwarranted fear of Russia that we are willing to turn loose the 'incurably militant' Germans for a third rape of Europe.

In this connection we ought to remember that the United States, descended from all Europe – but removed from Europe – can take a longer and more dispassionate view of Europe than the European, jammed close against his neighbour and filled with fears and grudges both ancient and modern. Here I will appeal for authority to history, and particularly to English history, still more particularly to a man who in the realm of Foreign Affairs I regard as one of the greatest of Englishmen – the Duke of Wellington.

The situation of France after Waterloo resembles strikingly in many ways the present state of Germany. Here was a nation which for upwards of two centuries (since the beginning of Louis XIV's reign – if not earlier) had kept Europe in continual uproar through aggression.

Think what a case a modern anthropologist could have made against the French in 1816. Versailles was filled with memorials of battles – mostly in Germany or against Germans. The great new national

shrine being built was (and still is) the Arc de Triomphe – a memorial of military victories – largely over Germans. The country had given a striking instance of bad faith – the re-establishment of Napoleon. Surely a modern anthropologist would easily have concluded that the ‘culture concept’ of the French was incurably militaristic and that they were extraordinarily gullible to anyone promising military glory.

That is precisely what the experts of Wellington’s time *did* conclude. And the cry was raised that the French should be made to cede various strategic fortresses and otherwise permanently chained down. Against all this Wellington set his face with admirable firmness and moderation. French territory, he said, must not merely be seized in strategic places. France must either be reincorporated into the European concert of nations or else ‘destroyed’. And, being a soldier, he set out in parallel arguments the way to achieve each end.

He then went on to explain that the Allies lacked both, to some extent, the means and still more the will utterly to destroy the French nation. That being the case, he said, the only choice was to try to reconcile the French to the new settlement. One means to this, he concluded, would be the terms of a generous peace – even though (and I quote his specific words) it left France ‘too strong’ for safety. I refer you to Philip Guedalla’s *The Duke* or Richard Aldington’s *Wellington*. And I recall that to Wellington’s settlement we owe one of the longest periods of peace in European history.

The parallel it seems to me is very close. The Germans cannot expect us to forget what they have done. They must be prepared to meet with a reasonable watchfulness and scepticism. But, if we put them in a spiritual ghetto and leave them no hope of rehabilitation, where else can they go *but* back to Communism or Nazism, twin versions of the same fundamental terror and violation of the human spirit. Finally, there is the question of economic relations. Here I want to mention two criticisms concerning the U.S., one of which I think is wrong and the other quite reasonable. I have said that the United States was deeply influenced by Christian ideals. Nowhere is that better exemplified than in post-war policy towards Europe.

In all sincerity – however it may surprise you – I will say that seldom has there been a nation less desirous of world leadership or control

than the United States. We have regarded the old world, with its bitternesses and feuds, with a sort of horror. Many of us still yearn to be quit of it. Even now we want only to make the world, in Woodrow Wilson's phrase, 'safe for democracy'. We desire nothing more earnestly than a really independent, self sustaining, peaceful Europe. To that end we have sent abroad as gifts not merely billions in money but also team after team of 'productivity' experts – anxious to share such 'know how' as we have and help to enable the rest of the world to develop to our level of well-being.

What have the Marxists said about this? Well, first the Marshall plan and its successors were merely devices to keep us from 'drowning in our own plenty', or to bribe others to support us. Next, that more 'productivity' was merely a device to exploit the workers. The whole pseudo-scientific clap-trap, so easily exposed by anyone who takes the trouble, regarding the industrial reserve army and the fund of surplus value is drummed up in a frantic effort to keep Europe weak and to prevent her from making the changes that will give her a viable independent economy.

Let me first discuss the Marshall plan point. There are technical fallacies inherent in the idea of any permanent capital saturation or 'nemesis of accumulation'. But let me confine myself to more practical considerations. I come from one of the poorest parts of the United States and I can tell you it is pure flapdoodle to say (supposing we were confronted with a temporary capital glut) that we 'could not use' our capital at home. There are plenty of poor people in Georgia and Mississippi and New Mexico. Plenty of schools that could be built or hospitals that could be expanded. Americans could well reply that they had to some extent neglected their own poor – to rebuild Europe.

And why? Was it merely to 'buy allies'? No such aid on such a scale, still less the help with productivity, would have been forthcoming on so narrow a motive. There were pressure groups waiting to cash in of course. But they would not have got anywhere had not most Americans wished to give largely in a spirit of Christian charity, thankfulness and gratitude and, if there was a second motive, the most important one was not to create dependent colonies but to make you self-supporting and independent.

The basic confusion here is well expressed in a recent book by an English theologian, Canon Demant:

‘Christian teaching will not allow that an action ceases to be morally good merely because it gives satisfaction to the doer of it. It is possible to do the right thing and find that it does not conflict with our self interest.’

Admittedly it benefits the U.S. to have a peaceful and prosperous world, but to the extent that gifts furthered that aim, that fact does not prove that they were made from self interest, still less to throw away any ‘unneeded’ surplus.

But let me not claim too much. Americans are not angels, and England and the Commonwealth have some just ground for criticism. How perilous the economic future still is for the United Kingdom has recently been documented with characteristic thoroughness and moderation by Professor Austin Robinson of Cambridge. That England still desperately needs to adjust, to modernize and increase its productivity cannot be denied. And this fundamental need would be just as urgent whether she were Socialist, Capitalist, or Communist. On the basis of incontrovertible scientific fact England is an over-populated, under-equipped island.

However, there is another side to the picture. If we Americans are to go abroad proclaiming the virtues of the enterprise economy, growth, change and economic freedom, then I submit we ought to practise what we preach. Europe has a right to ask of the United States two things: reasonably free trade policy for European products in the U.S., and relative stability of the U.S. economy. ‘Trade not Aid’ and no return to 1930, in other words. Here, in my opinion, is the most vulnerable point in the American position and one to which you can quite justly call attention.

Yet here too I would appeal to history and to English history for understanding, and here too I would recall England’s problems in the post-Napoleonic period. Our resemblances are twofold. First, England was no quicker to adjust to its world economic position than America is being. The corn laws for example were not repealed for some twenty-five years. England had her isolationists too.

But there is another similarity which I mention with great diffidence. I mean the wave of vilification and envy that broke over England

from abroad. You can find many echoes of it in Thackeray, but again it is most clearly seen in the slandering of Wellington. I would like to end on a plea for greater charity toward my country. I feel that England ought to be especially sympathetic in this regard. For there is nothing we are not experiencing now that you did not experience upon your emergence as a great Power. All the anti-American propaganda – the malice, the half truth, the unjust interpretation, the great big smear and the little dirty story – all these have been anticipated in the anti-British propaganda of the past century.

RUSSELL KIRK

Long Island University

THE COMMON PATRIMONY OF
AMERICA AND EUROPE

In *The Revolt of the Masses*, the late Jose Ortega y Gasset observed that American civilization could not long endure, were it severed from European civilization. Ortega's opinion, however, is not shared by certain American writers, among whom – especially in this century – there exists a tendency to arrogate to American culture cultural achievements that really are the product of four or five thousand years of civil social order. Mr. Roger Burlingame, for instance, in a recent book called *The American Conscience*, implies that conscience itself first appeared along the Atlantic seaboard of America in the seventeenth century. Mr. Burlingame, by the way, is hot against American political 'isolationists'; but I need scarcely remark that Mr. Burlingame himself is an isolationist of the mind. For Ortega was right. American culture, and the American civil social order, share with modern European civilization a common patrimony. The principal articles in that patrimony are the Christian faith, the Roman concept of law, and the great body of Western literature. From out this inheritance grow certain beliefs concerning the nature of man and the nature of society which remain common – however much weakened in our century – to both Europe and America.

This patrimony is a legacy of convictions, not a legacy of blood. So far as race and nationality are concerned, the continuity between Europe and America is confused and imperfect. Take, for instance, my own little village of Mecosta, in the pine barrens of central Michigan, a place founded by my great-grandfather and his uncle, and having nowadays a population of some two hundred souls. (Eighty years ago, Mecosta had two thousand inhabitants, but rural depopulation goes on at an increasing rate in much of the United States.) Well, the name 'Mecosta' means 'little cub bear' – a word

of the Pottawattomie Indians. The original population of the region – of whom a very few descendants survive to this day – was composed of Pottawattomies and Chippewas. What is unusual in the United States, the first civilized folk to establish themselves in the region were not white people, but negroes: escaped and emancipated slaves, most of whom had fled from the Southern states across the Ohio River and north to Canada, and then had entered Michigan from Canada after Lincoln's proclamation of emancipation. The descendants of those colored people are in Mecosta and its hinterland still, now mixed in blood with Indians and whites, but still forming a distinct community, centered round their own church.

To this same region of Mecosta, in the great days of Michigan lumbering, came New Englanders and New Yorkers of old Puritan stock like my great-grandfather, who laid out the town itself. There came also, about the same time or a little earlier, numbers of Bavarian peasants, whose church of St. Michael remains their bond of union. These Catholics were joined, presently, by Irish settlers. In recent years, Mecosta has gained a new element of population, principally Polish and Ukranian, filtering from the twentieth-century industrial cities of Michigan into the countryside. All in all, my little Mecosta is a microcosm of America, curiously diverse in ancestry and cultural origins. Our bank-manager has a strong strain of Indian blood; my carpenter is a Bavarian; half of the country people who gather in the village on Saturday nights have very dark complexions; while I sit in my Mecosta library surrounded by shelves of New England authors, under my framed diploma from St. Andrews University, in Scotland. What link is there between a village and a nation such as this, and the ancient communities of Europe?

European civilization, Edmund Burke said nearly a hundred and seventy years ago, is sustained by the spirit of religion, and the spirit of a gentleman. And so – despite the outward triumph of technology – is American civilization. What joins the cultures on either side of the Atlantic is a complex of religious and moral and social convictions, given expression in a body of literature, that Europe and America have received from common spiritual and intellectual ancestors. If this inheritance should be much diminished, all the elaborate fabric of our material civilization could not long survive, either side of

the ocean, the collapse of this subtle inner order. For order in private character and order in society are possible, as Gabriel Marcel suggests, only in an atmosphere of 'diffused gratitude', a society which is aware of the debt – what Burke called 'the contract of eternal society' – that the present generation owes to the generations that are dead and to the generations that are yet unborn. And the real element of sympathy and common interest between Europe and America is not material, nor military, nor racial, but rather spiritual and intellectual.

The first principal article in this common patrimony, I have said, is the Christian faith. All the important aspects of any civilization arise from that civilization's religion: even the economic system of that civilization. As one of the most important American thinkers and critics of this century – Irving Babbitt – wrote a generation ago, economics trends upward into politics, politics into ethics, and ethics into theology. This is no less true in the United States of America than in Egypt or India. And the United States of America is a Christian nation, the opinion of Thomas Jefferson expressed to the Dey of Tunis notwithstanding. In terms of church-attendance, indeed, America is the most Christian of nations. It may be true that a good deal of the high rate of church-attendance in my country reflects – as some critics argue – not so much religious conviction as mere religiosity. But that always has been true of all church-attendance everywhere. What matters, so far as the civil social order is concerned, is that the great bulk of the American people voluntarily subscribe to that venerable body of convictions that we call Christianity. In the things which most nearly concern the private life, they draw their moral and intellectual sustenance from the old religion of Europe and the Levant. The prophets of Israel, the words of Christ and His disciples, the writings of the fathers of the Church, the dissertations of Reformers and Counter-Reformers: these are the springs of American metaphysics and American morality, as they are of European metaphysics and European morality. And in American Christianity, as in European, there are blended with Christian doctrine the elaborate elements of classical philosophy. In its immediate influence upon culture, perhaps the most important aspect of Christianity is its view of the human personality: the doc-

trine of the immortal soul, the unique character of every soul, the concept of human dignity, the nature of rights and duties, the obligation to exercise Christian charity, the insistence upon private responsibility. Both European and American civilizations have been erected upon the grand foundation of the dignity of man: upon the assumption that man is made for eternity, and that he possesses dignity because he has some share in an essence more than human. The earliest enduring European settlements in America were founded expressly upon Christian principles; as John Winthrop preached to his Puritan company on the deck of the *Arabella*, as they sailed for New England,

We shall find that the God of Israel is among us, when ten of us shall be able to resist a thousand of our enemies, when He shall make us a praise and glory, that men shall say of succeeding plantations: 'The Lord make it like that of New England.' For we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have undertaken, and so cause Him to withdraw His present help from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world: we shall open the mouths of enemies to speak evil of the ways of God and all professors for God's sake; we shall shame the faces of many of God's worthy servants, till we be consumed out of the good land whither we are going.

If the American people have not invariably conducted themselves with the virtue which John Winthrop enjoined, nevertheless Christianity has remained an immense moving force among them, and is little diminished today. The student of civilization who endeavors to ignore the role of Christianity in European and American culture is as foolish as a physician would be if he endeavored to ignore the function of the heart. Even the most virulent secular movements of our age – the totalist ideologies – are inspired by a misunderstanding of Christianity or a reaction against it; they cannot break altogether with traditional religion. It was an American, Orestes Brownson, who first described Communism – in the fateful year of 1848 – as a heresy from Christianity and a caricature of Christian doctrines.

The second article in our common patrimony is what I have called the Roman concept of law. In America there prevails a system of legal theories and institutions directly descended from the laws of Europe. For the most part, Americans have learnt their law through the medium of English jurisprudence and English prescription, just as they have learnt their Christianity, for the most part, through the King James version of the Bible and the Book of Common Prayer. But they also acquainted themselves, from colonial days, with the great general source of European legal and political theory – the classical writers, and particularly Cicero. The doctrines of natural law; the models for a commonwealth; the ideal of a government of laws, not of men; the realization that justice means ‘to each his own’; the whole complex of reverence for the reign of law: these passed directly from Europe into American theory and establishment. The founders of the American Republic had for their guiding lights both the long political experience of England and their knowledge of the Roman Republic. The chief works of American political philosophy of that fateful time – the *Federalist Papers* and John Adams’ *Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America* – are suffused with an apprehension of European political and juridical institutions. John Adams, for instance, in his bulky work on the Constitutions, considers in detail the history and politics of several Swiss cantons. As Friedrich Gentz pointed out at the end of the eighteenth century, the American republicans – in contrast with the French revolutionaries – were devoted to tradition and precedent.

Thus America has in common with Europe a well-understood legacy of justice and order and freedom, a balancing of things public and things private, derived in considerable part from the Roman law and further secured by the Christian idea of personal freedom and personal responsibility. The principle of effectual restraints upon political power, for instance, is eminent in the political theory and practice of both Western Europe and the United States. It has been so since the beginnings of American society. John Cotton, for instance, declared in Massachusetts in the third decade of the seventeenth century, ‘Let all the world learn to give mortal men no greater power than they are content they shall use – for use it they will . . .

This is one of the strains of nature: it affects boundless liberty, and to run to the utmost extent. Whatever power he hath received, he hath a corrupt nature that will improve it in one thing or other; if he have liberty, he will think why may he not use it. . . . There is a strain in a man's heart that will sometime or other run out to excess, unless the Lord restrain it; but it is not good to venture it.' I suggested that the third principal article in our common patrimony is the corpus of literature of our European-American civilization. The great works of imagination and reason make us all kin. They do far more than all the endeavors of the United Nations Organization to transcend the barriers of nationalism. Homer and Hesiod; Herodotus and Thucydides; Plato and Aristotle; Virgil and Horace; Livy and Tacitus; Cicero and Seneca; Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius; Dante, Petrarch, Erasmus, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Montaigne, Goethe, and all the rest – these have formed the mind and character of Americans as well as Europeans. The best of American letters is part and parcel of the accomplishment of European literature. Romancers like Hawthorne, and historians like Henry Adams, though exhibiting certain casts of mind and habits of style distinctly American, nevertheless participate in the grand tradition of our common literature. Their view of human nature is one with that of their intellectual ancestors; their merits of style and method are derived, in part, from the bank and capital of a civilization that rises superior to nationality.

It was Fulbert of Chartres, I believe, who declared that we moderns are dwarfs standing upon the shoulders of giants – able to see so far only because we are elevated upon the immense stature of our ancestors. This is as true in the twentieth century as it was in the fourteenth century. Europeans and Americans have the same spiritual and moral ancestors, though not always the same physical ancestors. A remote American village like my native Mecosta shares with medieval Zurich or modern Zurich – or, for that matter, with Paris and Rome – the wisdom of our ancestors. It is a part, however inconspicuous, of that great continuity and essence which extends from Sinai to San Francisco, in both time and space. In all essential respects, Europe and America have a common faith, a common history, a common system of politics and law, and a common body

of great literature. They make one civilization. Thus a native of Bulgaria and a citizen of the territory of Alaska, let us say, ordinarily will have much more in common than will two Indian villagers – one a Moslem, one a Hindu – living within a few rods of one another. Their general assumptions concerning the nature of divine being, of man, and of society are, in essence, much the same.

Yet, all this said, I must add some words of misgiving. A civilization cannot continue to subsist solely by virtue of its patrimony. As the human body sloughs off old tissue and takes on new, so a civilization that cannot refresh itself regularly must decline into caducity. The means of its renewal is the means of its conservation. Without continuity, a civilization must perish; but without change, too, a civilization must perish. I am by no means certain that our own common civilization now displays the vitality and the awareness of the contract of immortal society which are indispensable to any enduring culture. My European readers know much more than I do about the vitality of Continental civilization; my own close observations are confined, for the greater part, to America and Britain. I propose, therefore, to point out briefly certain ominous symptoms of American neglect of our common patrimony. In our age, probably more than in most eras, there are many persons in rebellion against the wisdom of our ancestors. To such, the spiritual and intellectual patrimony of our civilization seems a burden, rather than a foundation. I do not know that there are more of these rebels against our common civilization in America than in Europe, but I am more uncomfortably aware of their activities in my own country. So far as our common Christian heritage is concerned, there is not the slightest danger that Christianity may cease to be popular in America. The peril, rather, is that the Christian religion may become altogether too popular for its own good. Tocqueville remarked upon the tendency of the American democracy to re-fashion religion on a democratic pattern, to abolish all intermediary powers between God and man, and to emphasize the social aspects of religious faith at the expense of the supernatural. Atheism, agnosticism, and anti-clericalism, even at the height of their nineteenth-century vogue, never exercised any real influence in America. In the United States, positivism – old-style or new-style – is confined almost wholly to

certain members of university and college faculties – those disgruntled persons whom the Irish call ‘sp’iled praists’ and the Scots call ‘stickit ministers’. Financially, at least, the American churches are in a most healthy state.

Yet the quality of that religious faith is another matter. The American Protestant clergy – and, to a lesser extent, even the Roman Catholic clergy – tend markedly toward what is called the ‘social gospel’, the sentimental and humanitarian application of religious doctrines to the reform of mundane society, at the expense of the supernatural element in religion and the personal element in morality. There also exists a tendency toward making the church into a club and a means of communal self-gratulation. Christian hope and Christian resignation both suffer under this domination of materialism and democracy in the church. Yet there is some excuse for cheerfulness: the social-gospel movement is less powerful than it was a generation ago, while the sterner theology and discipline of orthodoxy has undergone some considerable revival in the seminaries. America never will build her equivalent of the Gothic cathedrals of Europe, nor ever will the American churches be so much the center of all life as were the medieval churches. But Christian theology and Christian morals are not going to yield much ground before a twentieth-century nihilism.

When we turn, however, to our inheritance of the reign of law, there is serious cause for misgiving in America. I do not refer to the recent tempest in a teapot over the career of the late Joseph McCarthy: such phenomena – and I mean both sides in that controversy – are inevitable in any democracy. Scarcely anything could be sillier than Lord Russell’s recent suggestions that representative government and civil rights are imperilled in the United States. The trouble, rather, is less pressing and more profound. What I have in mind is a growing ignorance of the first principles of justice and jurisprudence, even among judges and lawyers; and the tendency toward concentration of power in the executive branch of the federal government, in the federal civil service, and in the federal government in general.

The cause of this drift is to be found, in part, in the gradual substitution of utilitarian and pragmatic standards for the tenets of

natural law, in jurisprudence and in political theory. One may perceive the triumph, in fine, of what Professor Eric Voegelin calls 'theoretical illiteracy'. This affliction exists at every level of American society, from top to bottom, and the ascendancy of the educational notions of the late John Dewey and other pragmatists has something to do with the trouble. Certain journals of opinion long very friendly toward the present Supreme Court of the United States now are manifesting alarm at the grounds on which the Court has based recent important decisions. The majority of that Court now seem to give social expediency and utility pride of place over authority and precedent. In the Court's decision upon the 'integration' of white and negro pupils in Southern schools, for instance, the Court apparently gave great weight to the sociological arguments of Mr. Gunnar Myrdal for social and racial integration: what *ought* to be in society, rather than what the existing law means, now is a primary consideration with the Supreme Court. I venture here only to suggest that this concentration of decision-power in a court of nine members is not wholly consonant with the principles of established constitutional democracy. And the degree of legal scholarship possessed by justices recently appointed to the Supreme Court is markedly inferior to the knowledge of law usually possessed by Supreme Court justices in the past.

One may see the same decay of understanding of the reign of law in obscure quarters. A university student of considerable natural intelligence and some decent training recently inquired of me why all the American checks upon power were desirable. Why could we not simply train up an elite of governmental administrators, he asked, and trust to their good-will and ability, and let them manage all the concerns of the nation – diplomatic, domestic, and economic? Such naïveté, which amounts to an ignorance of the whole tradition of European and American political theory and history, actually is often encouraged by the schools of 'administration' and 'governmental research' at American universities. It also reflects a profound ignorance of human nature and the ways of great states. It is the attitude which Lord Percy of Newcastle calls 'totalist democracy' – a foolish trust in an abstraction called The People, combined with an unquestioning faith in the positivistic specialist. It amounts to

the negation of some thousands of years of history and political philosophy.

This theoretical illiteracy in politics and jurisprudence, produced in part by the failure of twentieth-century American schooling, is paralleled by a decline in the United States of the understanding of humane letters. Here, too, the schools are at fault – and the spirit of the age. Fifty years ago, in his book *Literature and the American College*, Irving Babbitt described the marked decay of humane learning. Sentimentalism and a rootless aestheticism on the one hand, arid and pedantic specialization on the other, even then were weakening the humane disciplines in the United States. The recent ‘Great Books’ movement, let alone the amorphous ‘survey of humanities’ and ‘survey of civilization’ courses in American colleges and universities, has not succeeded in reversing this current.

The study of great literature, in our Western world, has pursued an ethical end through an intellectual means. The improvement of the private human reason for the private person’s own sake, and the incidental improvement of society thereby, was the object of true literary humanism. Both the aim and the discipline itself are badly neglected in twentieth-century America. An obsessive vocationalism has done much mischief to the higher learning – and, for that matter, even to primary and secondary schooling; while the ‘progressive’ aims and methods of John Dewey and his pedagogical disciples injured the old disciplines in other ways. Such slogans as ‘education for living’, ‘learning by doing’, ‘schooling for social reconstruction’, ‘adjustment to the group’, and ‘schools to serve the community’, have been employed for a generation as weapons against any genuine training of the imagination and the reason. Among the consequences has been the steady reduction of moral and intellectual leadership in the United States. The founders of the American Republic learnt the first principles of human nature and society from the Bible, Plutarch, Cicero, and Shakespeare. But the present generation of American schoolboys is expected, instead, to take a lively interest in tours of the municipal sewage-processing plant, and in vague textbooks on ‘social studies’ written in a primitive English that ought to be intelligible to the natives of New Guinea.

What is worst of all, perhaps, is the thoroughgoing neglect of almost

all literature calculated to stir the higher imagination. Poetry is replaced by 'communications skills', narrative history by approved and doctrinaire social generalization. Those persons with a natural bent toward good teaching are driven out of the schools by this domination of the 'Progressive' educational theorists; while the filtered wisdom of many centuries, expressed in great literature, is treated as so much antiquated rubbish. There are professors of pedagogy in my country who seriously argue that no young person ought to read a book more than fifty years old. When the representative of the school of education of a great state university came to my village to lord it over the local school-board, I ventured to suggest to him that possibly the curriculum of our school might be improved. But he was disdainful of 'subject-matter courses'.

'You have a course in English?' he asked our school superintendent. 'And a course in world history?' (This in a high school.) Well, the representative of the pedagogical hierarchy went on to declare, those two courses were quite enough for any high school, so far as intellectual disciplines were concerned. The rest of the pupils' time ought to be spent in 'extra-curricular activities' and 'learning about the community'. What becomes of the cultural patrimony of our civilization under the domination of such persons, I need scarcely suggest. In America we have more students in universities, per head of population, than has any other country in the world; but fewer students actually prepared to benefit from a university's disciplines, I think, than any country in Europe.

The threats to the continuity of our civilization which I have so briefly described in America are not peculiar to the United States. Neoterism in morals, politics, and the works of the mind is not an American passion; it has been said by some observers, indeed, that of all modern peoples the Americans are most sincerely attached to tradition and prescription. A talented Scottish editor, Mr. J. M. Reid, recently travelled through a part of the United States; and he writes to me that America still is characterized by vitality, diversity, and simplicity of life. So I do not despair at home. Yet we all live in an age in which the expectation of change, in the outward aspects of life, seems greater than the expectation of continuity. The patrimony of a civilization can be lost at the very moment of that civilization's material

triumph. In any culture worthy of the name, men must be something better than the flies of a summer; generation must link with generation. Some men in America are doing everything in their power to preserve and restore our common patrimony; and this is not a work that can be accomplished through the employment of positive law or the creation of international commissions. I trust that Europeans, who still possess so many more material reminders of the greatness of past ages, will not forget the ashes of their fathers and the temples of their gods.

FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK

Chicago University

WHAT IS 'SOCIAL' – WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

Except in the fields of philology and logic, there are probably few cases in which one would be justified in devoting a whole article to the meaning of one single word. Sometimes, however, a little word like this not only throws light upon the process of the evolution of ideas and the story of human error, but often continues to exercise an irrational power, which becomes apparent only when, by analysis, we arrive at the true meaning of it. I doubt whether there exists a better example of the little appreciated influence exercised by a single word than that afforded by the role which the little word 'social' has played for a hundred years in the whole sphere of political problems – and is still playing. We are so familiar with it, we accept it so much as a matter of course, that we are hardly conscious of any problem regarding its meaning. We have accepted it for so long as the natural exemplification of good behaviour and sincere thinking, that it seems almost sacrilege even to ask what this word, which so many men regard as the guiding star of their lives, really means. Indeed, I rather suspect that the majority of my readers have a feeling that, though they may not be quite sure what 'social' means, they nevertheless have little doubt that it does represent a guiding star by which all good men should regulate their actions, and they rather hope, therefore, that I shall now tell them exactly what it does mean. Let me say at once that in this respect I shall disappoint them; for the primary conclusion to which a meticulous scrutiny of the word and its meaning has led me is the discovery that even so exceptionally potent a word as this can be incredibly empty of all meaning and itself offers us no answer to our question.

Generally speaking, I am no friend of the new sport of semantics, which derives particular satisfaction from dissecting the meaning of words that are familiar to us all. Equally I have no desire to turn

the tables and, for once in a way, to employ against the concepts of the radical reformers the technique which has hitherto been used almost exclusively against the traditional values of the free world. Nevertheless I see in the ambiguity of the word and the slovenly manner in which it is normally used a very real danger to any clear thinking, any possibility of reasoned discussion with regard to a great number of our most serious problems. It is, I admit, no pleasant task to have to brush aside the roseate veil in which so 'good' a word has been able to envelop all our discussions on domestic problems; but it is a very important task, and one that must be done. The fact that for three or four generations it has been regarded almost as the hall-mark of good men, and that they all make constant use of it, must not be allowed to disguise the other fact that very soon avoidance of its use will inevitably come to be regarded as the hall-mark of clear and logical thinking.

Perhaps it would be as well if, at this juncture, I explained how it came about that, as far as I myself am concerned, a certain malaise regarding the use of the word 'social' was transformed into open hostility that caused me to regard it as a real danger. It was the fact that not only did many of my friends in Germany deem it appropriate and desirable to qualify the term 'free market economy' by calling it 'social free market economy', but even the statute of the Federal German Republic, instead of adhering to the clear and traditional definition of a constitutional State, used the new and ambiguous phrase 'a social, constitutional State'. I doubt very much whether anyone could really explain to us what the addition of this adjectival frill is supposed to denote. But in any case, it gave me a great deal to think about, and the second of the two instances I have quoted will furnish future jurists with plenty of hard nuts to crack.

Be that as it may, the final conclusion emerging from my deliberations has been that the word 'social' has become an adjective which robs of its clear meaning every phrase it qualifies and transforms it into a phrase of unlimited elasticity, the implications of which can always be distorted if they are unacceptable, and the use of which, as a general rule, serves merely to conceal the lack of real agreement between men regarding a formula upon which, in appearance, they

are supposed to be agreed. To a large extent it seems to me that it is to the result of this attempt to dress up political slogans in a guise acceptable to all tastes that phrases like 'social free market economy' and the like owe their existence. When we all use a word which always confuses and never clarifies the issue, which pretends to give an answer where no answer exists and, even worse, which is so often used as camouflage for aspirations that certainly have nothing to do with the common interest, then the time has obviously come for a radical operation which will free us from the confusing influence of this magical incantation.

Nothing brings more clearly to light the role played in our thinking by our interpretation of the meaning of 'social' than the significant fact that in the course of the last few decades the word has, in all languages and to an increasing degree, taken the place of the word 'moral' or the simple word 'good'. An interesting light is thrown on the whole issue if we ask ourselves what, exactly, does it mean when we speak of 'social' feeling or behaviour, where our grandparents or great-grand-parents would simply have said that a man was a good man or that his behaviour was ethical? Once upon a time a man was good if he obeyed the ethical rules, or was a patriot when he acted faithfully according to the laws of his country. What, then, was this new demand, which this freshly awakened 'social conscience' made of us and which has led to a distinction being drawn between 'straightforward' morality and a 'social' sense?

Primarily, it was doubtless a praiseworthy appeal that we should carry our thinking further than we had been in the habit of doing, that in our actions and our attitude we should take into consideration the situation and the problems of *all* the members of our society. In order, however, fully to understand what was meant by this, we must go back to the situation as it was when the 'social question' first became the subject of public discussion. This, in the middle of the last century, was, roughly speaking, a situation in which both political discussion and the taking of political decisions were confined to a small upper class, and there were good grounds for reminding this upper class that they were responsible for the fate of 'the most numerous and the poorest' sections of the community, who themselves had little or no part in the government of the country.

It was at that time – when the civilised world had discovered that there existed an ‘underworld’, which it felt itself called upon to ‘raise’, if it were not to be engulfed by it, and before the era of modern democracy and universal suffrage – that ‘social’ came to assume the meaning of the taking care of those who were incapable of grasping where their own interests lay – a concept which now seems somewhat of an anachronism in an age when it is the masses who wield political power.

Side by side with this challenge to deal with problems of whose existence many had until then been unaware, there was, however, another, though kindred, school of thought, which drew a distinction between the necessity for ‘social’ thinking and behaviour and the demands of the traditionally accepted ethical standards. The rules of the latter referred to the concrete and recognised situation in which a man found himself, and prescribed the things he should in bounden duty do or refrain from doing, regardless of the consequences. (A man, for example, did not lie or cheat, even though it might be to his or someone else’s advantage that he should do so.) But the demand for ‘social’ thinking contained also the demand that we should consciously take into consideration even the very remote consequences of our actions and should order our behaviour accordingly.

In this respect the demand for social thinking differed fundamentally from the traditionally accepted tenets of morality and justice, which, on principle, expect a man to give due consideration only to those consequences of his actions which in normal circumstances would be readily apparent to him; from this it easily followed that a man came to regard it as desirable that he should seek guidance as to what he should or could do in any given case from someone endowed with greater knowledge and judgement than himself. This whole conception of social behaviour is most closely linked, therefore, with a desire for a comprehensive blue-print of the social scene as a whole and a code of social behaviour based upon it in accordance with a uniform and orderly plan. Implicit in this conception is also the desire to see all individual activity directed towards defined ‘social’ aims and tasks and subordinated to the interests of ‘the community’. These tasks and aims may or may not be recognisable to the individual,

but they will not, in any case, be achieved if the individual, even though his actions may consistently be governed by the traditional rules of behaviour and justice, devotes his activities solely to the promotion of his own aspirations.

As long as forty years ago, the Cologne sociologist, Leopold von Wiese, drew attention to this somewhat peculiar interpretation of the social idea. In an article published in January 1919¹ he remarked: 'Only those who were young men in the 'social age' – the decades immediately before the war – can appreciate how strong was the inclination to regard the social sphere as a substitute for the religious. In those days there existed a dramatic manifestation – the social pastors. Even the philosophers fell under their spell. One particularly loquacious gentleman wrote a voluminous book, entitled 'The Social Question in the Light of Philosophy' . . . In the meanwhile, throughout Europe, and particularly in Germany, social work had been crowned with a halo. Rationally assessed, the relative value of all social policies and charitable activities is very considerable; but their limitations must be very clearly recognised. To be 'social' is not the same as being good or 'righteous in the eyes of the Lord'.

That this use of the word 'social' instead of simply saying 'moral' constitutes a complete change, indeed, almost a complete reversal, of its original meaning becomes apparent only when we go back some two hundred years to the era in which the concept of society was first discovered – or at any rate first became the subject of scientific discussion – and ask ourselves what, exactly, it was supposed to denote. It was, of course, introduced to describe that order of human relationships which had developed spontaneously, as distinct from the deliberate organisation of the State. We still use the word in its original sense when we talk about 'social forces' or 'social structures', such as language and customs, or rights that have gradually come to be recognised in contrast to rights that have been deliberately granted; and the object thereof was to show that these things were not the creations of an individual will, but the unforeseen results of the haphazard activities of countless individuals and generations. The truly social in this sense is, of its very nature, anon-

¹ *Der Liberalismus in Vergangenheit und Zukunft*. Berlin, 1917, p. 115.

ymous, irrational and not the result of logical reasoning, but the outcome of a supra-individual process of evolution and selection, to which the individual, admittedly, makes his contribution, but the component parts of which cannot be mastered by any one single intelligence.

It came to be realised that there existed forces working quite independently of the aspirations of mankind, and that the combination of their activities gave birth to structures which furthered the endeavours of the individual, even though they had not been designed for the purpose; and it was this realisation that led to the introduction of the concept of society, as distinct from the deliberately created and directed State.

How quickly the meaning of the word has changed until it has been transformed almost into the very opposite of its original meaning, becomes clear when we consider what it denotes in the very frequently used phrase, 'the social order'. This phrase *can*, of course, be used exclusively in the sense of something created spontaneously *by* society itself. Mostly, however, the word social in this connection denotes nothing more than something or other *connected with* the community, if not, indeed, primarily the only sort of order which so many people are capable of envisaging, namely, a social structure which has been forcibly imposed, as it were, on the community from without. How few there are to-day who understand Ortega y Gasset's dictum that 'social order' is not something imposed upon society from without, but a state of things which grows spontaneously *within* the corporate social entity itself.

If we are content to designate as social not only those co-ordinating forces which come into being as the result of the independent activities of the individual in the community, but also everything else which has in any way anything to do with the community, then the whole essential difference becomes completely obliterated. There then remains little or nothing in life which is not 'social' in one sense or another, and the word becomes, to all practical intents, meaningless. It is therefore high time that these various meanings were pitted against each other. Let us for the moment adhere to the meaning 'peculiar to society' or 'arising out of a specifically social process' – the sense in which we use it when speaking of social structures and social

forces. This is a sense in which we have urgent need of the word and the true sense, which I should like to see reserved for it. It is obviously quite different from the sense in which we use it in such phrases as social awareness, social conscience, social responsibility, social activities, social welfare, social policy, social legislation or even social justice, or from the other sense implicit in the terms social insurance, social rights or social control. One of the most astonishing, albeit most familiar, combinations of this kind is 'social democracy' - I should very much like to know what aims of a democracy can be said to be not social, and why? That, however, by the way.

The really important point is, that all these combinations have but little to do with the specific character of social forces, and that, in particular, the difference between that which has developed spontaneously and that which has been deliberately organised by the State has completely disappeared. In so far as social is not taken to mean merely communal, the word, obviously, should mean either 'in the interest of society' or 'in accordance with the will of society', i.e., of the majority, or sometimes perhaps 'an obligation on society' as such, vis-à-vis the relatively less fortunate minority. I do not propose here to discuss the question why the rather indefinite word society should be preferred to such precise and concrete terms as the people, the nation or the citizens of a State, although it is these latter that are meant. The important thing, to me, is, that in all these uses the word social *pre-supposes* the existence of known and common aims behind the activities of a community, *but does not define them*. It is simply assumed that 'society' has certain concrete tasks, that are known to all and are acknowledged by all, and that 'society' should direct the endeavours of its individual members to the accomplishment of these tasks. 'Society' thus assumes a dual personality: it is firstly a thinking, collective entity with aspirations of its own that are different to those of the individuals of whom it is composed; and secondly, by identifying itself with them, it becomes the personification of the views held on these social aspirations by certain individuals who claim to be endowed with a more profound insight or to possess a stronger sense of moral values. Frequently enough a speaker will claim that his own views and aspirations are 'social',

while those of his opponent are brushed aside as 'anti-social'. There is, I think, no need for me further to emphasise that, when 'social' is used in the sense of 'serving the interests of society', it certainly raises a problem, but provides no solution. It concedes precedence to certain recognised values, to which society should adhere, but it does not describe them. Were the word strictly used in this sense, there would, I think, be but little objection. In point of fact, however, not only does it compete in many ways with existing ethical values, but it has also undermined their prestige and influence. Indeed, I am coming more and more to the belief that the substitution of this parasitic fungus of a word, social, to denote values we have always qualified as 'moral', may well be one of the main causes of the general degeneration of moral sense in the world. The *first* great difference, at which I have already hinted, stems from the fact that the tenets of ethical behaviour consist of abstract, general rules, which we are called upon to obey, regardless of what the consequences may be and very often without our even knowing why it is desirable that we should act in one particular way and in no other. These rules have never been 'devised', and no one, so far, has ever succeeded in producing a rational definition of the foundations of the existing system of ethical behaviour. As I see them, these rules are genuine social growths, the results of a process of expansion, evolution and selection, the distilled essence of experiences of which we ourselves have no knowledge. They have acquired absolute authority because the groups in which they held sway have proved themselves to be better than other groups. Their claim to be observed is not based upon the fact that the individual is aware of the consequences of disregarding them, but they exemplify a recognition of the fundamental fact that the majority of these concrete consequences are beyond our ken and that the effect of our actions on our fellow men becomes predictable only when they are guided by rules which pay due regard to the circumstances under which we commit them. But it is just against the very nature of *all* these rules of ethical behaviour and justice that this bogus rationalism, to which the concept of 'social interest' owes its origin, transgresses. Rationalism refuses to be guided by anything it does not completely understand; it reserves to itself the right to decide

what is desirable in each individual case, because it claims to be fully aware of all possible consequences; it refuses to obey any rules, but insists on pursuing definite, concrete aims. But by so doing, it transgresses against every fundamental principle of ethical behaviour, for agreement regarding the importance of any aspiration is only possible if it is reached in unison and in accordance with accepted general rules which themselves are impervious to rationalisation. Thus, by undermining respect for rules and 'plain' ethical behaviour, this demand for 'social behaviour' is destroying the foundations on which it is itself built.

This dependence of the conception of what constitutes 'social' on ethical rules which it refuses categorically to recognise or even goes so far as completely to ignore, is most clearly demonstrated by the fact that it is constantly at pains to justify any and every extension of the domain to which it claims to be applicable.¹ The demand for a just and equitable distribution of the world's goods has to-day become one of the primary 'social' demands. But equity pre-supposes payment according to deserts, and deserts cannot be measured in terms of success achieved, but only in terms of the measure of adherence to certain defined rules. Reward according to deserts pre-supposes knowledge of all the circumstances under which the service in question was rendered. But in a free society, what the individual does and how he does it is left entirely to the discretion of the individual concerned, for the simple reason that all the circumstances governing his activities cannot be known. In a free society, therefore, we must make payment not according to services rendered, but according to the value of the service, which so often bears little or no relation to what is paid for it. The concept of equity in this context can be applied only in so far as this principle of reward in accordance with the value of a service, and not in terms of payment for services rendered, is applied generally. The demand for more, for payment in terms of services rendered, is a demand for something

¹ The extent to which the misuse of the word social has been pushed in this connection seems at last to have provoked protests in other quarters; and it was with great satisfaction that, shortly after delivering this thesis, I read in a book review by Charles Curran in the 'Spectator' of July 6 1958 (p. 8) the sentence: 'Social Justice is a semantic fraud from the same stable as People's Democracy.'

which is not possible in a free society, because all the circumstances under which the service was rendered cannot be either known or isolated. Any attempt to enforce partial adherence to the ideals of equity cannot, however, but result in injustice all round, in the sense that different categories of men will be rewarded in accordance with different sets of principles. Thus, the misuse of the concept of equity can lead to nothing but the destruction of all sense of justice.

In reality, things in this connection are even worse. Since in questions of distribution there exists perforce no yard-stick of equity, other and less noble feelings inevitably and unexpectedly insinuate themselves when decisions come to be taken. That the social concept in this context is only too frequently used as a cloak for envy, that a sentiment which with absolute justice John Stuart Mill has described as the most anti-social of all passions,¹ should be able to make its appearance, decked in the beautifying form of an ethical demand, is one of the worst consequences for which we have to thank the unthinking use of the word 'social'. The *third* point in which the predominance of the ideal of the social concept has had an anti-ethical effect is the destruction of the feeling of personal responsibility to which it has led. Originally, the appeal to the social sense was expected to lead to a more widely spread acceptance of personal responsibility. But the confusion that arose between the further aims to which the individual man should aspire, between the taking-into-consideration of social repercussions and social – in the sense of collective – behaviour, and between the moral obligations of the individual to the community and his claims upon it, has gradually undermined that sense of personal responsibility which is the foundation of all ethics. To this, all kinds of intellectual movements have made their contributions, into which I cannot go in any detail, but which, like 'social psychology' in most cases sail under the 'social' house flag. Indeed, there seems to me to be very little doubt that this whole process, which has thoroughly confused the issue as regards personal responsibility, absolving the individual on the one hand of all responsibility as regards his immediate environment and placing upon him vague and undefined responsibilities for things that are not clearly apparent on the other, has, by and large, led to a marked diminution of man's

¹ John Stuart Mill: *On Liberty*. 1859 (p. 10).

sense of personal responsibility. Without placing upon the individual any new and clear obligations which he has to fulfil by his own personal endeavours, it has expunged the boundaries of all responsibility and has become an invitation *in excelsis* to make further demands or to do good at the expense of others.

Fourthly, with their emphasis on concrete aims and on the claims of expediency, these 'social movements' have hindered more than they have promoted the very essential emergence of genuine principles of political ethics. All ethics and justice are based, surely, on the application of general, abstract principles to concrete cases; and the dictum that the end justifies the means has for a long time been justly regarded as a negation of all that is ethical. It is, however, just this that is, in fact, very often meant by the plea, so frequently heard nowadays, that due consideration must be given to 'the social aspect'. As regards the genuine products of social evolution, such as justice and ethics, it is claimed on behalf of the social will of the moment that it is justified in neglecting such aspects in favour of its own immediate aims.

I have, unfortunately, insufficient space to go in any detail into the reasons why the rules of political ethics, like all other rules of ethics, are, of their nature, long-term principles, and for that reason must not be judged on the evidence of their effect upon an individual case. More important from our point of view is the fact that it is only as the result of a long and unfettered process of evolution that these rules are able to come into being and to acquire authority. Only when adherence to a principle comes, as a matter of course, to be regarded as more important than success in any individual case, and only when we acknowledge that the use of compulsion is justifiable solely when it is applied in accordance with general principles, and never as an expedient in the pursuit of a concrete aim, can we hope that a general principle of political ethics of this nature will gradually come to be accepted by all. Any 'social' code of ethics must be based upon rules which are binding on the collective behaviour of society, and to me it seems that we are further from a recognition of the fact to-day than we were in the past.

For there certainly *was* a time when a conscious sense of what was just and right imposed ethical limits on the use of compulsion by

society for its own ends. The ideal of the freedom of the individual was one, and, indeed, the most important, of these ethical rules of political behaviour which, at one time, enjoyed universal recognition. But it is just this ideal that those who march under the 'social' standard have been attacking with ever increasing vehemence. The ideals of freedom and independence, of being answerable to one's own conscience and of respect for the individual have all gone by the board under the dominant pressure of the social concept. But in reality, it is the nurturing of the spontaneous forces of freedom that truly constitutes a service to society – to that which has grown, as distinct from that which has been deliberately evolved – and to the further strengthening of the creative forces of the social process. What we have experienced under the banner of the social concept has been a metamorphosis from service *to* society to a demand for an absolute control *of* society, from a demand for the subordination of the State to the unfettered forces of society to a demand for the subordination of society to the State. If the human intellect is allowed to impose a pre-conceived structure on society, if our powers of reasoning are allowed to lay claim to a monopoly of creative effort (and hence to recognition only of pre-meditated results), then we must not be surprised if society, as such, ceases to function as a creative force. And in particular we must not be surprised if, from a policy based upon the ideal of material equality, there emerges a mass society, admittedly more thoroughly organised, but devoid of any corporate entity. True service to the social concept is not rendered by the imposition of absolute authority or leadership, nor does it even consist of common endeavour towards a common aim, but rather of the contribution that each and every one of us makes to a process, which is greater than any one of us, from which there constantly emerges something new, something unforeseen, and which can flourish only in freedom. In the last resort we find ourselves constrained to repudiate the ideal of the social concept because it has become the ideal of those who, on principle, reject the concept of a true society and whose longing is for the artificially constructed and the rationally controlled. In this context, it seems to me that a great deal of what to-day professes to be social is, in the deeper and truer sense of the word, thoroughly and completely anti-social.

THEODOR LITT

Bonn University

SELF-APPRAISAL IN THE PRESENT AGE

THE NATURE OF SELF-UNDERSTANDING

Never, in the whole course of human evolution, has any generation been conscious of so strong an urge to feel the pulse of its own era, to indulge, that is, in self-analysis, as is the present generation. It is quite astonishing to observe the amount of ink and newsprint that has been expended in giving the man of to-day as comprehensive a picture as possible of his inner self. There has emerged a complete branch of literature, to which may well be given the generic title: Self-Analysis in the Present Age.

We should be justified in greeting this urge towards self-analysis as a welcome trait, if the results that emerge from it could be said to augment in any way our self-esteem. But, with the best intentions in the world, that cannot be asserted. The subject, incidentally, has not been spared the fate to which every question strongly affecting any contemporary generation falls victim, namely, that it has been seized upon with avidity by those who, in their treatment of 'contemporary questions', are set upon exhibiting the colourful sparkle of their own intellects. Anyone who aspires to be regarded as a man well *au courant* with contemporary affairs feels himself constrained to make his contribution to the subject. Snobbish pomposity and the cheap press type of twaddle spread themselves with vexatious volubility on it. But even those who are above suspicion of seeking self-aggrandisement have little to say that is of any comfort to us. What we hear from them is depressing rather than encouraging. Nor – and let there be no mistake about it – could it be otherwise. It is not the man who is convinced of his robust health, but the man who has doubts on the subject, who seeks a diagnosis of his condition. It is the abnormal, and not the normal, that attracts attention. We must therefore not be surprised to find that the diagnosticians of our epoch devote themselves almost exclusively to

those things which, in their opinion, are *not* as they should be. Anyone who has once allowed himself to be lured into this investigation feels himself irresistibly drawn towards the more brittle portions of the whole fabric of our era.

But when he does succumb to the temptation, it happens all too frequently that his own powers of observation and judgement become profoundly modified. A doctor who diagnoses some physical infirmity would never think of regarding the incidence of that infirmity as a reproach to his patient; the latter, in normal cases, cannot in any way be considered to deserve any blame. But the man who devotes his attention to a scrutiny of the spiritual and intellectual state of his era and searches for possible abnormalities, is dealing, it seems, with things which are there, not as a result of any process of nature or of conscious human effort, but are simply – as they are: they have, obviously, as a result of human behaviour and action, acquired a form which now gives cause for grave misgivings. The question then at once arises as to who or what, what men or what man-made structure is to be held responsible for the abnormalities from which the current age suffers? In this way, in all but imperceptible stages, the diagnostician is transformed into the prosecutor, and the prosecutor into the judge. What started as a diagnosis becomes a court of law, sitting in judgement on the era, or, alternatively, on the men and the powers who stand accused of responsibility for the abnormalities of the era. And it will be readily understood how welcome this change of roles is to those whose ambition it is to see themselves in the limelight of publicity. For only those who know themselves to be free of the faults they attribute to it, can feel justified and called upon to sit in judgement on the age in which they themselves live. The status of judge alone suffices as proof of their immunity. What a great pleasure it must be, to prove to oneself and to the whole world, through the medium of the severity of one's verdict, how far one stands above the frailties one condemns! How brightly must shine the light of one's own immaculacy against the sombre background of contemporary degeneracy!

When one sees this current urge towards self-analysis degenerate into a stimulant to pharisaical self-satisfaction, one cannot help feeling that the incidence and prevalence of this taking-to-pieces of

the soul is of itself a disorder of the times which must be combated. But here, as in every aspect of intellectual life, we must be careful not to judge the integrity and significance of any spiritual or intellectual movement according to the exaggerations and effete distortions which follow in the footsteps of even the most sincere and reasoned endeavours. The real point at issue remains untouched by the riff-raff of sensation-mongers treading closely upon its heels. Of *genuine* self-analysis our own epoch has all too great a need! Why this should be so, we can fully appreciate only if we are clear in our own minds with regard to the nature and object of this self-appraisal. We must be clear on this point, because it is essential that we be able to differentiate between the type of self-analysis that is implicit in the word itself and those other types of analysis which superficially appear to be related to it, but which, in essence, are quite different.

The first distinction we must make is to set apart in toto those reflections in which man is constrained to indulge, because he is a creature who not only has to act, but is also constantly being called upon to act in accordance with some given situation in which he finds himself, and is therefore obliged to formulate a picture of the particular situation within the framework of which he is called upon to act. The possibilities that arise from it, the pleasing incentives that it offers, the menaces that are inherent in it – all these things demand to be given due consideration, to be weighed one against the other – and to be grasped, rejected or warded off as the case may be. And this applies not only to the individual man, but also to every human community into which men have joined together in a common way of life. The thing which distinguishes the reflections to which I have referred above, and the intellectual aspect, which is the subject of our scrutiny, is the fact that they are concerned purely and solely with the actual and visible circumstances that *confront* men, and cannot, therefore, be entered under the heading *self-appraisal*.

On the other hand, there is also a type of reflection which is akin to self-appraisal, but is still not the same as that 'understanding of oneself' which we are attempting to clarify. To elucidate in a more or less imaginative manner not only the world around him, but also

his own position in, and his own attitude towards, this world is one of the primeval instincts of man. Even those anachronisms to which we have given the name of 'myths' are not only an affirmation of the powers that, riding rough-shod over mankind, create and rule the world, but also the personification of that to which he, as the plaything of these powers, is exposed and linked by indissoluble bonds. It is this fundamental consciousness of the mythical that lies at the root of all the concepts, fancies and speculations regarding the ego of man which subsequently emerged in the form of religious beliefs, folklore, poetic fantasy and philosophical reflection. But whatever may have emerged from this genealogical table of human self-appraisal, it all differs in one vital respect from what in this treatise is termed 'understanding of oneself'. What I mean and what I am endeavouring to convey is the understanding of *man himself*, the unchanging, immutable creature that he is, always has been and always will be. I disregard the transitory and superficial modifications caused by the passage of time and the vicissitudes of fate. It is to man, *the essential creature*, that all my observations refer. In this scrutiny of the essential creature, I have paid no more attention to the endless situations which man may be called upon to face than if these were things which lightly brushed his skin, but left his inner self untouched.

We have before us, then, two sharply diverging groups of intellectual endeavour. The first is formed of reflections regarding the incessantly changing situations in human affairs, the other is concerned with the immutable nature of the creature, man. But the essential point of what this treatise has to say regarding the term 'understanding of oneself' is that it also embraces both sides of the question of this schism to which I have referred. For while the reflections which lead to this understanding of oneself give due consideration to the peculiarities of the situation which confronts man in the present age, they are equally no less concerned with the characteristics which contemporary man has developed as a result of facing up to this situation and endeavouring to meet the demands which it makes upon him. The possibilities it offers, the incentives it presents, the dangers which lurk in it – all these are not merely the confrontations with which man, in thought and deed, has to cope, but are

also most certainly the incentives of which his spiritual and intellectual development has need to enable him to extract a clearly defined reality from a number of vague and nebulous ambiguities. Thus the immutable, essential nature of man retires into the background, and there emerges that type of human comprehension of his contemporary self which has been called *epochal consciousness*.

SELF-APPRAISAL AND RATIONALISM

In my opening remarks I have drawn attention to how natural it appears to the man of to-day to live in a state of epochal consciousness of this kind and to interpret his life accordingly. This self-appraisal comes so naturally to him that he finds it difficult to imagine an existence in which this consciousness of self is lacking. All the greater, then, will be his surprise to hear of how recent a date this form of self-assurance in reality is. As far as our western civilisation is concerned, it was born in the *age of rationalism*. As recently as two hundred years ago, therefore, western man was still wont to elevate his conception of the contemporary pattern of life to the status of a comprehension of his own being. Until then, he had not been in the least conscious of that urge to probe into the essence of man, as such, which has become one of the salient characteristics of the present generation. Why is it, then, that a need which modern man feels to be so imperative, should have been so tardy in raising its voice?

If I were asked to summarise the reason in a sentence, I would say that the urge was first awakened by *the schism between man and his pattern of life*, which was heralded in the age of rationalism and to which that age gave ever increasing impetus. Under the heading of 'pattern of life' I include the whole fabric and structure by means of which men strive to give cohesion, stability and permanence to communal existence – the State, justice, society and the development of the life economic. This change of outlook was all the more profound, because the two things that had separated as a result of it had hitherto always constituted a single entity, the components of which were held together as a most rigid unity. The pattern of life had been a corporate whole, by which man knew that he was en-

compassed and supported, of which he felt himself to be an incorporated part, and by which meaning and limitation were given to his mission in life. Finally, it was, to him, something granted by God and therefore beyond the scope of any criticism. As far as the details of its structure were concerned, specific aspirations could, of course, raise their voices, and conflicts, which in certain circumstances could be of a violent nature, could break out. But all such controversy took place within the framework of a universal conception, which all accepted unreservedly as binding and, indeed, as a matter of course.

It has with justice been pointed out that, even in the most violent dissension which afflicted Christianity in the Middle Ages, the quarrel between Emperor and Pope, the two contending sides were in agreement on a number of fundamentals regarding the character, origin and purpose of the truly Christian pattern of life. Things became very different, however, from the moment that man, becoming conscious of himself as a separate, living entity, stood back and disassociated himself from the pattern of life around him in a manner which allowed him to see it as something to be sampled, tested and, if necessary, altered. From that moment man and the pattern of life became two separate entities, of which one – man – felt that he was not only qualified but, indeed, also called upon to query the legitimacy and utility of the other. The ‘self-evident’ had forfeited its inviolability.

No sooner had this change occurred, however, than a further change also set in, to the inevitability of which I have referred above – the observer became transformed into the prosecutor, and the prosecutor into the judge; and this change took place with incredible speed and violence. That it happened was the work of the man who gave the signal for the attack on the status quo – Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It was nothing less than the destruction of human happiness and human virtue of which he felt himself called upon to accuse the pattern of life of his times, that was then approaching its zenith. In few circles was his cry of alarm taken up so eagerly as in the intellectual movement of the Germany of the time. In the process the contents of the case for the prosecution underwent a characteristic change. The fault committed by the contemporary pattern of life was held to lie in

the fact that it compelled the individual to develop one of the faculties inherent in him at the expense of the others, and so to sacrifice his corporate intellectual entity as a human being on the altar of a single and specifically developed function.

This condemnation of the existing pattern of life contains, however, a far-reaching inference. To attribute to it so great a degree of evil pre-supposes the assumption that it is no longer regarded as something granted by God, but as something devised by man. It could only have been human volition, fallible and wayward human design, that endowed it with a form which exposed it to so many objections. It was nevertheless this same human volition which, thanks to its appreciation of the degeneracy of the status quo, felt itself imperatively called upon to substitute something better. If the moulding of human affairs is thus understood to be the concern of responsible human volition, then everything that occurs as the result of human design becomes transplanted into that category of events which we call 'history'. So long as the pattern of life is regarded as something in being, self-evident and immutable, because God has desired it so and not otherwise, the idea that it possesses in its current form any historical character is untenable. But once this belief in the supernatural ceases, then the pattern of life becomes exposed as something that has been evolved and can cease to exist just as easily as it began to do so; and that means that it has become a historical phenomenon. The stream of historical vicissitude has then assimilated everything by means of which man's volition strives to give stability and permanence to his existence.

The mutation to which the pattern of life is subjected by this *Vergeschichtlichung* – this process of transferring it to the domain of history – is in keeping with what we had in mind when we referred to the endless variety of the situations with which man is confronted and called upon to cope. For any and every pattern of life is nothing else but an attempt by society to deal with the needs and demands of the situation that confronts it.

But when these situations and patterns of life become absorbed into the moving stream of historical events, there at once arises an important question. In view of the unending vicissitudes to which we find man's way of life subjected, can we adhere to our belief in a

humanity that, in its innermost essence, is and remains immutable? Is it credible that the same man who, in the moulding of his pattern of life seems to be so completely and utterly in the power of historical events, is and remains in his ultimate ego a creature impervious to mutation and beyond the reach of historical influence? Is it possible for his innermost self to remain unaffected by changes in the pattern of life?

To this question the same age of rationalism, which paved the way for an end of the belief that the pattern of life was impervious to the influences of history, has provided an answer, which seems to be the opposite of that which might be expected. Not only did it adhere to the theory of the immutability of the essential human ego, but also insisted upon it in the most tenacious manner possible. Man, so the doctrine asserted, had at his centre *the power of reason*, which was born in him. This power existed equally and in the same form in every living creature of the human race. It was thanks solely to this faculty common to the whole of mankind, that man has been able to rise superior to all the patterns of life and their variations which history had produced. For in this power to reason he possessed an infallible yard-stick when it came to assessing the merits or demerits of the manifestations of history.

In the light of this doctrine, what of that separation of man, as such, and the pattern of life, in which we thought to discover the roots of the urge towards self-understanding? That the two separated is due to the fact that the human race, misled either by foolishness or wickedness, deviated, in the management of its affairs, from the guiding principles which its powers of reasoning had formulated for it. The history of humanity is the history of the mistakes which were responsible for this schism. But there is more to it than that. In the criteria of reason, by which man is taught to recognise where and how his species has acted contrary to the precepts of logic, he possesses rigid and defined standards to which he must adhere if he wishes correctly to choose between good and bad counsel. And to the exact extent to which he adheres to them, the history of his mistakes is continued in the history of the corrections and improvements he evolves. That he does adhere to them is proven by the irrefutable evidence that that which is in accordance with reason is

always able to convince him of its validity. In the light of that reason common to all men, the mists of irrationality in all its thousands of forms are dissipated. The more the light spreads, the more the gap closes by which man and the pattern of life have been estranged and separated from each other. For how could this schism prevail, when the pattern of life conforms more and more to the dictates of that reason which has its being in the mind of every man? How could a man regard as strange, sometimes even as hostile, something which is nothing less than the fulfilment of his aspirations and his heart's desire? Thus it comes about that history, which had its being in the struggle between reason and illogicality, merges into a conception of life in which this struggle has ceased, because there are no longer any protagonists to wage it. Where reason regulates the whole of life, there is not only peace between man and the pattern of life – they are in complete harmony, since the former then re-discovers himself in the latter. The end of this struggle denotes also – the end of history. History was necessary and, indeed, was possible, only as long as there existed an opponent to challenge the supremacy of reason. Once he has fled the field, there arises a situation which can only be described as 'supra-historical'. How could it be otherwise? When reason, the gift common to all men, rises superior to all the vicissitudes of history, all life itself, which conforms to the dictates of reason, must also assume the same 'supra-historical' character. History is thus destined to merge into a pattern of life that is devoid of history – and hence to cease to be.

We have thus outlined the guiding principles of the whole process of development, as seen by the eyes of rational thinking, when it professes to discover the trend of historical life in terms of what it calls '*progress*'. For *progress*, to the rational mind, means that march of historical events towards that pattern of life of an incomparable perfection, which is its absolute and ultimate aim.

Starting off with the schism between man and the pattern of life which so disturbed its own era, rationalism, in the process of developing the philosophy of '*progress*', also gave to the world an understanding of self that was of remarkable clarity and completeness. Rationalism was first and foremost an interpretation of the situation *in its own era*. It defined that situation as one of opportunity,

indeed, of challenge, to rid the world of its illogical pattern of life and to blaze the trail for reasoned, rational thinking. It was, however, also an interpretation of man, as such, who found himself confronted with this situation. It portrayed him as a man who had come to a realisation of his own capabilities as a thinking, rational entity and has set about the task of ordering his life in accordance with the dictates thereof. This self-appraisal was of a nature that was both satisfying and beneficial to a degree. Satisfying, because it traced the ills from which the epoch was suffering back to the human origins which had been the cause of them; and by so doing, it stripped them of their guise as the work of an inscrutable and implacable destiny. Beneficial, because it gave rise to a discernment capable not only of appreciating what was wrong and what had to be done to remedy it, but also of realising the manner in which imperfection could be replaced by perfection. Realisation that the present is an epoch that encompasses mankind implies both a realisation that the past consists of confusion that has to be undone, and an appreciation that the future represents an aspiration to be achieved.

SELF-APPRAISAL IN THE COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY

In its pure form, in which it is here represented, the philosophy of 'progress' belongs to the past. But what does not belong to the past, what, indeed, can claim to be enjoying at the present time an era of unparalleled dissemination, vigour and influence is the theory of epochal self-understanding which has found its initial and highly successful expression in this philosophy. It is the pattern of a self-appraisal which co-relates the past, the present and the future in terms of 'progress', a pattern, to appreciate the why and wherefore of which is a duty imposed upon the rational, reasoning faculty of man. Where this pattern is celebrating its resurrection no one who knows where in our modern world 'Progress' is spoken of and regarded with truly religious fervour can have any doubt. It is the ideology of the communist State, the 'dialectic materialism', that it has to thank for its recent revalorisation. To discuss in any detail the aspects in which this theory goes further than the philosophy

of rationalism does not come within the scope of this treatise. But the first thing that any scrutiny of the differences would be bound to point out would be the fresh impetus and vigour which this theory imparts to the process of history, because it is not presented simply as the rise of reason, but is organised and co-ordinated as a 'dialectic' movement.

Of decisive importance are the things that have remained unaffected by this re-fashioning. There remains the conscious realisation that the present is a period of transition between a past that has to be surmounted and a future that holds the promise of perfection. There remains, too, the certainty of a future transition from a period of unending strife to an ultimate, supra-historical condition of perfect peace and happiness. And, finally, there remains the assumption that there will also emerge an equally supra-historical way of thinking, by means of which the origin, evolution and ultimate aim of his development will be made clear to man. To this last concept the objection might, perhaps, be raised that, according to the doctrine of dialectic materialism, it is, surely, not merely the situation and the circumstances which become drawn into the stream of the dialectic movement, but also the men who are called upon to face them, and that therefore any expectation of the emergence of a supra-historical way of thinking is out of the question. This objection, however, overlooks the fact that a philosophy which not only undertakes to expose the phases and progress of the dialectic movement and lay bare its aims and the manner in which it achieves them, but is also quite certain that the whole vista of the past, present and future is clearly delineated before its eyes, could not possibly be partner to such views, if it itself were a philosophy that had been drawn into the stream of this movement and were no more than a manifestation of one of the phases of its evolution. By attributing to itself a competence to present a comprehensive review of the whole process, it is at the same time conferring upon itself the status of a detached observer, impervious to the vicissitudes of history. To surrender this claim to sovereign detachment would be tantamount to a denial of the whole fundamental basis of its own argument. Because the doctrine in question remains true, in all essentials, to the general pattern of the rational interpretation of life, what it has

to offer to the world at large is something that is at the same time creative, pleasing and beneficial. That this doctrine does not to-day live merely in the minds of utopian theorists, but has become the faith of millions, is demonstrated by the vast concatenation of political power to which it has given rise. One of the reasons for this lies in the fact that man finds in it both a political programme and an interpretation of his own existence, the illuminating arguments of which satisfy his need for a faith, in the same manner as the exciting aims of its programme rouse and inspire his determination. When it is recollected how very much modern man suffers from the uncertainty that overwhelms him when he seeks knowledge regarding the essence, origin and purpose of his own species, it becomes easy to appreciate the feeling of relief with which even brains of undeniable quality seek and find refuge in a comforting doctrine which has an answer to every question, a counter to every doubt, a remedy for every mistake.

The example afforded by the world which swears by the doctrine of Marx and Lenin makes it plain to us that the 'self-appraisal' of the epoch, which is the subject of this treatise, is no longer merely the concern of detached observers of world events, but is an essential ingredient of that process of convincing argument by which man can be won over to a definite line of thought and action in the political and social affairs of the world. From the moment that he is released from the apron-strings of a pattern of life which sustained him and guided his footsteps, he has been conscious of a desire to know *why* he should decide in favour of one rather than another of the conflicting patterns that are competing for his adherence. And the more completely the answer to this *why* satisfies his demand for an understanding of himself and the world around him, the more convincing it will appear to him. Hence the thunder of appreciation that has greeted the Marx-Leninist interpretation of the world we live in.

THE UNCERTAINTIES IN THE WESTERN WORLD

When one turns one's gaze from the example of the communist world of thought to a contemplation of our own, the 'free', western

world, a sense of profound shock inevitably ensues. For what have we of our own, in the nature of self-appraisal, with which to confront the so exceptionally effective panorama of eastern dogma? Such a question causes us at once to turn again to that example of profound cultural pessimism which was the point of departure of this thesis. The more radical its posturings – and there is in all conscience no lack of forthright nihilistic outbursts and condemnations – the greater is its contribution to the weakening of those defensive resources which are so vital to us against the onward march of an eastern gospel confident of the ultimate triumph of its doctrines. But apart altogether from such extremist views, there is prevalent a universal lack of that faith in the merit of the existing state of affairs, in the desirability of maintaining it and its own ability to survive and progress, with which the protagonists of the Marx-Leninist doctrines are imbued regarding the system they have sanctified.

If we ask what the things are which we have to defend against the onslaught of this system, or even in what respect have we something which is superior to anything that this system has to offer, all too often we are met with disconcerted silence, reprehensible and confused evasiveness and wholly unconvincing apologia. It is no exaggeration to say that what we have to offer in the way of 'self-appraisal', regarded with the eyes of the intellect, is at the very best a nebulous outline, surrounded by a thousand doubts and queried by a thousand dissident voices. Nowhere is this lack of self-confidence more apparent than in the field of *education*. How often do we hear from the lips of those professionally entrusted with the upbringing of the rising generation the resigned cry: What have we to offer that compares with the inspiring, unifying and strength-giving slogans of the communist idea? On our side there is nothing but a multitude of divergent opinions and aims, diverse views and outlooks, jostling in confused and disintegrated array. Do we really know what we want to teach and why we ought to teach it?

THE RATIONALISATION OF LIFE

After what has already been said here, there can be little doubt that

the cause of western sovereign independence will be in poor shape if the western world does not succeed in rousing itself out of the state of moody malaise which inevitably results from a lack of self-confidence, and in arriving at an understanding of itself and the world with which it will be able to face, if, indeed, not to outstrip, the self-assurance of the east. That, however, will happen only if the west succeeds in refuting not merely the woeful prophesies of the modern apostles of repentance, but also the facts which, on their face value, appear to justify their mournful admonitions, and in exhibiting to the world the other side of the medal – the things wherein the west is ahead of the east.

To see ourselves in a correct light, we must revert once more to that event which we have described as 'the schism between man and the pattern of life'. What has already been said may perhaps have given the impression that this schism was the outcome of a *one-sided* tendency towards separation. It seemed as though man were withdrawing from the pattern of life and were disassociating himself from it to a degree which allowed him to stand aside and regard it quite objectively from without. It was, indeed, as a unilateral process of emancipation of this type that the man of the epoch of rationalism felt that he should regard it. And he felt himself in duty bound to implement the process to the best of his ability, because he was convinced that he alone could bring about a harmony between man and the pattern of life which would be all the more perfect because it would be based upon the dictates of reason. But what, in reality, occurred was just the opposite. When he set about the task of fashioning a pattern of life in accordance with the principles of reason, he set in motion a process in which *the pattern of life disassociated itself from man to a no lesser degree than man disassociated himself from the pattern of life*. What his emancipation achieved was not the harmony on which he had pinned his hopes, but a new schism, and this time a schism in the causing of which *both* sides actively participated.

The remarkable thing is, however, that this progressive estrangement, to which both sides were party, was the direct outcome of that process of the self-appraisal of 'rational' thinking, by which its originators had confidently expected to be able to put an end to the schism between man and the pattern of life. When 'ratio', reason,

takes upon itself the task of establishing a correct relationship between man and the pattern of life, its endeavours result in the 'rationalisation' of every branch of individual and corporate activity by which human communities strive to maintain and to raise the standard of their lives. Rationalisation, then, means: everything that takes place must be ordered in accordance with the interests of the 'cause' which the envisaged activities are designed to serve. Anything which cannot show that it is necessary to, or to the advantage of, the cause, is eradicated. The very first victim of this process of elimination is man himself – those facets of him, that is, which characterise him as one, definite, particular man – in short, as a *person*. He is of importance only to the extent to which he contributes to the furtherance of the 'cause'. And his contribution is neither more nor less than that of any and every other individual, equally conversant with what the 'cause' requires of him. The inevitable obliteration of man, as a person, resultant upon this transformation of him into a cog in the machine is well illustrated by the ease with which the individual can be supplanted or replaced in the activities which devolve upon him. Ratio, reason, undoubtedly one of the most precious gifts which distinguish man from the rest of nature, is nevertheless a stern mistress who, within the confines of her own domain, does not hesitate to destroy the personal individuality of man without the slightest compunction.

We have established the fact that, as a result of the changes brought about by rationalisation, man and the pattern of life separated into two; and it would now appear that this schism, far from clearing the way, as was hoped, for a new and complete unity between them, has, on the contrary, rendered both possible and necessary a re-shaping of the relationship, which, to say the least of it, may well result in a schism of a far deeper and more fundamental character. For the contrast between man and his pattern of life is of so incomparably radical a nature, because it has been caused, not by the intrusion of something external and strange into the sphere of human experience, but by a dichotomy which has its origins in the innermost being of man himself. The specific qualities and properties which he recognises in his pattern of life are not anything given *a priori*, but become recognisable only in as much as human reason

tries to define its own pattern. It is man himself who, as the font of reason, erects a contrast to which, as an individual person, he is forced to resign himself. What is really happening becomes clearer if we look at the case of an animal, which, since it possesses no faculty of reason, is quite incapable of creating a schism of the kind in question.

It is therefore inescapable that a pattern of life fashioned according to the dictates of reason should have repercussions on the men who fashioned it which take the form of pressure upon their individual existence. When and in what manner they show themselves to be most sensitive to these repercussions, we already know. They result in that necessity, already deplored by the German classics, which the pattern of life imposes upon man, to over-develop *one* of his natural capabilities at the expense of the others and thus to become but a truncated fragment of what he ought to be. That this necessity is the direct result of the supremacy of the cause that follows on the heels of rationalisation, is obvious. The cause, the structure of which becomes increasingly clear in terms of rationalisation, can be broken down into its essential component parts. This allows the various tasks involved to be distributed among a number of men, of whom each individual is responsible for the carrying out only of that portion of the whole which has been allotted to him. And, since it is logical to assume that the more restricted a field of activity is, the higher will be the standard of efficiency attainable in it, it is obvious that reason must approve of making the widest possible use of this system. In this way, rationalisation becomes the first step towards turning man into that specialist, 'one-function' automaton which threatens to submerge the corporate entity of his existence.

RATIONALISATION IN NATURAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Everything that has been mentioned here as being characteristic of the workings of rationalisation also applies, even when the problems which rationalisation is called upon to solve lie in the field of *human* affairs; when, that is, the problem is of relatively close concern to those who have undertaken to find a solution to it. It

applies primarily, therefore, to those structures of communal life which we call the State and society. As long as rationalisation confines its activities to affairs within the boundaries of this field, it is dealing with 'things' which are far too closely woven into the pattern of human existence for its tendency towards 'dehumanisation' not to come into constant conflict with humanity itself. In these circumstances, rationalisation can never be completely successful. Very different, however, is the picture we see when we turn to those spheres of human activity in which the problems to be solved by 'rational' methods are not concerned directly with human relations, but with inanimate reality, which poses problems that reason attacks in its own way. I refer to the field to which man finds himself transported when he turns his attention to what we call 'Nature'. Here for the first time the last vestiges of that resistance disappear, which the effort at rationalisation encounters as long as it is dealing with purely human affairs. Here for the first time there emerges in its pure and unadulterated form what, in reality, I mean by the term 'the cause'. As a result, nowhere does Reason find such favourable conditions in which to exercise its functions as in the field of Nature, or, to be more precise, of inorganic nature. This it realises initially when it approaches Nature from the *theoretical* angle, for Nature is a field of calculation of incomparable exactitude; and it realises it also and even more, when it sets out *in practice* to master Nature; for that which is calculable is, *per se*, predictable and hence can be advantageously applied in practice. Technology and the industrial production based upon it are the powers of the age which demonstrate with overwhelming force the might that lies in the hands of Reason. Nature is a field in which everything is worked out with absolute clarity, and it is in its mastering that Reason has achieved its greatest triumph.

The favour that a benevolent Nature bestows upon Reason is demonstrated not only in the individual instances, be it of deed or thought, in which man comes into contact Nature. It is demonstrated again and more vividly by the comprehensive manner in which the aggregate of these instances become welded into a corporate whole. Because the object at which the multiplicity of these instances is directed remains constant in essence, yet increasingly

expanding in its ramifications, these instances do not disintegrate into isolated, unrelated efforts, but are fused into contributory components of a co-ordinated cosmos. The unity of purpose thus displayed becomes convincingly clear when we go back over the process by which, in an endeavour that has lasted for more than three hundred years, human brains have raised the sum of human knowledge of Nature, the development of techniques based upon that knowledge and the application of those techniques to the requirements of industry to the high standards with which we are all familiar to-day. What is astonishing is the undeviating manner in which this process has gone forward from discovery to discovery, from invention to invention and from one process of production to another. An inherent logic endows the whole cycle of the process – idea, planning, execution – with a unity and cohesion that is never broken.

This unity owes its origin to the rigidity with which every individual participating in the process, whether on the theoretical or the practical side, is compelled to bear in mind the current position as regards the ultimate object in view. The penalty which has to be paid for any deviation from this rule is a complete breakdown of the whole process.

Because the whole process is thus strictly required to follow the lines laid down by the ultimate object in view, there comes into being that species of evolution to which the name ‘progress’ has been given. Each point along the way laid down by the ultimate object in view is both the target of the endeavours leading to it and the starting point on the road to the next goal beyond it. Each new traveller along the road is richer in both knowledge and practical capability than all those who went before him. Adherence to the precepts of the ultimate object in view is a guarantee of a steady approach nearer to perfection. Deviation from these principles is treason against progress.

‘PROGRESS’ IN THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM

There is, undoubtedly, something fascinating about a movement which organises itself with such assurance in accordance with the

principles of progress and which accords to all participating in it the dignity of being the champions of progress; and we feel inclined to laud as a fortunate occurrence the intellectual change which brought it into being. But this change, which, as we know, was brought about by the emergence of rationalism, is, in reality, none other than the change which incurred our displeasure because it not only failed to put an end to the undesirable schism between man and the pattern of life, but actually endowed it with fresh vigour. Nor must the fact be overlooked that that which endows the movement with the character of 'progress', is dependent upon the maintenance, indeed the widening, of that breach. Only because it pursues its ultimate aim with such irrefutable logic, only because it ruthlessly and with a complete disregard for their personal existence holds all its disciples on so tight a rein, has the movement been able to put into practice its 'Progress' policy in so pure a form. Even the slightest deviation from the precepts of the ultimate aim is sabotage against progress. Thus we come to the vital question: Which is right? Do we pronounce the 'No' with which we opposed the schism between man and the pattern of life? Or do we pronounce the 'Yes' which the sight of so imposing a progress deserves of us? There is no question the answer to which is of more vital significance with regard to an understanding of the present age than is the choice between the alternatives I have just enumerated.

Once again, nothing could be more instructive, in this connection, than a glance at the attitude which the self-appraisal inherent in the communist ideology adopts when it is called upon to answer this same question. That the question demands an answer no less insistently from the east than from the west is due quite simply to the fact that the pattern of life, in so far as it is determined by the demands of the theory and practice of planned activity, is subject, in its development and expansion, to the same rules there as here. On both sides of the iron curtain it is the same natural sciences, the same techniques, and the same types of production, that the minds and practical skills of men set in motion. No matter how divergent the political and ideological convictions may be, the actual endeavours of man towards his ultimate goal remain wholly unaffected. Indeed, the ultimate goal would cease to be what its name implies, if it

permitted such convictions to have even the slightest influence on the pattern of life which it espouses. Hence the quite fortuitous, though none the less complete, uniformity of outlook regarding these activities, which unites two systems that otherwise have so very little in common.

It is not difficult to foretell the choice which those who swear by the communist panacea will make between the above-mentioned alternatives. A system which, in thought and deed, attributes to the concept of 'progress' that degree of precedence which the communist faith allots to it as a matter of course, cannot fail to see, in a movement the 'progressive' character of which is obvious even to the most superficial glance, a truly splendid thing and an irrefutable confirmation of its own fundamental principle – and to acclaim it with corresponding enthusiasm. The progress achieved by the co-ordination of science, technology and industry, they maintain, fits smoothly and easily into the fabric of a life which, because and in so far as it is regulated by the doctrines of Marx and Lenin, contributes, *with all it has to offer*, to the attainment of that state of perfection at which the concept of progress aims. Thus, as a result of the assumptions made on behalf of the prevailing system, there emerges quite naturally a rapturous and exuberant glorification of the transformation of modern life that technology has brought about. And the fiery and all but religious fervour with which the younger generations of the eastern bloc bow down before Technology, the Redeemer, bears witness to the powers of allurements which this gospel possesses.

But what has happened, within the confines of this school of thought, as regards the conflict between man, the individual, and the co-ordinated pattern of life? The situation now is exactly the same as it was at the time of the age of rationalism. The existence of any such conflict is repudiated with the assertion that man, by deciding to take his place in the 'Progress' movement, and to the extent to which he remains true to that decision, is helping his individual ego to achieve the fulfilment that is its due. This is exactly a repetition of the confidence expressed by the age of rationalism that, with the rise of Reason, the conflict between man and the pattern of life would come to an end. We must from the outset be quite clear on one point,

namely, that the premises upon which the system is based preclude the possibility of any other attitude. Were the existence of a conflict admitted, the admission would be tantamount to a confession that, while the principle of 'progress' would certainly achieve complete fulfilment in the sphere of technical civilisation, outside that sphere it would be opposed and defeated by needs and forces of a different origin and nature. Conflict between man and the pattern of life must not be allowed, for, so the argument runs, if such conflict were to arise, the principle of progress, which has been enthroned by the pattern of life, would encounter in man, as such, other forces with quite different aspirations and, indeed, of an 'anti-progressive' nature. And that would be intolerable.

We must therefore not be surprised when, within the framework of this system, we are constantly greeted with the assurance that the joyful acceptance and active promotion of technical progress is all part and parcel of the system's recognition of, and care for – humanity! The spiritual need of man, as such, the claims made by the technical labour system and the rules governing the political and social structures of life – all these things become fused into one harmonious whole, wherever the irrefutable truths of the Marx-Leninist interpretation of society and history are accepted as the guiding principles of the way of life. Conflict between man, as such, and the pattern of life around him occurs only when, instead of these truths, the prejudices and greeds of privileged classes determine the structure of the way of life. A schism between man and the pattern of life is not something that is by nature inevitable, but is the manifestation and the result of a faulty shaping of the structure of human affairs.

It will thus be seen that those who adhere to this school of thought are presented with a picture of the present era in which all the enlightenment that emerged from the rationalist school of thought and all the blessings that were promised by it have reached their full fruition.

But – the same political system which undertakes, by means of the theory it has sanctified, to release humanity from all the discords of life has, by the way it behaves in practice, furnished incontrovertible proof of the way in which the contradictions whose existence

it denies invariably make themselves felt at the very moment when the precautions taken by those in power prevent them from coming into the open. On paper, of course, it is not at all difficult to justify the granting of absolute power over all spheres of life to the principle of consistent, undeviating progress, and to prove that under its aegis all human endeavour can be channelled into one harmonious stream. It is easy to give the impression that a system which everywhere controls the course of events and under which practice obeys the precepts of a theoretic guiding principle, could well be applied to *all* dimensions of human existence. In a nutshell, both the whole of public life – the sphere, that is, of political and social activity – and of private life – the personal life, that is, of the individual – could be directed in accordance with the guiding principle of ‘progress’. The impression can also be created that, except where stupidity or malicious intent intervene to disrupt it, the course of events in these spheres would inevitably follow the same even tenor with which things progress in the domain of controlled, material activities. In reality, however, there exists in both public and private life no authoritative guiding principle to which the individual has but to adhere in order to achieve what is expected of him. Indeed, it is when he contrasts this state of affairs with the precise directives laid down for the conduct of controlled, material activity by the principle of progress, that man becomes painfully conscious of the uncertainties, the ambiguities and the hazards of his own existence. What happens, then, if a political system still insists on imposing upon every sphere of human existence a pattern of life which it has based upon the principle of ‘progress’? Inevitably the directive which a self-guaranteeing cause would issue will be replaced by orders, which those in power in the moment see fit to give. Such orders however, will not command the unquestioning obedience enjoyed by the directives of a self-evident cause, but are more likely to encounter opposition from thousands who disagree with the views of those in power. In that case, in order to implement the measures they have initiated in the name of ‘progress’, those in power will be compelled to use every available means to make their opponents alter their opinions or, at least, to deprive them of any further desire to voice those opinions; and the means available range

from persuasion and propaganda to psychological brain-washing, harsh repression and a forthright reign of terror. Only in this way is it possible to create at least the illusion that all those who live under the aegis of the system are united in their determination to go forward, together and without deviation, towards that state of political and social development which is accepted on all sides as 'progressive'. Nor does this compulsion find it difficult to justify itself both in its own eyes and in the eyes of public opinion. The very tenets of their ideology prove that it can be only fools or knaves who stand in the way of progress – and why, forsooth, should such people not be treated with scant consideration?

There is, then, an essential connection between the theory of universal progress and the practice of universal slavery. What can be accomplished without any pressure in the sphere of progress planned by the cause itself, but *solely* in that sphere, can be accomplished only by means of massive uniformity and regimentation, in which the presence of any guiding hand, rationally directing the course of affairs and resisting all attempts at arbitrary intervention, would be sought in vain – when the cause itself is determined by man. The lesson inherent in this system of manipulated progress lies in the fact that as a result of the compulsion put upon all who are subordinated to the system to think and act solely along the lines prescribed by the system, all the disadvantages which are inherent in a rationalised pattern of life re-appear here in a highly aggravated form. For here, rationalisation of the pattern of life is no longer the form in which a corporate effort towards a pre-conceived objective is carried out, but an instrument by means of which an arbitrarily fashioned political and social structure can be forcibly imposed upon a protesting society. What is really happening is the exact opposite of that which is so emphatically being proclaimed in the system's programmes. These claim to have brought man and the pattern of life into perfect harmony, whereas in reality the pattern of life has been transformed into an instrument of compulsion, which mercilessly deprives men of their individuality and turns them into the slaves of the system that rules over them. It is a social experiment without parallel in the annals of history, by which man is being made to realise the possible consequences to which he ex-

poses himself by leaving the fashioning of the pattern of life to Reason.

MAN AND CAUSE — AS SEEN BY WESTERN EYES

Compared with the brutalities of a system which, in the name of alleged 'progress', subordinates all human thought and action to the decrees of those in power, the stresses which the schedule of their work impose upon men may well seem trivial and easy to tolerate. For although the demands made by his task may sometimes involve a man in a great deal of hard work, he does at least know that the hardships he endures are self-evidently necessitated by the requirements of the task — which is more than can be said for the demands made upon him by the arbitrary decrees of those who happen to be in power. It is not surprising, therefore, that in the eastern world that segment of the pattern of life which is based upon the requirements of planned materialism — the technical and industrial segment, that is — apparently not only gives rise to no protests against the plan, as such, but is, indeed, acclaimed with the enthusiasm which real and visible 'progress' invariably evokes.

After what has already been said here, it will not be difficult to understand why, in the western world, men are so much more conscious of the tension between material demands and human rights — and deplore it with so much greater vehemence. Human existence in the west unfolds within the framework of a generally accepted pattern of life, a structure of State and society, that is, which it is left to man himself to determine to a degree that the theory and practice of communism would render quite impossible. The natural result is that, since we are free of *this* type of compulsion, we are all the more sensitive to that alleged measure of 'interference with the liberty of the individual' which no sleight of hand can remove from our lives, because it is recognised as being essential to our material requirements. We complain about 'mechanisation' in a labour system which must seem like a haven of refuge to those who find themselves pressed into the communist system of forced labour. The demands against which *we* revolt are not of that type which are imposed upon us by fate or by the arbitrary decrees of some ruling despot. *Our* complaints are aimed solely against the

enlightened ideas evolved by the brains directing our material activities. We revolt, in short, against a system the efficiency of which is in every way the direct result of our free contact with a Nature generous in the revealing of her secrets.

When, as we do here, we compare the communist man's matter-of-course acceptance of the technical and industrial labour system imposed on him with the doubting mistrust that is characteristic of the west, we are liable to get the impression that this latter attitude is nothing more than the expression of the hyper-sensitivity of a man pampered and spoilt by the fresh breezes of freedom. That, however, is not at all the impression that I have meant to convey. Let it not for a moment be thought that the movement the 'progressive' nature of which is so great a source of delight to the communist man, is not also the subject of doubt and reservations. Communist ideology is justified in asserting its claim to be in the right only in so far as it considers that the question of even any wavering along the path towards progress, let alone refusal to tread it, simply does not arise. It is not, however, justified in asserting that this type of progress is synonymous with the furtherance of the needs of humanity. The division of labour and the consequent social order of things evoked many misgivings in the minds of the classical champions of humanity, and subsequent developments in this field have done nothing even to allay these misgivings, let alone to show that they were groundless. Of all people, we of to-day are the last who should make light of the qualms aroused by the concept of mechanisation and all that it implies. Only those whose eyes are completely blinded by the idol of 'progress' could fail to see how very much man, as such, is being driven into a corner by the demands of work, as it is organised to-day. The 'cause' has developed into an imperious mistress, who is becoming ever increasingly heedless of his personal needs. The unqualified 'No' of those who condemn the way in which modern work is organised deserves as little support as does the unqualified 'Yes' of those who bow down in worship before it. We shall acquire a proper understanding of the spirit of the age only when we succeed in reconciling the voluntary incorporation of the modern world into a labour system of unimpeachable excellence, to which no exception can be taken, with the vigilance we

must exercise if we are to avoid being bound, body and soul, losing our individuality as persons and becoming transformed from a community of individuals into a conglomeration of cogs in the machine. We must pay due heed to the antinomy inherent in human nature, whereby man feels himself called upon to use his gifts to build up a system of institutions, each of the components of which is the outcome of his creative ingenuity and methodical energy, but which, as a corporate whole, exercises influences that threaten to deprive him of his soul. Rationalisation, far from creating perfect harmony between man and the 'cause', has brought into being a co-ordinated structure which exposes man to an ever increasing degree to the danger of complete isolation.

It is obvious that an interpretation of life that is thus nakedly and unashamedly antinomian is very unlikely to be able to satisfy man's natural desire for unequivocal guidance, illuminating explanations and straightforward solutions. How very much he prefers to be given an interpretation of his own existence which leaves nothing unexplained, which contains no embarrassing contradictions and which knows how to straighten out all anomalies! These are the virtues which recommend the communist ideology to a world in urgent need of an interpretation of itself that satisfies it. In the communist ideology there are no gaps, no unexplained contradictions, no uncertainty regarding the ultimate aim in view. Nothing could be of greater advantage to the proselytising powers of a doctrine than this ability to resolve all the doubts that beset mankind. Against these merits, 'free' humanity, it seems, has but one virtue to cast in the scales. But it is a virtue that is paramount among virtues – *the absolute adherence to truth*. In the west, nothing is suppressed, nothing is glossed over, everything is called bluntly by its right name. And, since there is no more evil state of servitude than that which man creates for himself by arraying his real position in the garments of false and illusory pipe-dreams, we are entitled to say that, without this adherence to truth which reigns supreme, the *freedom* which is the sheet-anchor of our western world would not exist.

MAN AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE
THE WESTERN CONCEPT

It is a very remarkable fact that the differences which emerge in the attempts made by both east and west to arrive at an interpretation of human existence become clearly apparent, even when an examination of these attempts is confined to those spheres of life in which, since they are governed by material requirements, both east and west find themselves compelled to follow the same line of thought and action, and which, thanks to their materialistic nature, contribute to the complete implementation of the principle of 'progress'. How very much greater, then, must be the divergencies when one goes beyond these confines and examines those other spheres in which, since there is no concrete, material objective, there can also be no precise and definite rules of procedure. It is in the case of a community founded upon the joint structures of State and society that there arises a dilemma which brings east and west to a parting of the ways. The choice before them is: either the unconditional unity and unanimity of comrades marching under the banner of 'progress' – but in that case, acceptance also of that iron compulsion without which even uniformity of behaviour, let alone unanimity in thinking, could never be achieved; or – a renunciation of all forcible coercion in the shaping of men's minds and the enslavement of their consciences – but in that case, acceptance, too, of the divergencies and the multiplicity of views, convictions and aspirations, which are the characteristics of a State of 'free men'. To hope to have both simultaneously, uniformity of conviction and freedom of the individual to form his own opinions, to think – as do some of those who secretly admire eastern solidarity – that it is possible to have both, is complete nonsense. Man must make up his mind which he places higher – unity of 'idea', which, in reality, is merely a forcibly contrived unity, or a multiplicity of faiths, which is no bogus façade, but a genuine and self-evident reality. Those who opt for the second alternative will certainly have to learn by experience the truths which the western interpretation of the workaday world has already proved beyond any dispute: the world becomes richer in contradictions, more difficult to under-

stand in theory and more difficult to master in practice, when the antinomy that is inherent in human nature is allowed to flourish openly and to enjoy freedom of expression, than when it is driven into the darkness of anonymity by a system of forced uniformity and regimentation. It seems quite incredible that many an educationist in the west should become filled with apprehension when, in a world riddled with conflicting views and outlooks, he is asked to give a pupil the chance to find his own feet and to prepare him to be ready to make the choice which the world will one day demand of him. It is, of course, so very much easier to school the lad to accept one infallible dogma and to train him for the demands it will later make of him, than to inculcate in him the desire to choose for himself.

But a little knowledge of the methods which must be employed if dogma is to maintain its undisputed authority, should suffice, surely, to stifle any feelings of envy that might at first be engendered by the sight of the complete assurance with which eastern indoctrination goes about its task – that feeling of inferiority, which so easily comes to those who lack a similar assurance. In the midst of all the doubts and distress that assail us, it is high time that those who hope to have their being in a world that is free should be made to realise the price that must be paid if we are to be allowed to choose our way of life as we see fit, on our own responsibility and at our own risk, and not to be forced to think, to wish and to act in accordance with orders issued to us.

THE EASTERN AND WESTERN CONCEPTS OF THE STATE

It is only when we compare the bogus façade of a unanimity imposed by force on the people of a totalitarian State with the polyphony of convictions voiced in the 'free' world, that we begin to realise the importance that any appraisal of our epoch must attach to that portion of our social structure which we call 'The State'. That the State must be given pride of place is a fact to which, I feel, attention should be drawn, because there have been times when it seemed as though the State were nothing more than the external 'form' of communal existence, the protective periphery within

which life went its way, independently and quite unconscious of any need for the existence of a 'State'. This is a viewpoint that cannot be ignored, particularly as there are even to-day quite a number of poets, men of letters and philosophers, who feel it is their mission in life to banish not only the State but the whole of officialdom to the outer confines of human existence, and thus to reserve for themselves a State-free sphere of 'pure' intellectual and spiritual life. Any attempt at isolation of this sort is defeated at the very outset by the vigour which the State displays in safeguarding its own position in any serious attempt towards epochal self-appraisal. It does so with merciless logic by means of that process of self-appraisal which we call dialectic materialism. Here the State is most certainly not merely an institution which holds together the outer skeleton of the social structure and allows life within to settle its own affairs as it deems fit. It is, on the contrary, the competent authority whose duty it is to keep life in all, and even in its most intimate, aspects firmly on the path of an evolution the guiding principles of which are laid down in the Marx-Leninist theory of social science. It is the Redeemer, who, when the movement has reached its goal in accordance with the laws of dialectics, will crown his work by creating a social structure of such perfection that he himself – the compulsory powers, that is, which he personifies – will become superfluous. But when we turn from this Heaven-upon-earth of a State to the State as it is in the 'free' world – the democratic State – it might at first appear that the more conscientiously a democracy respects the freedom of its constituent human institutions, the more applicable to it becomes the totalitarian concept I have outlined above. But to reduce a democratic State to the status of a mere keeper of law and order is fundamentally to misconstrue the whole concept of democracy. A democratic State which knows its business does not regard itself as a protective outer casing within which life pursues its own independent course; on the contrary, it realises that it is these very diverse manifestations of life *that constitute its own life*, or rather, that these diverse manifestations must be projected into its own activities, if the State is to be something more than a scaffolding of lifeless institutions and become what it should be, namely, a constantly changing and growing political entity.

It is true that a democratic State has all the time to be working in unison with one of the conflicting political parties within it, that it not only tolerates these constant changes, but by its very constitution is constantly encouraging them to renewed activity. But it is just this which makes of it a State of 'freedom'. As such, it can be understood only when considered as the essential expression of the whole life of the community, and not merely as the co-ordinator of the forces of its external existence. If only all those whom the anomalies, frictions and conflicts that are inseparable from any democracy provoke to expressions of dissatisfaction, could be made to realise this one important point: that, by refusing to support and co-operate with democracy, by slanderously damaging its moral credit, they are simply inviting the intrusion of totalitarianism that is hammering at their gates! Anyone who does not realise that these are the only possible alternatives cannot pride himself on having taken any real step forward towards an understanding of the age in which he lives. It would seem, however, that this step forward comes particularly difficult to just those very people who would be the very last to sacrifice even one jot of the freedom of expression which they claim for themselves.

MANKIND AND HISTORY

Whoso decides, for freedom's sake, to turn a deaf ear to the blandishments of communist ideology, finds himself also constrained to abandon one hope which has done more, perhaps, than anything else to win over hearts to the communist cause. We have seen that the communist doctrine, following the precepts of the enlightened philosophy of human existence, sees in that chain of events which we call history, merely the results of those conflicts which must take place in order that the evolution of mankind should achieve a state of supra-historical perfection and happiness. The direction of historical 'progress' is determined by an objective beyond the scope of history. When we become convinced that the continuation of human evolution, even in those spheres where well-defined material aims direct the course of affairs, far from bringing harmony any nearer, simply gives rise to new tensions, when, further, we

become clear in our own minds that outside these spheres there is certainly no possibility at all that human affairs will achieve a state of perfection, we are at the same time bidding farewell to the hope that humanity, groaning under the burden of historical events, will some time, even if only in the far distant future, achieve a state of tranquillity beyond the reach of the arm of history. We are abandoning, too, the hope that in the end history itself will render itself superfluous. More – we are admitting to ourselves that man and history – in the strict sense – are solidly welded together, that by virtue of our existence as human beings we both contribute to the making of history and accept the consequences of historical events, and that to have a history is synonymous with existing as human beings. A human race exempt from the effects of history is a will-o'-the-wisp, and an interpretation of the age which sees in this chimera the aim to which it is its duty to aspire constitutes one of the most pernicious of all the delusions which our foolish species cherishes. To combat this illusion, which bemuses millions of our fellow men, we must make an appeal to that spirit of truth which refuses absolutely to mitigate a state of affairs established by history and maintained by the forces which history has created, by surrendering to pipe-dreams, for the illusory consolations of which a plunge into the abyss of utter darkness will sooner or later be the price we shall have to pay.

By recognising that mankind and history belong together, we are taking leave also of any idea that there may possibly be a power of reason common to all mankind, which, from somewhere beyond the reach of history, not only shaped the historical events of the past, but also prescribes the lines along which the history of the future will continue. We realise that each successive generation will not be presented, by some supra-historical power of reason, with a set of tasks to fulfil, but will have to decide its future course of action according to the conditions under which it is living, by its own ingenuity and on its own responsibility. The hazards involved in taking a decision will not be removed by the oracular pronouncements of some supra-historical wisdom. The only supra-historical enlightenment that remains is the insight which makes clear to us the impossibility of evading the march of history and the irrevoca-

bility of historical repercussions. For it would be impossible to merge this, too, into the stream of history, without robbing it of all authority and meaning. In this sense, but *only* in this sense, have we, too, taken the liberty in this article of attempting a detached, supra-historical survey, which alone could justify us in venturing any opinion on the inevitability of history.

The introductory passages of this article, the object of which was to explain the essence of, and the necessity for, an epochal self-appraisal, afford a typical example of the scope *and* the limitations of the observations which anyone adopting this detached attitude is justified in making. What this self-appraisal can achieve and should strive to achieve, what the historical changes are which have caused it to become an indispensable attribute of modern life – these are questions that can be answered only by thought that does not confine itself to the self-appraisal of *one* particular epoch, but rises superior to the particular characteristics of epochal consciousness. But epochal consciousness will not be overcome, thrust aside or condemned as out-dated by such an attitude of mind; on the contrary, thinking on this plane will both elucidate and confirm its particular function in life, a function that it alone can fulfil. In this way epochal self-appraisal becomes a manifestation in human existence in which both man's special position vis-à-vis history, and his own appreciation of that position, are admirably portrayed.

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT

London School of Economics

THE MASSES IN REPRESENTATIVE
DEMOCRACY

I

The course of modern European history has thrown up a character whom we are accustomed to call the 'mass man'. His appearance is spoken of as the most significant and far-reaching of all the revolutions of modern times. He is credited with having transformed our way of living, our standards of conduct and our manners of political activity. He is, sometimes regretfully, acknowledged to have become the arbiter of taste, the dictator of policy, the uncrowned king of the modern world. He excites fear in some, admiration in others, wonder in all. His numbers have made him a giant; he proliferates everywhere; he is recognized either as a locust who is making a desert of what was once a fertile garden, or as the bearer of a new and more glorious civilization.

All this I believe to be a gross exaggeration. And I think we should recognize what our true situation is in this respect, what precisely we owe to this character, and the extent of his impact, if we understood more clearly who this 'mass man' is and where he has come from. And with a view to answering these questions, I propose to engage in a piece of historical description.

It is a long story, which has too often been made unintelligible by being abridged. It does not begin (as some would have us understand) with the French Revolution or with the industrial changes of the late eighteenth century; it begins in those perplexing centuries which, because of their illegibility, no historian can decide whether they should properly be regarded as a conclusion or a preface, namely the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. And it begins, not with the emergence of the 'mass man', but with an emergence of a very different kind, namely, that of the human individual in his modern

idiom. You must bear with me while I set the scene for the entry of the character we are to study, because we shall mistake him unless we prepare ourselves for his appearance.

II

There have been occasions, some of them in the distant past, when, usually as a consequence of the collapse of a closely integrated manner of living, human individuality has emerged and has been enjoyed for a time. An emergence of this sort is always of supreme importance; it is the modification not only of all current activities, but also of all human relationships from those of husband, wife and children to those of ruler and subject. The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in western Europe were an occasion of this kind. What began to emerge, then, was conditions so pre-eminently favourable to a very high degree of human individuality, and human beings enjoying (to such a degree and in such numbers) the experience of 'self-determination' in conduct and belief, that it overshadows all earlier occasions of the sort. Nowhere else has the emergence of individuals (that is, persons accustomed to making choices for themselves) either modified human relationships so profoundly, or proved so durable an experience, or provoked so strong a reaction, or explained itself so elaborately in the idiom of philosophical theory.

Like everything else in modern Europe, achievement in respect of human individuality was a modification of medieval conditions of life or thought. It was not generated in claims and assertions on behalf of individuality, but in sporadic divergencies from a condition of human circumstance in which the opportunity for choice was narrowly circumscribed. To know oneself as the member of a family, a group, a corporation, a church, a village community, as the suitor at a court or as the occupier of a tenancy, had been, for the vast majority, the circumstantially possible sum of self-knowledge. Not only were ordinary activities, those concerned with getting a living, communal in character, but so also were decisions, rights and responsibilities. Relationships and allegiances normally sprang from status and rarely extricated themselves from the analogy of kinship. For the most part anonymity prevailed; individual human character

was rarely observed because it was not there to be observed. What differentiated one man from another was insignificant when compared with what was enjoyed in common as members of a group of some sort.

This situation reached something of a climax in the twelfth century. It was modified slowly, sporadically and intermittently over a period of about seven centuries, from the thirteenth to the twentieth century. The change began earlier and went more rapidly in some parts of Europe than in others; it penetrated some activities more readily and more profoundly than others; it affected men before it touched women; and during these seven centuries there have been many local climaxes and corresponding recessions. But the enjoyment of the new opportunities of escape from communal ties gradually generated a new idiom of human character.

It emerged first in Italy: Italy was the first home of the modern individual who sprang from the break-up of medieval communal life. 'At the close of the thirteenth century', writes Burckhardt, 'Italy began to swarm with individuality; the ban laid upon human personality was dissolved; a thousand figures meet us, each in his own special shape and dress'. The *uomo singolare*, whose conduct was marked by a high degree of self-determination and a large number of whose activities expressed personal preferences, gradually detached himself from his fellows. And together with him appeared, not only the *libertine* and the *dilettante*, but also the *uomo unico*, the man who, in the mastery of his circumstances, stood alone and was a law to himself. Men examined themselves and were not dismayed by their own want of perfection. This was the character which Petrarch dramatized for his generation with unmatched skill and unrivalled energy. A new image of human nature appeared – not Adam, not Prometheus, but Proteus – a character distinguished from all others on account of his multiplicity and of his endless power of self-transformation.

North of the Alps, events took a similar course, though they moved more slowly and had to contend with larger hindrances. In England, in France, in the Netherlands, in Spain, in Switzerland, in Poland, Hungary and Bohemia, and particularly in all centres of municipal life, conditions favourable to individuality, and individuals to exploit

them, appeared. There were few fields of activity untouched. By the middle of the sixteenth century they had been so firmly established that they were beyond the range of mere suppression: not all the severity of the Calvinist *régime* in Geneva was sufficient to quell the impulse to think and behave as an independent individual. The disposition to regard a high degree of individuality in conduct and in belief as the condition proper to mankind and as the main ingredient of human 'happiness', had become one of the significant dispositions of modern European character. What Petrarch did for one century, Montaigne did for another.

The story of the vicissitudes of this disposition during the last four centuries is exceedingly complex. It is a story, not of steady growth, but of climaxes and anti-climaxes, of diffusion to parts of Europe at first relatively ignorant of it, of extension to activities from which it was at first excluded, of attack and defence, of confidence and of apprehension. But, if we cannot pursue it in all its detail, we may at least observe how profoundly this disposition imposed itself upon European conduct and belief. In the course of a few hundred years, it was magnified into an ethical and even into a metaphysical theory, it gathered to itself an appropriate understanding of the office of government, it modified political manners and institutions, it settled itself upon art, upon religion, upon industry and trade and upon every kind of human relationship.

In the field of intellectual speculation the clearest reflection of this profound experience of individuality is to be seen in ethical theory. Almost all modern writing about moral conduct begins with the hypothesis of an individual human being choosing and pursuing his own directions of activity. What appeared to require explanation was not the existence of such individuals, but how they could come to have duties to others of their kind and what was the nature of those duties; just as the existence of other minds became a problem to those who understood knowledge as the residue of sense experience. This is unmistakable in Hobbes, the first moralist of the modern world to take candid account of the current experience of individuality. He understood a man as an organism governed by an impulse to avoid destruction and to maintain itself in its own characteristic and chosen pursuits. Each individual has a natural right to inde-

pendent existence: the only problem is how he is to pursue his own chosen course with the greatest measure of success, the problem of his relation to 'others' of his kind. And a similar view of things appeared, of course, in the writings of Spinoza. But even where an individualistic conclusion was rejected, this autonomous individual remained as the starting point of ethical reflection. Every moralist in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is concerned with the psychological structure of this assumed 'individual': the relation of 'self' and 'others' is the common form of all moral theory of the time. And nowhere is this seen more clearly to be the case than in the writings of Kant. Every human being, in virtue of not being subject to natural necessity, is recognized by Kant to be a Person, an end in himself, absolute and autonomous. To seek his own happiness is the natural pursuit of such a person; self-love is the motive of the choices which compose his conduct. But as a rational human being he will recognize in his conduct the universal conditions of autonomous personality; and the chief of these conditions is to use humanity, as well in himself as in others, as an end and never as a means. Morality consists in the recognition of individual personality whenever it appears. Moreover, personality is so far sacrosanct that no man has either a right or a duty to promote the moral perfection of another: we may promote the 'happiness' of others, but we cannot promote their 'good' without destroying their 'freedom' which is the condition of moral goodness.

In short, whatever we may think of the moral theories of modern Europe, they provide the clearest evidence of the overwhelming impact of this experience of individuality.

But this pursuit of individuality, and of the conditions most favourable to its enjoyment, was reflected also in an understanding of the proper office of government and in appropriate manners of governing and being governed, both modifications of an inheritance from the Middle Ages. We have time only to notice them in their most unqualified appearance, namely, in what we have come to call 'modern representative democracy'. This manner of governing and being governed appeared first in England, in the Netherlands and in Switzerland, and was later (in various idioms) extended to other parts of Western Europe and the United States of America. It is

not to be understood either as an approximation to some ideal manner of government, or as a modification of a manner of government (with which it has no connection whatever) current for a short while in certain parts of the ancient world. It is simply what emerged in Western Europe where the impact of the aspirations of individuality upon medieval institutions of government was greatest.

The first demand of those intent upon exploring the intimations of individuality was for an instrument of government capable of transforming the interests of individuality into rights and duties. To perform this task government required three attributes. First, it must be single and supreme; only by a concentration of all authority at one centre could the emergent individual escape from the communal pressures of family and guild, of church and local community, which hindered his enjoyment of his own character. Secondly, it must be an instrument of government not bound by prescription and therefore with authority to abolish old rights and create new: it must be a 'sovereign' government. And this, according to current ideas, meant a government in which all who enjoyed rights were partners, a government in which the 'estates' of the realm were direct or indirect participants. Thirdly, it must be powerful – able to preserve the order without which the aspirations of individuality could not be realized; but not so powerful as itself to constitute a new threat to individuality. In an earlier time, the recognized methods of transforming interests into rights had been judicial; the 'parliaments' and 'councils' of the middle ages had been pre-eminently judicial bodies. But from these 'courts of law' emerged an instrument with more emphatic authority to recognize new interests by converting them into new rights and duties; there emerged legislative bodies. Thus, a ruler, and a parliament representative of his subjects, came to share the business of 'making' law. And the law they made was favourable to the interests of individuality: it provided the detail of what became a well-understood condition of human circumstance, commonly denoted by the word 'freedom'. In this condition every subject was secured of the right to pursue his chosen directions of activity as little hindered as might be by his fellows or by the exactions of government itself, and as little distracted by communal pressures. Freedom of movement, of initiative, of speech, of belief

and religious observance, of association and disassociation, of bequest and inheritance; security of person and property; the right to choose one's own occupation and dispose of one's labour and goods; and over all the 'rule of law': the right to be ruled by a known law, applicable to all subjects alike. And these rights, appropriate to individuality, were not the privileges of a single class; they were the property of every subject alike. Each signified the abrogation of some feudal privilege.

This manner of governing, which reached its climax in the 'parliamentary' government which emerged in England and elsewhere in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, was concurrently theorized in an understanding of the proper office of government. What had been a 'community' came to be recognized as an 'association' of individuals: this was the counterpart in political philosophy of the individualism that had established itself in ethical theory. And the office of government was understood to be the maintenance of arrangements favourable to the interests of individuality, arrangements (that is) which emancipated the subject from the 'chains' (as Rousseau put it) of communal allegiances, and constituted a condition of human circumstance in which the intimations of individuality might be explored and the experience of individuality enjoyed.

Briefly, then, my picture is as follows. Human individuality is an historical emergence, as 'artificial' and as 'natural' as the landscape. In modern Europe this emergence was gradual, and the specific character of the individual who emerged was determined by the manner of his generation. He became unmistakable when the habit appeared of engaging in activities identified as 'private'; indeed, the appearance of 'privacy' in human conduct is the obverse of the desuetude of the communal arrangements from which modern individuality sprang. This experience of individuality provoked a disposition to explore its own intimations, to place the highest value upon it, and to seek security in its enjoyment. To enjoy it came to be recognized as the main ingredient of 'happiness'. The experience was magnified into an ethical theory; it was reflected in manners of governing and being governed, in newly acquired rights and duties and in a whole pattern of living. The emergence of this

disposition to be an individual is the pre-eminent event in modern European history.

III

There were many modest manners in which this disposition to be an individual might express itself. Every practical enterprise and every intellectual pursuit revealed itself as an assemblage of opportunities for making choices: art, literature, philosophy, commerce-industry and politics each came to partake of this character. Never, theless, in a world being transformed by the aspirations and activities of those who were excited by these opportunities, there were some people, by circumstance or by temperament, less ready than others to respond to this invitation; and for many the invitation to make choices came before the ability to make them and was consequently recognized as a burden. The old certainties of belief, of occupation and of status were being dissolved, not only for those who had confidence in their own power to make a new place for themselves in an association of individuals, but also for those who had no such confidence. The counterpart of the agricultural and industrial *entrepreneur* of the sixteenth century was the displaced labourer; the counterpart of the *libertine* was the dispossessed believer. The familiar warmth of communal pressures was dissipated for all alike – an emancipation which excited some, depressed others. The familiar anonymity of communal life was replaced by a personal identity which was burdensome to those who could not transform it into an individuality. What some recognized as happiness, appeared to others as discomfort. The same condition of human circumstance was identified as progress and as decay. In short, the circumstances of modern Europe, even as early as the sixteenth century, bred, not a single character, but two obliquely opposed characters: not only that of the individual, but also that of the ‘individual *manqué*’. And this ‘individual *manqué*’ was not a relic of a past age; he was a ‘modern’ character, the product of the same dissolution of communal ties as had generated the modern European individual.

We need not speculate upon what combination of debility, ignorance, timidity, poverty or mischance operated in particular cases to pro-

voke this character; it is enough to observe his appearance and his efforts to accommodate himself to his hostile environment. He sought a protector who would recognize his predicament, and he found what he sought, in some measure, in 'the government'. From as early as the sixteenth century the governments of Europe were being modified, not only in response to the demands of individuality, but in response also to the needs of the 'individual *manqué*'. The 'godly prince' of the Reformation and his lineal descendant, the 'enlightened despot' of the eighteenth century, were political inventions for making choices for those indisposed to make choices for themselves; the Elizabethan Statute of Labourers was designed to take care of those who were left behind in the race.

The aspirations of individuality had imposed themselves upon conduct and belief and upon the constitutions and activities of governments, in the first place, as demands emanating from a powerful and confident disposition. There was little attempt to moralize these demands, which in the sixteenth century were clearly in conflict with current moral sentiment, still fixed in its loyalty to the morality of communal ties. Nevertheless, from the experience of individuality there sprang, in the course of time, a morality appropriate to it – a disposition not only to explore individuality but to approve of the pursuit of individuality. This constituted a considerable moral revolution; but such was its force and vigour that it not only swept aside the relics of the morality appropriate to the defunct communal order, but left little room for any alternative *to itself*. And the weight of this moral victory bore heavily upon the 'individual *manqué*'. Already outmanoeuvred in the field (in conduct), he now suffered a defeat at home, in his own character. What had been no more than a doubt about his ability to hold his own in a struggle for existence, became a radical self-distrust; what had been merely a hostile prospect, disclosed itself as an abyss; what had been the discomfort of ill-success was turned into the misery of guilt.

In some, no doubt, this situation provoked resignation; but in others it bred envy, jealousy and resentment. And in these emotions a new disposition was generated: the impulse to escape from the predicament by imposing it upon all mankind. From the frustrated 'individual *manqué*' there sprang the militant 'anti-individual', disposed

to assimilate the world to his own character by deposing the individual and destroying his moral prestige. No promise, or even offer, of self-advancement could tempt this 'anti-individual'; he knew his individuality was too poorly furnished to be explored or exploited with any satisfaction whatever. He was moved solely by the opportunity of complete escape from the anxiety of not being an individual, the opportunity of removing from the world all that convicted him of his own inadequacy. His situation provoked him to seek release in separatist communities, insulated from the moral pressure of individuality. But the opportunity he sought appeared fully when he recognized that, so far from being alone, he belonged to the most numerous class in modern European society, the class of those who had no choices of their own to make. Thus, in the recognition of his numerical superiority the 'anti-individual' at once recognized himself as the 'mass man' and discovered the way of escape from his predicament. For, although the 'mass man' is specified by his disposition – a disposition to allow in others only a replica of himself, to impose upon all a uniformity of belief and conduct that leaves no room for either the pains or the pleasures of choice – and not by his numbers, he is confirmed in this disposition by the support of others of his kind. He can have no friends (because friendship is a relation between individuals), but he has comrades. The 'masses' as they appear in modern European history are not composed of individuals; they are composed of 'anti-individuals' united in a revulsion from individuality. Consequently, although the remarkable growth of population in Western Europe during the last four hundred years is a condition of the success with which this character has imposed itself, it is not a condition of the character itself.

Nevertheless, the 'anti-individual' had feelings rather than thoughts, impulses rather than opinions, inabilities rather than passions, and was only dimly aware of his power. Consequently, he required 'leaders': indeed, the modern concept of 'leadership' is a concomitant of the 'anti-individual', and without him it would be unintelligible. An association of individuals requires a ruler, but it has no place for a 'leader'. The 'anti-individual' needed to be told what to think; his impulses had to be transformed into desires, and these desires into projects; he had to be made aware of his power; and these were

the tasks of his leaders. Indeed, from one point of view, 'the masses' must be regarded as the invention of their leaders.

The natural submissiveness of the 'mass man' may itself be supposed to have been capable of prompting the appearance of appropriate leaders. He was unmistakably an instrument to be played upon, and no doubt the instrument provoked the *virtuoso*. But there was, in fact, a character ready to occupy this office. What was required was a man who could at once appear as the image and the master of his followers; a man who could more easily make choices for others than for himself; a man disposed to mind other people's business because he lacked the skill to find satisfaction in minding his own. And these, precisely, were the attributes of the 'individual *manqué*', whose achievements and whose failures in respect of individuality exactly fitted him for this task of leadership. He was enough of an individual to seek a personal satisfaction in the exercise of individuality, but too little to seek it anywhere but in commanding others. He loved himself too little to be anything but an egoist; and what his followers took to be a genuine concern for their salvation was in fact nothing more than the vanity of the almost selfless. No doubt the 'masses' in modern Europe have had other leaders than this cunning frustrate who has led always by flattery and whose only concern is the exercise of power; but they have had none more appropriate – for he only has never prompted them to be critical of their impulses. Indeed, the 'anti-individual' and his leader were the counterparts of a single moral situation; they relieved one another's frustrations and supplied one another's wants. Nevertheless, it was an uneasy partnership: moved by impulses rather than by desires, the 'mass man' has been submissive but not loyal to his leaders: even the exiguous individuality of the leader has easily aroused his suspicion. And the leader's greed for power has disposed him to raise hopes in his followers which he has never been able to satisfy.

Of all the manners in which the 'anti-individual' has imposed himself upon Western Europe two have been pre-eminent. He has generated a morality designed to displace the current morality of individuality; and he has evoked an understanding of the proper office of government and manners of governing appropriate to his character.

The emergence of the morality of the 'anti-individual', a morality, namely, not of 'liberty' and 'self-determination', but of 'equality' and 'solidarity' is, of course, difficult to discern; but it is already clearly visible in the seventeenth century. The obscurity of its beginnings is due in part to the fact that its vocabulary was at first that of the morality of the defunct communal order; and there can be little doubt that it derived strength and plausibility from its deceptive affinity to that morality. But it was, in fact, a new morality, generated in opposition to the hegemony of individuality and calling for the establishment of a new condition of human circumstance reflecting the aspirations of the 'anti-individual'.

The nucleus of this morality was the concept of a substantive condition of human circumstance represented as the 'common' or 'public' good, which was understood, not to be composed of the various goods that might be sought by individuals on their own account, but to be an independent entity. 'Self-love', which was recognized in the morality of individuality as a legitimate spring of human activity, the morality of the 'anti-individual' pronounced to be evil. But it was to be replaced, not by the love of 'others', or by 'charity' or by 'benevolence' (which would have entailed a relapse into the vocabulary of individuality), but by the love of 'the community'.

Round this nucleus revolved a constellation of appropriate subordinate beliefs. From the beginning, the designers of this morality identified private property with individuality, and consequently connected its abolition with the condition of human circumstance appropriate to the 'mass man'. And further, it was appropriate that the morality of the 'anti-individual' should be radically equalitarian: how should the 'mass man', whose sole distinction was his resemblance to his fellows and whose salvation lay in the recognition of others as merely replicas of himself, approve of any divergence from an exact uniformity? All must be equal and anonymous units in a 'community'. And, in the generation of this morality, the character of this 'unit' was tirelessly explored. He was understood as a 'man' *per se*, as a 'comrade', as a 'citizen'. But the most acute diagnosis, that of Proudhon, recognized him as a 'debtor'; for in this notion what was asserted was not only the absence of distinction between the units who composed the 'community' (all are alike

'debtors'), but also a debt owed, not to 'others' but to the 'community' itself: at birth he enters into an inheritance which he had played no part in accumulating, and whatever the magnitude of his subsequent contribution, it never equals what he has enjoyed: he dies necessarily insolvent.

This morality of the 'anti-individual', the morality of a *solidarité commune*, began to be constructed in the sixteenth century. Its designers were mostly visionaries, dimly aware of their purposes, and lacking a large audience. But a momentous change occurred when the 'anti-individual' recognized himself as the 'mass man', and perceived the power that his numerical superiority gave him. The recognition that the morality of the 'anti-individual' was, in the first place, the morality not of a sect of aspirants, but of a large ready-made class in society (the class, not of the 'poor', but of those who by circumstance or by occupation had been denied the experience of individuality), and that in the interests of this class it must be imposed upon all mankind, appears unmistakably first in the writings of Marx and Engels.

Before the end of the nineteenth century, then, a morality of 'anti-individualism' had been generated in response to the aspirations of the 'mass man'. It was, in many respects, a rickety construction: it never achieved a design comparable to that which Hobbes or Kant or Hegel gave the morality of individuality; and it has never been able to resist relapse into the inappropriate concepts of individuality. Nevertheless it throws back a tolerably clear reflection of the 'mass man', who by this means became more thoroughly acquainted with himself. But we are not concerned with its merits or defects, we are concerned only to notice it as evidence of the power with which the 'mass man' has imposed himself on modern Europe over a period of about four centuries. 'Anti-individuality', long before the nineteenth century, had established itself as one of the major dispositions of the modern European moral character. And this disposition was evident enough for it to be recognized unequivocally by Sorel, and to be identified by writers such as Nietzsche, Kierkegaard and Burckhardt as the image of a new barbarism.

From the beginning (in the sixteenth century) those who exerted themselves on behalf of the 'anti-individual' perceived that his

counterpart, a 'community' reflecting his aspirations, entailed a 'government' active in a certain manner. To govern was understood to be the exercise of power in order to impose and maintain the substantive condition of human circumstance identified as 'the public good'; to be governed was, for the 'anti-individual', to have made for him the choices he was unable to make for himself. Thus, 'government' was cast for the rôle of architect and custodian, not of 'public order' in an 'association' of individuals pursuing their own activities, but of 'the public good' of a 'community'. The ruler was recognized to be, not the referee of the collisions of individuals, but the moral leader and managing director of 'the community'. And this understanding of government has been tirelessly explored over a period of four and a half centuries, from Thomas More's *Utopia* to the Fabian Society, from Campanella to Lenin. But the leaders who served the 'mass man' were not merely theorists concerned to make his character intelligible in a moral doctrine and in an understanding of the office of government; they were also practical men who revealed to him his power and the manner in which the institutions of modern democratic government might be appropriated to his aspirations. And if we call the manner of government that had been generated by the aspirations of individuality 'parliamentary government', we may call the modification of it under the impact of the 'mass man', 'popular government'. But it is important to understand that these are two wholly different manners of government.

The emergent individual in the sixteenth century had sought new rights, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century the rights appropriate to his character had, in England and elsewhere, been largely established. The 'anti-individual' observed these rights, and he was persuaded that his circumstances (chiefly his poverty) had hitherto prevented him from sharing them. Hence the new rights called for on his behalf were, in the first place, understood as the means by which he might come to participate in the rights won and enjoyed by those he thought of as his better placed fellows. But this was a great illusion; first, because in fact he had these rights, and secondly because he had no use for them. For the disposition of the 'mass man' was not to become an individual, and the enter-

prise of his leaders was not to urge him in this direction. And what, in fact, prevented him enjoying the rights of individuality (which were as available to him as to anyone else) was not his 'circumstances' but his character – his 'anti-individuality'. The rights of individuality were necessarily such that the 'mass man' could have no use for them. And so, in the end, it turned out: what he came to demand were rights of an entirely different *kind*, and of a kind which entailed the abolition of the rights appropriate to individuality. He required the right to enjoy a substantive condition of human circumstance in which he would not be asked to make choices for himself. He had no use for the right to 'pursue happiness' – that could only be a burden to him: he needed the right to 'enjoy happiness'. And looking into his own character he identified this with Security – but again, not security against arbitrary interference in the exercise of his preferences, but Security against having to make choices for himself and against to meet the vicissitudes of life from his own resources. In short, the right he claimed, the right appropriate to his character, was the right to live in a social protectorate which relieved him from the burden of 'self-determination'.

But this condition of human circumstances was seen to be impossible unless it were imposed upon all alike. So long as 'others' were permitted to make choices for themselves, not only would his anxiety at not being able to do so himself remain to convict him of his inadequacy and threaten his emotional security, but also the social protectorate which he recognized as his counterpart would itself be disrupted. The Security he needed entailed a genuine equality of circumstances imposed upon all. The condition he sought was one in which he would meet in others only a replica of himself: what he was, everybody must become.

He claimed this condition as a 'right', and consequently he sought a government disposed to give it to him and one endowed with the power necessary to impose upon all activities the substantive pattern of activity called 'the public good'. 'Popular government' is, precisely, a modification of 'parliamentary government' designed to accomplish this purpose. And if this reading is correct, 'popular government' is no more intimated in 'parliamentary government' than the rights appropriate to the 'anti-individual' are intimated in the rights appro-

priate to individuality: they are not complementary but directly opposed to one another. Nevertheless, what I have called 'popular government' is not a concrete manner of government established and practised; it is a disposition to impose certain modifications upon 'parliamentary government' in order to convert it into a manner of government appropriate to the aspirations of the 'mass man'. This disposition has displayed itself in specific enterprises, and in less specific habits and manners in respect of government. The first great enterprise was the establishment of universal adult suffrage. The power of the 'mass man' lay in his numbers, and this power could be brought to bear upon government by means of 'the vote'. Secondly, a change in the character of the parliamentary representative was called for: he must be not an individual, but a *mandataire* charged with the task of imposing the substantive condition of human circumstances required by the 'mass man'. 'Parliament' must become a 'work-shop', not a debating assembly. Neither of these changes was intimated in 'parliamentary government'; both, in so far as they have been achieved, have entailed an assembly of a new character. Their immediate effect has been twofold: first, to confirm the authority of mere numbers (an authority alien to the practice of 'parliamentary government'); and secondly, to give governments immensely increased power.

But the institutions of 'parliamentary government' proved to have only a limited eligibility for conversion into institutions appropriate to serve the aspirations of the 'mass man'. And an assembly of instructed delegates was seen to be vulnerable to a much more appropriate contrivance – the *plébiscite*. Just as it lay in the character of the 'mass man' to see everyman as a 'public official', an agent of 'the public good', and to see his representatives not as individuals but instructed delegates, so he saw every voter as the direct participant in the activity of governing: and the means of this was the *plébiscite*. An assembly elected on a universal adult suffrage, composed of instructed delegates and flanked by the device of the *plébiscite* was, then, the counterpart of the 'mass man'. They gave him exactly what he wanted: the illusion without the reality of choice; choice without the burden of having to choose. For, with universal suffrage have appeared the massive political parties of the modern world,

composed not of individuals but of 'anti-individuals'. And both the instructed delegate and the *plébiscite* are devices for avoiding the necessity for making choices. The 'mandate' from the beginning was an illusion. The 'mass man', as we have seen, is a creature of impulses, not desires; he is utterly unable to draw up instructions for his representative to follow. What in fact has happened, whenever the disposition of 'popular government' has imposed itself, is that the prospective representative has drawn up his own mandate and then, by a familiar trick of ventriloquism, has put it into the mouth of his electors: as an instructed delegate he is not an individual, and as a 'leader' he relieves his followers of the need to make choices for themselves. And similarly, the *plébiscite* is not a method by which the 'mass man' imposes his choices upon his rulers; it is a method of generating a government with unlimited authority to make choices on his behalf. In the *plébiscite* the 'mass man' achieved final release from the burden of individuality: he was told emphatically what to choose.

Thus, in these and other constitutional devices, and in less formal habits of political conduct, was generated a new art of politics: the art, not of 'ruling' (that is, of seeking the most practicable adjustments for the collisions of 'individuals'), nor even of maintaining the support of a majority of individuals in a 'parliamentary' assembly, but of knowing what offer will collect most votes and making it in such a manner that it appears to come from 'the people'; the art, in short, of 'leading' in the modern idiom. Moreover, it is known in advance what offer will collect the most votes: the character of the 'mass man' is such that he will be moved only by the offer of release from the burden of making choices for himself, the offer of 'salvation'. And anyone who makes this offer may confidently demand unlimited power: it will be given him.

The 'mass man', as I understand him, then, is specified by his character, not by his numbers. He is distinguished by so exiguous an individuality that when it meets a powerful experience of individuality it revolts into 'anti-individuality'. He has generated for himself an appropriate morality, an appropriate understanding of the office of government, and appropriate modifications of 'parliamentary government'. He is not necessarily 'poor', nor is he envious only of

'riches'; he is not necessarily 'ignorant', often he is a member of the so-called *intelligentsia*; he belongs to a class which corresponds exactly with no other class. He is specified primarily by a moral, not an intellectual, inadequacy. He wants 'salvation'; and in the end will be satisfied only with release from the burden of having to make choices for himself. He is dangerous, not on account of his opinions or desires, for he has none: but on account of his submissiveness. His disposition is to endow government with power and authority such as it has never before enjoyed: he is utterly unable to distinguish a 'ruler' from a 'leader'. In short, the disposition to be an 'anti-individual' is one to which every European man has a propensity; the 'mass man' is merely one in whom this propensity is dominant.

IV

Of the many conclusions which follow from this reading of the situation the most important is to dispose of the most insidious of our current political delusions. It has been said, and it is commonly believed, that the event of supreme importance in modern European history is 'the accession of the masses to complete social power'. But that no such event has taken place is evident when we consider what it would entail. If it is true (as I have contended) that modern Europe enjoys two opposed moralities (that of individuality and that of the 'anti-individual'), that it enjoys two opposed understandings of the office of government, and two corresponding interpretations of the current institutions of government, then, for the 'mass man' to have won for himself a position of undisputed sovereignty would entail the complete suppression of what, in any reading, must be considered the strongest of our moral and political dispositions and the survival of the weakest. A world in which the 'mass man' exercised 'complete social power' would be a world in which the activity of governing was understood *solely* as the imposition of a single substantive condition of human circumstance, a world in which 'popular government' had altogether displaced 'parliamentary government', a world in which the 'civil' rights of individuality had been abrogated by the 'social' rights of anti-individuality – and there is no evidence that we live in such a world. Certainly the 'mass man'

has emerged and has signified his emergence in an appropriate morality and an appropriate understanding of the office of government. He has sought to transform the world into a replica of himself, and he has not been entirely unsuccessful. He has sought to enjoy what he could not create for himself, and nothing he has appropriated remains unchanged. Nevertheless, he remains an unmistakably derivative character, an emanation of the pursuit of individuality, helpless, parasitic and able to survive only in opposition to individuality. Only in the most favourable circumstances, and then only by segregating him from all alien influences, have his leaders been able to suppress in him an unquenched propensity to desert at the call of individuality. He has imposed himself emphatically only where the relics of a morality of communal ties survived to make plausible his moral and political impulses. Elsewhere, the modifications he has provoked in political manners and moral beliefs have been extensive, but the notion that they have effaced the morality of individuality and 'parliamentary government' is without foundation. He loves himself too little to be able to dispose effectively of the only power he has, namely, his numerical superiority. He lacks passion rather than reason. He has had a past in which he was taught to admire himself and his antipathies; he has a present in which he is often the object of the ill-concealed contempt of his 'leaders'; but the heroic future forecast him is discrepant with his own character. He is no hero.

On the other hand, if we judge the world as we find it (which includes, of course, the emergence of the 'mass man') the event of supreme and seminal importance in modern European history remains the emergence of the human individual in his modern idiom. The pursuit of individuality has evoked a moral disposition, an understanding of the office of government and manners of governing, a multiplicity of activity and opinion and a notion of 'happiness', which have impressed themselves indelibly upon European civilization. The onslaught of the 'mass man' has shaken but not destroyed the moral prestige of individuality; even the 'anti-individual', whose salvation lies in escape, has not been able to escape it. The desire of 'the masses' to enjoy the products of individuality has modified their destructive urge. And the antipathy of the 'mass

man' to the 'happiness' of 'self-determination' easily dissolves into self-pity. At all important points the individual still appears as the substance and the 'anti-individual' only as the shadow.

ALEXANDER RÜSTOW

Heidelberg University

ORGANIC POLICY
(VITALPOLITIK) VERSUS MASS REGIMENTATION

Mass regimentation, the most prevalent and the worst social evil of our times, has attacked the peoples of both the west and the east, both on this side of the iron curtain and the other. But it has made its appearance in east and west in very different forms. In the west it has been more chronic in nature and has run its course with slow and dragging footsteps, while in the east it has appeared in a vigorous, acute and violent form. Bodily illnesses, we know, are more informative to doctors when they occur in acute and virulent forms, and the same, I think, applies here.

In the east, where we meet this malady in *statu nascendi*, in acute form and in the throes of its first onslaught, the causes of it are quite clearly apparent. It is totalitarian dictatorship, the brutal despotism of those in power there, that has deliberately and with intent created this condition of mass regimentation by smashing and demolishing the traditional forms of integration. Its objects are equally clear – to sweep, as the sole power, over this limitless mass of pulverised humanity, this vast desert of individual particles of sand, and then to impose upon them, as a substitute for the institutions it has destroyed, a specific type of pseudo-integration and thus artificially to integrate these pulverised individuals under its orders and in its service; to reduce them, by ideological and demagogic propaganda appropriate to its own despotic interests, to a frenzied state of mass hysteria, and in this way artificially to weld this vast conglomeration of sand into one monolithic, concrete mass.

When we try and trace the origins of the much milder form which this malady has assumed in the west – a task rendered, admittedly, very much more difficult by the very fact that it is in so mild a form – we find, if we have the patience to go back far enough, that here,

too, rule by force, whether direct or indirect, is the fundamental cause of its incidence.

Before the process of acquisition by conquest, which started less than ten thousand years ago, before the formation of great vassal empires under the domination of the ruling power, there existed in the world no such thing as mass regimentation or anything remotely like it¹ – and for a very simple reason. Until then, men, as we know from the case of our own peoples in their primitive state, lived together in small, compact groups of not much more than a hundred souls, bound together and integrated by the closest and most intimate ties, and the social conditions that obtained in this world of small, living communities is the absolute antithesis of mass regimentation. It is only by the destruction, dissolution or disintegration – i.e. by mass regimentation – of these communal ties that communities are transformed into society, in the accepted sense that Toennies has attributed to the term. And as a result, this mass-society suffers structurally from a dearth of living ties and a lack of adequate integration.

When we look back into history, we find, of course, that conquerors differed considerably in the attitude they adopted towards the natural social growths of the peoples they had conquered. It is true that they always reserved to themselves the right to decide which of these structures they would, of their mercy, spare, and which they would not, and thanks to their superior strength they were, of course, always able to destroy those which did not find favour in their eyes. But as a general rule, the conquering State has throughout the course of history shown a tendency to retain and, in certain circumstances, even to strengthen those structures which were ready to surrender to it and to enter into the service of their conquerors, and to destroy only those which stood in their way, which they found irksome or which had the temerity to resist them. The opinions of conquerors regarding which of the existing structures they would be wise to spare and which it would be more expedient to destroy have varied very considerably in the course of history and from place to place and age to age. But absolutism – the form, that is, which

¹ Cf. My 'Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart, Vol. I: Ursprung der Herrschaft,' Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1950.

despotism assumed in the western world from the time of the Renaissance up to the French revolution and which was further radicalised during the Jacobite phase of the revolution and its continuation under Napoleon – adopted a somewhat impatient attitude in this respect, and in those countries in which it held permanent sway it destroyed as many of the existing social structures as it was able – and particularly those independent institutions which stood between the absolute power above and the general mass of the people below. It did, admittedly, hold its hand in the case of the family, which the modern eastern dictatorships did not do, or at least had no intention of doing at the outset.

My readers will know, of course, that in Soviet Russia bolshevism tried to smash and socialise the family, because it was a bond which had neither been forged by the State nor was directly dependent upon it, but was an independent and established tie and, as such, a thorn in the flesh of the almighty State. But you also know that the attempt failed, that it had to be abandoned, albeit with regret and to no greater extent than was absolutely necessary. At the moment – there is always a swing of the pendulum in suchlike matters – a more hostile attitude seems again to be in the ascendant, and efforts are being made at least further to curtail such remnants of solidarity and independence as the family had reluctantly been allowed to retain. In Soviet China we are confronted with a gruesome spectacle. In a land of six hundred million inhabitants, where the ties of family have been woven by age and tradition into a fabric that is exceptionally strong and greatly revered, the regime is doing its utmost to loosen these bonds and to destroy them.

We see, therefore, how, both in the west and in the east, this phenomenon of mass regimentation has its origin – in the eastern world still clearly visible, in the west lying farther back in the past and working more indirectly – in despotism, and it follows, therefore, that, in order to evolve an aetiological cure for this disease, we must first of all eradicate the two fundamental causes of it – despotism and the use of force. That, however, is easier said than done.

My readers will know that these premises and considerations of a like, though somewhat more naive, nature have led the protagonists of anarchy to the radical conclusion that all social strata, all forms

of authority and subordination, should be completely abolished. That, of course, is a rather childish form of radicalism, for, in the endlessly complex social relations existing in the world to-day, we must all realise that such a course is quite impracticable for a thousand reasons, into which I need not go in any detail.

As the exact opposite of that theory we have the theory of centralisation, which deems it both advisable and necessary that all authority, all power, should, as far as possible, be concentrated in one central body which would delegate to lower, local authority only those functions which, to its own deep regret, it feels that it cannot itself exercise. A centralisation of this nature – in reality the basic foundation on which despotism, the determination to wield absolute power, is built – constitutes of itself a danger which is by no means universally appreciated. There are to-day very many well-meaning and peace-loving people, who would approve of neither the motives nor the consequences of this principle, but who do not realise the connection and therefore regard centralisation, as such, as rather a good and wholesome idea. In Germany, and particularly in Prussia, this point of view is widely held. Prussia, as we all know, has always been proud of her stern and rigorous deportment, of that attitude of 'Shun! Eyes – Right!' that she has always adopted; and even to-day, though the Prussian State no longer exists, this heritage is still very much alive, and not the least so in some German social-democrat circles, which have a traditional weakness for Prussian rigour – only to-day they bark 'Eyes – Left!' instead!

But – having agreed that anarchy is impracticable and that centralisation is an evil, how and where are we to find the right middle course between these two antitheses, both of which we reject? This, as will be appreciated, is a very fundamental and important question, both in theory and in practice. The answer lies in the 'Subsidiaritätsprinzip' – a principle which advocates the exercise by all (within their own sphere of competence) of absolute and unquestioned autonomy.¹

¹ Translator's footnote. In a brief footnote the author himself somewhat ruefully deplores the inadequacy of this rather tongue-twisting term. The Subsidiaritätsprinzip is very akin to the principle of decentralisation, but with this essential difference, that, whereas the latter accepts the over-ruling by higher

It was the Catholic Church that rendered us the great service of enunciating this, in reality, liberal principle of decentralisation in its encyclical, 'Rerum Novarum', the first of its two great social encyclicals. In complete contrast to centralisation, the principle advocates that in the successive grades of social authority from the bottom to the top, the lower authority should always be allowed to exercise all the functions that lie within its competency, and that recourse to higher authority should be made only on those matters with which, of their nature, the lower authority cannot be expected to deal. It is, of course, a principle the detailed application of which bristles with difficulties. In many cases, for example, doubts may well arise as to whether a certain function should be left to the lower authority, should be transferred to higher authority or be divided in some way between the two. But experience has shown that once the fundamentals of the principle have been grasped and once it has been realised that centralisation is, of itself, a false and, indeed, a dangerous principle, we have at our disposal a sure criterion to guide us in the taking of practical decisions, and we are well on the way towards a clear-cut and healthy form of administration. Here, then, is the correct compromise between anarchism and centralisation, ready to hand.

The application of the 'Subsidiaritätsprinzip' must, of course, begin at the bottom – with the individual himself. To the individual should be left the control and exercise of all those interests and obligations which lie within his competency and in which he is himself the best judge of what should be done. This leads us at once to the principle of economic freedom, for each individual, obviously, knows best where his own economic interests lie and what steps must be taken to safeguard them. For that reason, he must be allowed to act as he thinks fit and on his own responsibility, provided always that his actions do not prejudice or jeopardise the same liberty of action of his fellow men; his actions, that is, must be confined within the framework of fair competition.

authority of any decision taken at a lower level, the Subsidiaritätsprinzip advocates that any decision taken by any authority (within its own sphere of competence) should be regarded as absolute, inviolable and subject to no interference by higher authority.

In our social structure as it is, however, the individual does not as a rule stand alone, but has a family. And the family is the smallest self-contained social unit, upon which all the other social structures are built, the cell, as it were, of all social organisms, the one social structure nearest to man's heart and indispensable to him, without which, indeed, he could not normally live. From this it follows that any policy which aims at decentralisation as a cure for the social malady from which we are suffering, must make the family and the promotion of family interests its primary concern; and, moreover, it must pay due heed to the fact that the family is an independent, living entity, with its roots in the very elements of human nature, and not a haphazard social structure, fortuitously set up and artificially brought into being. This incontrovertible fact, incidentally, has not always been recognised by science. In the XIX century a very different and darwinistic outlook was prevalent in the popular mind which held that the family was a later product of civilisation and that originally there reigned supreme a state of conflict of all against all, with unrestrained sexual promiscuousness, and that it was only later, gradually and in the face of strong opposition, that the family, as a socially recognised entity, developed; that the family, therefore, was something imposed upon mankind by civilisation, which at once explains why so many people find the married state irksome. It will be seen, then, that this outlook bears the unmistakable stamp of the XIX century and that, in particular, this theory of universal promiscuousness is nothing more than the illusory conception of *primaeval* times conjured up by the XIX century mind.

To-day, science has at its disposal methods by which, with the help of historically accumulated ethnological data, we are able to trace the history of mankind a very long way back along the path of time. And we find that the farther back we go into man's history, the less do the conditions we discover conform to the ideas of the XIX century; on the contrary, at the furthestmost limits of human civilisation to which we have been able to delve, among those *primaeval* people, that is, whose life was as primitive and as close to nature as it could possibly be, we find that not only did the family exist, but it existed in more or less the monogamous form with which we are familiar to-day. The same conclusions are reached by research of a

different nature, conducted on the zoological side. In this field, in particular, my esteemed friend, Adolf Portmann of Basle, by a meticulous comparison with relationships in the animal world, has demonstrated, with a wealth of detail, man's adherence to, and dependence on, the institution of the family and the cultural tradition which grows up within its framework.

From this biological proof that the family is a natural, independent, evolutionary entity in its own right, it follows, incidentally, that the laudable desire to see the interests of family life promoted by the State is one which should be pursued with great caution, and that more importance should be attached to giving the family the chance to develop by its own resources, rather than to intervention by higher authority, even though the latter be no more than indirect and of a financial nature. And above all we must be quite clear in our own minds that in the tasks which face us in this field there can be no return to the out-moded, fusty and desiccated family life of the XIX century; what, rather, is required is a regeneration in harmony with the age, a regeneration of 'the eternal family'.

This, however, by no means implies that the State, the higher social authority, can and should do nothing for the family. And among the most important fields in which higher authority can help the family is in the housing and settlement policy that it pursues. In this respect, too, what I propose to say refers to conditions as they are in Germany, firstly because these are the conditions with which I am best acquainted, and also because it is in Germany that the problems have in many respects reached their most acute form and are for that reason most clearly apparent. In Germany, and particularly in north and north-western Germany, urbanisation has gained ground to an exceptionally great extent, and both the conception of a proletariat and the process of proletarianisation, which, after all, is mass regimentation in one of its most virulent forms, have spread rapidly. For this reason energetic efforts are being made in my country, and are being supported by a diversity of interests and to a most gratifying degree, to overcome this deplorable state of proletarian urbanisation and to pursue a housing and settlement policy whereby each worker and his family will have a house of their own in rural or semi-rural surroundings, such as most of his fellow workers

enjoy in south Germany.¹ But even in those areas where this satisfactory form of settlement exists, it stands in urgent need of protection, for it is threatened in a great number of ways, which I cannot enumerate in detail here; and in those areas in which urbanisation has become an all but pathological mania, it must be combated. These things are now being done. It must be admitted, however, that the problems are not as simple as they at first appear, and that with each successive step forward new difficulties, new problems, crop up which have to be considered and solved.

At this juncture, it will be very clearly seen that so-called external matters are most closely and inevitably linked with the so-called internal matters, the material with the abstract, and the realisation of this is of fundamental importance in the problems with which we are dealing. For there is a perverse form of sublimation, of contempt for material things, which refuses to recognise this connection, which underestimates the human, spiritual and intellectual significance of things that are allegedly of purely material superficiality, and which regards such things as settlement schemes as being purely material and of no importance; whereas in reality, of course, the thing that really matters is the soul, the inner being of man which, quite independently of such things as housing estates and settlements, can make of a man a God-fearing citizen in the most forlorn of town tenements, or the reverse in the most idyllic rural surroundings. All this is undeniably correct, but it is nevertheless indisputable that in the majority of cases such material superficialities as the kind of house and surroundings in which he lives have a profound effect on a man and on so intimate and private a thing as his family life. For when, as is frequently the case in north-western Germany, the working man and his family live in the middle of the stony desert of a metropolis, in lodgings which mean little more to them than a place in which to sleep, which induce a feeling of claustrophobia in all members of the family, and in which their only consolation lies in the fact that during their working hours at least they can get

¹ Dr. Hellmut Rall: *Die Eigentumsmassnahmen des werksgeforderten Wohnungsbaues*, Cologne 1956.

Cf. also my own treatise: *Vom Sinn des Eigenheims*, 'Der Arbeitgeber', June 3 1956, No. 11.

away from the wretched place (a consolation, incidentally, that is denied to the old people and the children) – in such surroundings, how can family life burgeon into the happy and healthy thing that it should be?

It has been frequently pointed out – and anyone can confirm it for himself – how very different things are for the family in the country, in a rural settlement, in a house of their own, and how infinitely more pleasant the situation is, especially for the aged and the children, who, in house and garden and in the fields, find a thousand ways in which to make themselves useful and, indeed, indispensable. Here, then, we have a completely different way of life, a condition which takes heed of man's essential needs in a quite different way and which removes all feeling of congestion and restriction – first and foremost in that most intimate and centralised entity, the family. In the sphere of domestic life, the next unit in the scale of upward graduation is the group, the neighbours in the settlement – the community. In Germany, however, from the point of view of integration, things within the community are in poor shape, and even in the rural areas there is an ever increasing tendency towards disintegration. This is particularly so in the workers' settlements to which I have just referred. Here the families have as a rule come together more or less fortuitously, and the mere fact that there are neighbours to left and right does not, of itself, engender any feeling of communal solidarity. On the contrary, only too frequently does it lead to friction and hostility. What is to be done about it is a very difficult problem which, in Germany at least, has hardly been faced, let alone attacked.

Nevertheless, a certain impetus towards a progressive solution has been given by the experiment of calling upon the members to build their own settlements on the principle of mutual assistance, whereby all members co-operate in the building of each house, one after the other. In this way, a somewhat stronger, more vital and more dynamic sense of community is engendered than when each individual is either allotted or buys himself a house. Even then, the bond created is, admittedly, a very slender one and in no way any guarantee that eventually a community in the true sense of the word will emerge. The situation is the same as regards other experiments of

a like nature, such as that initiated by the Jungdeutscher Orden and its founder, Arthur Mahraun. This latter, with great good will, is trying, in small and medium-sized towns, to bring together the people who live in the same quarter of the town and who of necessity, therefore, face the same needs and problems. I myself have followed the course of this experiment with considerable hopes which, I must confess, appear to have failed to materialise – and for very obvious reasons. For to-day, it is pure chance that brings people to live together in any particular quarter of a town. Each has his own particular reason for being there, and, in any case, the population is constantly changing. People are constantly on the move, and although in Germany the current shortage of houses has put a brake on such moves, there is nevertheless a constant state of flux. And when neighbours change every year, and sometimes even every quarter, how can any neighbourly human relations be built up?

The first essential, I think, is to call upon such local groups to administer their own affairs, to impose upon them certain obligations and responsibilities and to endow them with the power and the authority to fulfil them, as is done in the United States of America and, I am sure, in Switzerland, too. For under conditions in which the individual has no option but to approach superior authority with his wishes, which may or may not coincide with those of his neighbours in the community, no real communal integration can possibly emerge.

Thus we find ourselves confronted with problems which are as far from solution as they are in urgent need of it. For when one thinks of the human significance which such external factors as living cheek by jowl, as neighbours, has – or should have – one realises how truly important this problem is and how very deserving it is of urgent and energetic attention.

As regards the housing conditions under which we live, there reigns in all large towns a state of indiscriminate cohabitation, of fortuitous conglomeration, which might well be described as domestic promiscuity. This incoherent, unco-ordinated chaos, a typical symptom of mass congestion, is by no means an old phenomenon. It was only during the XIX century that the right to choose one's own place of domicile was introduced in Germany and other countries

and the right of local authority to accept or reject new applicants for domicile in a community was gradually abolished. At the time, this was triumphantly regarded as a very great step forward, and, from the purely economic point of view, so it was. But the fact that there was another – the sociological – aspect, that by this process important social bonds had been torn asunder and that the first prerequisite for the creation of a district community was the right of co-option, the right, that is, of the existing members to ‘vet’ those who wished to join the community – and to reject them, if they were deemed undesirable – these were facts that were completely overlooked and are only now gradually coming to be recognised again. But once more without, so far, any real idea of what should be done about it. For the whole of our economic conditions have been built up on this freedom of movement and domicile to such a degree, that the problem has become one of extreme difficulty. Those settlements in which the workers own their own houses are also confronted with similar problems. For purely from the point of view of market economy, it is highly desirable that labour should be as mobile as possible, and, from the point of view of supply and demand, the more labour can follow in the wake of market fluctuations and move to places where wages are at their highest, the better it is. But this, of course, those living in their own houses are less inclined to do. They are, then, faced with a dilemma, and each man must decide for himself which he values more highly and whether he is prepared, if necessary, to make some material sacrifice in order to enjoy those higher values which have nothing to do with economics. For that, in reality, is the point at issue; and if a man places such little value on possession of a house of his own that he is not prepared to be content with slightly lower wages in order to retain it, then he does not deserve to have it at all. But the consensus of opinion is very far from accepting this point of view, and what the majority think exercises a great influence, of course, on the attitude adopted by the individual. But that again offers us a chance to reverse the process and, by changing the consensus of opinion, to exercise an influence on the outlook and mentality of the individual. And for that reason it is, I think, valuable to put forward these views publicly, as I am doing in this treatise.

To turn for a moment to my own sphere of activity, the question whether a man chooses to attach greater value to the ties of his community, to a homogeneous intellectual and spiritual entity, than to the material benefits which would accrue from changing his place of domicile, is one which plays quite an important role in the academic world. I have recently heard with lively satisfaction of cases in which colleagues of mine have been offered appointments that would have led to very considerable improvement in their material fortunes, and have refused because the circle of their friends and the joint scientific activities upon which they were engaged meant more to them than did the material benefits offered to them. That, however, is a comparatively rare occurrence. Throughout the XIX century (and that stretches well into the XX, too, for there are to-day not a few of our contemporaries who really belong to the XIX century), it was accepted as a matter of course that, when a professor was offered a post which enhanced his salary, he naturally accepted it – unless, of course, his own Ministry came forward with an equal or better proposition. This, as I have just pointed out, is not invariably the case to-day. But the extent to which these things are in a state of transition is well illustrated by the fact that, although many of my academic colleagues build their own houses as soon as they can afford to do so, they do not feel that by so doing they have settled down for good, and if they are offered a more lucrative post elsewhere, they accept it – and simply lease the house to someone else! All this seems rather contradictory in some ways, but it is typical of the state of transition in which we find ourselves at the present moment. For after all, until real communities have been created everywhere (and so far they certainly have not been), it would be idle to expect people to behave as though they had. The essential prerequisites must first be fulfilled, and that process, of itself, presents a complicated and different set of problems of its own.

When we turn from a contemplation of the world in which we live to a scrutiny of the world in which we work, the world of economic activity, the principal question that emerges is whether, from the point of view we have ourselves just expressed, a planned economy, which welds labour into a corporate entity, is not better than a market economy, which does the very opposite and in which competition

appears to have a disintegrating effect? Is it not still preferable, on purely sociological grounds wholly unconnected with economics, even if – as is, indeed, demonstrable both in theory and empirically – it means a considerable reduction in productivity and must therefore be achieved at the cost of considerable economic sacrifice?

In reality, however, the centralised, planned economy of totalitarianism creates merely a pathological pseudo-integration, because it is contrary to the 'Subsidiaritätsprinzip' and consequently demands of us not only economic sacrifices (which we might well be prepared to make for the sake of higher values), but also the sacrifice of our freedom and human dignity, which we are not prepared to make in any circumstances. For totalitarian planned economy, as both historical and sociological experience show, is politically directly linked with totalitarian dictatorship.

If we decide in favour of social, market economy and free competition, not only because of the very much higher economic productivity it ensures, but also and, indeed, primarily, because of the political freedom it gives us, we must at the same time admit that, without prejudice to its other, very important advantages, this free competition is not of itself an active integrating force. It is therefore all the more necessary for it to seek integration in other ways, and particularly within the framework of the individual industrial undertakings, which, after all, are the constituent components of market economy.

Hence the paramount importance of solidarity in an industrial concern. That solidarity should unite all those who spend the whole of their working lives together in a factory and upon whose co-ordinated efforts the success of the enterprise and, with it, the standard of life of each individual employee depends, is a fact that will be unhesitatingly accepted by any but a jaundiced and prejudiced mind. And so things were, until, after the so-called industrial revolution and the great expansion of vast industrial concerns, there intervened with disastrous effects an attitude of despotic autocracy on the part of management above and, as a reaction, a declaration of class warfare from below.

The creation of this class warfare front by the trades unions and the Labour Parties was a type of integration imposed upon them by

necessity, the only form in which, in the pathological, despotic and perverse social conditions prevalent at the time, the proletariat could create the solidarity of which it stood in need. But, thanks primarily to the successes gained step by step by the labour movement itself, the unhealthy social conditions of the XIX century have now been completely eradicated, the whole structure has been re-cast, and to-day the way has been opened for a just and healthy harmony in industry as a whole. To seize the chance thus offered and to transform it into reality is one of the most important and responsible tasks that now face us. In the Federal German Republic a Factories Act provides us with a framework within which to do so. Nevertheless, a great deal still remain to be done, and there still survives not a little of that mistrust and resentment inherited from the past, which will have to be dissipated by hard and patient endeavour. In any case, however, harmony in industry must be one of the most important points in any policy that aims at eradicating mass regimentation.

Going step by step farther up the social pyramid, we come, one by one, to the whole gamut of the social structures that lie between the close-knit community at the bottom and the State at the apex. As regards this aspect, things in Germany are in particularly bad shape, because absolutism, though not exactly predominant, is busily engaged in trying to eliminate these intermediate social strata and in propagating the belief that this is the only and right course to be adopted. As a result, it has become a common practice in the country for any individual who finds himself confronted with any sort of difficulty which he cannot himself overcome, to appeal at once to the State, without bothering to consider possible alternatives or whether, for example, the problem could not be solved with the help of his fellows and without State intervention. In Germany to seek to solve his own difficulties would never enter any man's head, whereas in England, for example, it is the first thing any man would do. In this respect, we have a great deal to learn. We have made a start, but it will take a great deal of time and hard work to overcome, step by step, points of view and attitudes of this nature.

To turn once again to my own milieu, I should like to mention in passing that the same sort of problem faces our German univer-

sities, which, of course, are almost entirely State universities, and it behoves us to fight strenuously to defend such remnants of autonomy as they still possess. This was by no means always so. Formerly our universities were independent institutions, and I am convinced that we should do all we can step by step to restore their independence, though I fully realise, of course, the difficulties of all kinds that we should have to overcome in order to do so. In America, where, of course, the majority of the universities are endowed institutions, things in this respect are very much better, though they, too, naturally have their own difficulties and problems.

It follows logically, I think, that we should do all in our power to support independent institutions on whatever level and wherever they are to be found between the State at the apex and the private stratum of the social pyramid below, and, as each social problem arises, to see in the first instance whether it cannot be solved within the sphere in which it arose, without calling upon the State for assistance and without constantly extending the boundaries of State intervention.

Thus we come finally to the problem of social policy itself, and it is this problem that originally gave rise to the idea of a *Vitalpolitik*, a policy which certainly has social aims, but which does not confine itself to the purely material and statistical aspect of wage scales and work hours, but realises that both his wages and the number of hours he has to work are, of course, of vital importance to the man concerned, but that there are other things at least as important and that all our social problems certainly cannot be solved by incessant increases in wages and decreasing of working hours. Apart from anything else, those who think that they can, forget that in this, as in all human affairs, there is an optimum which it is as easy to overstep as it is to fail to reach. As far as wages are concerned, the optimum is reached when wages are at a level any raising of which would lead to price inflation and thus set in motion the disastrous spiral of wages and prices.

Apart altogether from other equally disturbing and disastrous effects, an increase above this level in actual cash wages, designed to keep pace with the compensatory rise in prices, would, in the long run, prove to be quite impossible.

As regards working hours, it is more difficult to lay down any precise optimum, since it depends upon a number of psychological and sociological factors; and in this connection, I am looking at the problem from the point of view of the employee, and not of the firm that employs him. But that here, too, there is an optimum and that working hours can be too greatly decreased, are facts beyond dispute. From experience everyone, too, knows that holidays can be too long, particularly holidays which really allow a man to relax, which is what holidays are meant to do. Here again, one must not take the perverse, essentially feudal view that work is something burdensome and that 'hours off' alone are filled with joy. Since we do not live in Utopia, the larger portion of our time on this earth is spent working. And if one regards one's work as a burdensome evil, how can one possibly be happy in life? Furthermore, this negative and disparaging attitude towards work is one of those feudal conceptions which in the passage of time have gradually slipped downwards from above. The nomads, the nomadic conquerors, prided themselves on doing nothing beyond issuing orders to their inferiors. As a result, to be a complete idler was looked upon as something very grand, desirable and genteel, while work was something despicable and derogatory. The anathematisation of work in the Book of Genesis is also closely linked with this old, nomadic point of view. Then, as time passed, it descended from the nomadic conquerors and their successors lower and lower down the social scale.

The way in which points of view gradually seep down from the upper to the lower classes is a very typical social process. In Western Germany, for example, idolisation of the standard of living has taken a form whereby a man's social status is measured in terms of the possession of such luxuries as radiograms, television sets, refrigerators and the like. I recently heard of a village where the inhabitants were blessed with fine, cool, natural cellars, hewn in the cliffs, and so had no need of refrigerators; but they all bought them – simply for prestige purposes, to 'keep up with the Joneses'.

At the sight of such pretentiousness and stupidity, we in our own circle react with indignation. But we never stop to think how it was that these people came to get such ideas. The idea of buying

luxuries of this kind to enhance one's social status did not drop suddenly from heaven; the habit originated with the upper classes, whose purchases were frequently dictated not by any purely material need, but as often as not by mere ostentation. Then, when others saw these things, they said to themselves: 'Isn't that lovely! We must have one, too!' Here, then, we have yet another example of feudal ideas permeating downwards from above, and although the upper classes cannot be held responsible for the emergence of this social tendency, it does nevertheless place an obligation upon them, and they should regard it as their duty in all things they do, by the way in which they live and by their attitude towards life, to set a social example and to bear well in mind what I have termed the ethics of social aspiration.¹ And the first thing they must learn is that social aspiration should be directed – not at the maximum, but at the optimum.

I have already said that the conception of this *Vitalpolitik* emerged as an alternative to a purely materialistic social policy, the objects of which it does not, of course, oppose, but seeks rather to supplement and to put them in their correct perspective, on the principle that the proper conduct of our material and concrete affairs is not the alpha and omega either of what we can do or of what we should strive to achieve. It is, then, a policy which deliberately sets out, in all political matters, in all affairs which can in any way be influenced and regulated socially, to find an answer to the question: How do the rules appertaining thereto affect the well-being and contentment of the individual citizen? This, of itself, is so important and at the same time so elementary an aim that it need hardly be stressed. For what could be more worthwhile than a desire to improve man's lot and to make him happier and more contented? The XIX century, however, not only merely ignored this very natural point of view, but actively attacked and despised it and installed in its place a mania for progress and a wild scramble for records. I have selected just a few, significant examples from the immensely vast domain of this policy, and I can safely leave it to my readers to

¹ Cf. my speech at the 125th anniversary of the foundation of the Industrie- und Handelskammer, Düsseldorf: 'Die Zukunft des Unternehmertums.'

pick up the threads and complete the pattern. There are but few things which do not, directly or indirectly, come within the scope of this policy and which should not and could not be considered and dealt with from this point of view. I use the word policy in its widest possible sense; all social measures, and experimental decrees, not only those introduced by the State, but also all the various social structures and the modifications made to them, should be fashioned to suit the essential attributes of mankind and in such a way as to promote man's happiness and sense of well-being. For the more the conditions under which he lives conform to his essential attributes as a human being, the better and happier a man will feel. It is not by mere chance that the science of anthropology has to-day gained such great impetus and is, I am convinced, destined to occupy the place once traditionally held by philosophy.

A social policy, based thus on anthropological principles and applied to the whole gamut of human affairs in a variety of ways to suit a variety of circumstances, but always converging eventually on the main and final objective – this, in my opinion, is the only means by which mass regimentation can be overcome.

I admit freely that in many circles one hears the opinion expressed that, to confront the rigid unity of purpose which reigns supreme on the other side of the iron curtain and which confers (to our detriment) such obviously great advantages on the communists, we must have something equally rigid, equally centralised, a universal faith, the counterpart of their communism, a single, unified organisation, a focal point, whence will emanate the cure for all our ills. Anyone who subscribes to this, alas, all too widely-held viewpoint has already in his heart of hearts succumbed to the allurements of totalitarianism. Of far more vital importance is it that we should realise that the advantages undeniably conferred by totalitarian centralisation cannot be counter-balanced by measures of the same kind, that here we are confronted with inhumanities which must be faced and fought and that we ourselves must both think and act in a completely different manner. We must be quite clear in our own minds that the ills and evils of our age cannot be attacked and cured by one single remedy, but must be treated differently, in accordance with the manner in which they affect each and every aspect of our whole way of life,

and that only by patient endeavour of this nature, decentralised but nevertheless converging on a common aim, can this malady of ours be overcome and cured.

To the possible objection that we have but little time at our disposal and that something must be done quickly, there are two answers. Firstly, our object cannot be achieved quickly, any more than a doctor can effect an instant cure in response to the entreaties of his patient. And if one is tempted by this answer to think that our situation is hopeless, because world events will not grant us the time we require to cure our malady, there is yet another, and more encouraging, answer. For once we have made a genuine and serious start on this task of catharsis on the whole front, once we have clear-cut aims which are visible and acceptable to all, and we see that step by step we are making progress in the right direction, we shall already have turned the corner, and the victory of our cause will be in sight. When the family, as the basic entity of the body social, is healthy; when harmony reigns in industry; when Government and Parliament at the top, and all the other legislative authorities, realise that the integration of the nation committed to their care is their most important task and, conscious of the urgent need for an increased measure of integration, meticulously weigh the integrating or disintegrating potentialities of every measure they introduce; when, from top to bottom, everything possible is done to ensure that the space between the apex and the base is occupied by a multiplicity of independent institutions, graduated in accordance with the principles of decentralisation, so that the whole social fabric becomes permeated with a close-knit network of living ties and associations; when, by means of this policy, all that is humanly possible is done to ensure that the life of each and every one of us is as worthwhile as human endeavour can make it; and when such a policy by its dynamic virility makes it clear to all that this is the social structure to which we should all aspire – then we are on the right democratic way towards overcoming mass regimentation and the achievement of the optimum in our social integration.

For the gap that separates us from a goal towards which we are striding and getting nearer with every step we take is not something negative, but something very positive, as we all know from the

pleasure rambles we so often take. And for this reason I am convinced that this *Vitalpolitik*, in its widest and most lively sense,¹ is both the counter-stroke with which we should and must confront bolshevism, and at the same time the factor that will prove to be decisive in the cold war.² Once we succeed in this, once we embark with the requisite energy and determination on this course and continue along it, the superiority of our own way of life vis-à-vis the inhuman conditions on the other side will become so completely obvious that not only shall we win the cold war, but we shall also prevent the outbreak of a hot war, which would be a catastrophe for the whole human race. And so, it is my firm belief that this overcoming of mass regimentation, this policy of decentralisation, is, indeed, a matter of the most vital concern to each and every one of us.

¹ Soziale Marktwirtschaft als Gegenprogramm gegen Kommunismus und Bolschewismus, in: *Wirtschaft ohne Wunder*. 1953, pp. 97-108.

² Wie kann die freie Welt den kalten Krieg gewinnen? in: *Die freie Welt im kalten Krieg*. 1955, pp. 213-230.
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HANNAH ARENDT

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FREEDOM AND POLITICS

To deal with the relationship between freedom and political government in the space of a single, short treatise is not possible. Indeed, a whole book would hardly suffice to deal adequately with the subject. For freedom, which is only very seldom – in times of crisis or revolution – the direct aim of political action, is, in reality, the reason why such a thing as politics exists at all in human affairs. In this connection, by freedom I do not mean that heritage of humanity which philosophers define in a variety of ways and isolate, to their own satisfaction, as one of the inherent attributes of man. Still less do I mean that so-called inner freedom, in which man seeks refuge when under external pressure; it is historically a later, and objectively a secondary, phenomenon. It has its origins in a withdrawal from the world, whereby certain experiences and aspirations are transferred to the inner, sub-conscious self, which originally were part and parcel of the outer world, and of which we should have known nothing, had we not previously encountered them as tangible, mundane realities. Basically, whether I enjoy freedom or suffer the reverse depends upon my intercourse with my fellow men and not on my intercourse with myself. Men can only *be* free with reference to one another, only, that is, in the fields of politics and of the things they do; it is only in these spheres that they come to realise that freedom is something positive and not merely a negation of compulsion.

It is not possible to speak of political government without speaking of freedom; nor is it possible to talk about freedom without talking about political government. Where communal existence is not organised politically – as, for example, among primitive tribes or in the private sphere of family life – it is not freedom, but force of circumstance and self-interest that bind men together; and wherever

the world is not the scene of political activity – as, for example, in a despotically ruled community, in which the members are banished into the corners of their own private homes – freedom is no mundane reality. If there existed no politically guaranteed public field of activity, freedom could find no place in the world, and even though it always and in all circumstances dwells as a longing in the hearts of men, it is not demonstrably positive. In terms of positive reality, political government and freedom are linked together and are to each other as are the two halves of a single thing.

To-day, however, we do not accept as a matter of course this juxtaposition of politics and freedom – and for very good reasons. Since we have become acquainted with the totalitarian form of despotism, we have, in general terms, come to the conclusion that nothing is more likely to banish freedom completely and for all time than the subordination of our whole lives to the sphere of politics. In the light of recent experience, which, of course, must remain ever present in our minds when we consider questions of this nature, it is only natural that we should not only query the existence of any connection between politics and freedom, but should also ask ourselves whether, indeed, the two are in any way compatible, whether freedom only starts to exist where political control ceases to function, so that, if there be no end to politics there will be no boundaries within the confines of which politics must stay, and then there can be no more freedom in the world. The less we have of politics, it would appear, the more liberty we will enjoy; and the smaller the sphere occupied by politics, the greater will be the sphere in which freedom will flourish. And so to-day we have quite naturally come to measure the degree of freedom enjoyed by any community by the extent of the liberty accorded in spheres of activity which are regarded as non-political, such as commerce and industry, the academic world and the religious, cultural and intellectual spheres. We feel that politics are compatible with freedom only so far as they are able to guarantee freedom from the influence and control of politics.

This interpretation of political freedom, to which we have been constrained to revert by our recent experiences, as freedom from the influence and control of politics, has played an important part in the history of political thought. We find it primarily among the po-

litical thinkers of the XVII and XVIII centuries, who identified political freedom directly with security. The object of politics was to guarantee security, so that freedom, as something non-political, could become the personification of those activities which have their being outside the field of politics. Even Montesquieu, who certainly held politics in higher esteem than did Hobbes or Spinoza, occasionally went so far as to say that political freedom was the same thing as security.

The gap that has here been torn between politics and freedom was further widened by the theories of political science and economy of the XIX and XX centuries. For the State, which, since the beginning of the modern era, has been closely identified with the whole process of political government, has since then always been regarded as the authority upon which devolved the duty of safeguarding not the freedom, but the way of life and the vital interests of the community and each individual member of it. Here again, security is the decisive criterion, but the thing that this security is called upon to safeguard is not so much freedom, but rather the opportunity to lead one's own life, free from interference. This latter has nothing to do with security, in the proper sense of the word; it is, rather, an urge that is inherent in human nature. Freedom thus becomes a limiting factor and marks the boundaries beyond which political activity may not go, unless, of course, life itself and all its vital interests and requirements stand in jeopardy.

It is thus not only our own generation, whose mistrust of political government has so often been deepest at just the time when freedom has been the subject of our gravest concern, but also the whole of the modern era, that have drawn a distinction between freedom and political government. Nevertheless, I am sure my readers felt, when I said that the ultimate aim of political government was freedom, I was putting into words something that they had all known and accepted long ago. There are both historical and objective grounds for this assertion. On the historical side there is the quite astonishing fact that not one of all our western languages has a word for 'politics' which conforms to the original meaning of the Greek word *πόλις*. It is not only etymologically and not only for savants that this word is steeped in associations emanating from that human

community in which politics, in its specific meaning, were first discovered. It is thanks to this manner of speech and to these associations that, no matter how far we may have moved from the original concept of *πόλις*, there is one all-important tenet of this school of political thought which we have never abandoned and upon which all the statesmen and all the theorists of the western world are agreed – namely, that the most evil form of government is a tyranny. This, be it noted, is by no means self-evident, and the only authority upon which it is based is the fact that among the classical forms of government a tyranny is the only one which, on principle, was held to be irreconcilable with the concept of freedom. Were we really to believe, as the theories of the modern world are trying to cajole us into believing, that the sole purpose of political government is to ensure security and safeguard vital interests, we should have no reason to reject a tyranny on principle: for a tyranny is the one form of government that can guarantee security, and in so far as the actual protection of life and limb is concerned, it has often proved itself the superior of any other form of government. In this negative sense, then, at least, the original fusion of freedom and political government, which the ancients of the classical era – but only they – accepted as a matter of course, has survived.

Our most recent experiences of totalitarian dictatorship seem to me to confirm the classical conception of the nature of politics. For they have shown clearly that even the most uncompromising determination to abolish all political freedom will not attain its object simply by suppressing those things which we commonly call political rights, that it will not suffice merely to forbid men to engage actively in politics, to express their political views in public and to form parties or other associations with a view to political action. As far as is possible – and it is possible to a very far-reaching extent – freedom of thought, the desire for freedom and even the apparently harmless freedom of artistic creation must also all be destroyed at the same time. In other words – all those spheres which we are wont to regard as being outside the scope of political jurisdiction must also be brought under subjection, for they, too, have a certain element of political content. Or, to put it another way: if men are to be prevented from acting freely as they see fit, they must be pre-

vented from thinking, from having any aspirations, any creative impulses, for all these activities imply action and, therefore, freedom in every sense, including the political. For this reason I myself believe that we completely misinterpret the phenomenon of totalitarian dictatorship if we believe that under it the whole of life will be governed by political decree, and that freedom will thus be completely destroyed. The exact opposite is the case; in dictatorship and despotism we are confronted with phenomena of 'depoliticalisation', carried to such a length that it is not content merely to paralyse all action, the outlet par excellence for political activities, but also destroys the element of freedom in every type of activity, including the political.

This outlook, though it may seem to be strange, is wholly in keeping with the traditions of political thinking. Montesquieu, for instance, holds that it is the sign of a free nation when the men in it use their faculty of reason, and that, regardless of whether they do so well or badly, the fact that they think suffices to ensure that freedom will emerge. It is therefore a characteristic of despotism, he further asserts, that the principle of its dominion is at once in jeopardy as soon as men begin to reason (*raisonner*) – even when, in the process, they seek theoretically to justify despotism. The important point here is not truth, not the results of any process of thought, but the stark fact that once reason itself is at work, freedom must emerge. Reasoning creates a hiatus between man and man, a space in which freedom is a reality. Now – once more according to Montesquieu – it is a characteristic peculiar to the freedom resulting from the process of reasoning that it protects men against the consequences of reason; when, therefore, freedom – or rather, the area of freedom between man and man that emerges as the result of the process of reasoning – is destroyed, as it is by all despotic forms of government, the consequences of reason can prove disastrous. Wherever freedom has ceased to be a concrete reality, freedom in the form of a subjective faculty of the individual can lead to disaster. All this the modern dictators realise full well; as the events following on the death of Stalin showed, they dare not tolerate freedom of thought, even if they wished to do so.

There are, then, a host of associations which come to mind when

we hear freedom and political government mentioned; among them are the most ancient narratives recorded in our language, the heritage of the political thinking of the past that has been handed down to us, and the things we have ourselves experienced in the present. Taken together, they help us towards an appraisal that goes far beyond contemporary political theory and its terminology. They represent a concept of freedom and an interpretation of political government which differ from those generally held among us and which we must now consider at some length.

II

In the relationship between political government and freedom, it is not a question of freedom of will or choice, of *liberum arbitrium*, which decides between good and evil, rather in the way Richard III decided to become a miscreant. Rather is it the freedom of Brutus: 'That this shall be, or we will fall for it', the freedom, that is, to bring into being something which has hitherto not existed, which cannot be conjured up by the power of imagination, for the simple reason that it was never known to have existed. The action here is not dictated by some pre-knowledge of events to come, which cannot be grasped by the will. Rather, as Montesquieu puts it in his analysis of forms of government, is it dictated by a principle. This principle inspires it, but lays down no aim, as would be the case in, say, the implementation of a programme; it fulfils itself not in any given achievement, but purely in the completion of the action itself. In this, the will and the deed are fused together, are one and the same thing; the will does not pave the way for the deed – it is itself an act. The deed is not the implementation of an act of will, it does not so much manifest itself as a subjective act of volition and its final purpose, but is the means by which the principle, as such, finds its expression – say honour or valour or the Greek *ἀεὶ ἀριστεύειν*, the urge to outshine all, but also fear, mistrust or hate. Freedom, again, is not a predication of these principles, nor is it confined to the will or any other attribute of human nature; while one is acting, one is free – but not before or after one acts, because to act and to *be* free are one and the same thing.

To illustrate my meaning, let me invite my readers' attention to Machiavelli, who re-discovered this ancient concept of freedom and moulded it into an intelligible concept long before Montesquieu. His *virtu*, which replies to the *fortuna* of the world, is not the Roman *virtus* and not what we understand by the word virtue. It corresponds rather to what we call virtuosity, the quality which flourishes not in the creative arts but in skill in the practice of an art, and the merit of which lies in the execution of that skill and not in something which survives, as an end product, after the artist has come to the end of his labours. It and the Machiavellian *virtu* have much in common with the Greek ἀρετή, even though Machiavelli knew little or nothing of the Greeks. I do not suppose that he even knew that the Greeks, whenever they wished to explain the specific in political activity, turned to comparisons such as flute-playing, dancing, the practice of medicine, the profession of seafaring – to arts, that is, in which virtuosity of the artist was the prime factor.

Because all action demands virtuosity, and because virtuosity is a characteristic peculiar to the applied arts, the opinion has been widely held that politics constitute an art. If, as is frequently the case, the word art is understood to mean creative art, and the State is regarded as a work of art, as, indeed, the greatest work of art created by the hand of man, then such an idea is completely false. In terms of the creative arts, which produce something concrete that survives the labour that produced it and is completely disassociated from it, politics are the very reverse of an art; that, however, does not mean that politics are not a science. The State is not a work of art, because, if for no other reason, its existence never becomes independent of the actions of the men who created it. But the similarity between action and the applied arts goes further still. Exactly as music, the ballet and the theatre have need of an audience before which to unfold their virtuosity, action, too, requires the presence of others in a politically organised sphere (which is by no means to be found everywhere and as a matter of course), where men live together in some sort of community. In ancient days, the πόλις supplied the 'form of State' which action required.

If we regard politics in terms of the πόλις – to which only those were admitted who were not subordinates, either slaves exposed to

compulsion by others or working men driven by the necessities of material and biological conditions – then politics can be said to represent the *mise en scène* for that freedom, the virtuosity of which unfolds only in terms of action. The sphere of public politics then becomes, for all the world to see, the place where freedom can manifest itself and become a reality in words, deeds and accomplishments, which remain in the minds of men and constitute history. Whatever happens in this sphere is, *per definitionem*, political, even though it has nothing directly to do with action. What remains outside this sphere, such as for example the great achievements of the barbarian empires, may well be very great and remarkable events; but they are not political in the true sense of the word. Without some such *mise en scène* of its own, fashioned to suit its own requirements, freedom cannot become a reality. There is no such thing as freedom without politics, because without politics it would have no substance. A community, on the other hand, which does not provide an arena for the endless variations of virtuosity but in which freedom manifests itself, is not a political entity.

The conception of freedom and politics and the relationship and connection between them may appear to be somewhat strange, because by freedom we understand either freedom of thought or freedom of will, and because to the field of politics we ascribe the task of providing the necessities of life, which ensure the security of human existence and the safeguarding of our vital interests. But in this, too, there is something which rings very familiar and which we have always known and tend to forget only when we start to theorise on these matters. It is the age-old conviction that courage is the cardinal virtue in political behaviour. Now courage is a mighty word. I do not mean that foolhardy type of courage which welcomes danger and gladly hazards all for the sake of the thrill that danger and possible death evoke. Such foolhardy courage is of as little value in life as is cowardice. The type of courage which we feel is indispensable in the political field does not emanate from individual inclination, but from the nature of the community. For in contrast to a man's private world, in which, in the safe haven of the family and the privacy of his own four walls, everything combines, as combine it must, to safeguard the existence of the individual, there stands

the world at large, which, if only because it was there before we were and will still be there when we have gone, can never be expected to concern itself in the first instance with the troubles and anxieties of the individual. To step forth into this world requires courage – in the political sense, not because of the peculiar dangers that lurk in it, but because the worries and anxieties of the individual no longer matter. Courage frees us of our individual worries in life for the sake of the freedom of the world. Courage is required, because in politics primary concern is never for life itself, but always for the world, which will survive whatever we may do.

Those for whom the word politics conjures up the idea of freedom cannot therefore feel that the world at large is made up of the sum total of private interests, or, alternatively, of the compromise between their conflicting interests, or that the State's attitude towards all its nationals is the same as that of a father towards the members of his family. If that were so, politics could not be reconciled with freedom. Freedom can be the essence of politics only if we regard them as a public arena, which is not only completely separate from the sphere of private life, but also constitutes a certain contrast to it.

In theory, the conception of a nation as one vast family, one single, gigantic household, is very old; as a practical conception, however, it has only come into being since modern society pushed its way between the politico-public and the purely private spheres of life, and the boundaries between these two spheres have consequently become somewhat nebulous. It is in this social no-man's-land that we all now have our being, and modern political theories, be they liberal, conservative or socialist, all tend to regard public affairs as though they were family affairs and to make purely private affairs the subject of public concern. Along this path it is, of course, the dictatorships which have gone farthest, and, as we all know, boast that they have abolished the difference between public and private life and the conflict between public and private interests, in favour of an instrument of terror and despotism, which represents the mutual interests of the whole community. But in the western democracies, too, the boundaries between public and private life have become confused, though in a different way; here the party politicians boast

that they represent the private interests of their electors in the same way as a good lawyer represents those of his client; as a result, the arena of public affairs, the world around us, is equally riddled with private interests. My readers know all about the so-called social sciences, and, from behaviourism to proletarian Marxism, they all aim at one and the same thing, namely, to prevent the man of action and his freedom from interfering in the course of events. From the point of view of the problem we are considering, it is immaterial whether this '*Vergesellschaftung*', this elimination of the social element from human existence, takes the form of behaviourism, which reduces all human actions to an analysis of stimulus and response, or the much more drastic form of modern ideologies, which reduce all political events and actions to a historical process which must obey its own, inherent laws. The difference between this widely-held ideological idea and a totalitarian dictatorship is, that the latter has discovered the means by which it can absorb men into the social stream of history in such a way that they no longer have any desire to interfere with its automatic flow, but on the contrary become willing to assist in increasing its momentum. The means by which this is achieved are the compulsion exercised by a reign of terror, unleashed from without, and the imposition of an ideological way of thinking from within. There is no doubt that this totalitarian development is the vital step towards both the elimination of politics from the activities of men and the abolition of freedom; in theory, however, wherever the concept of society and history have ousted the concept of politics, freedom is on the wane.

III

We have seen that the assertion: 'The meaning of politics is freedom' pre-supposes that politics are concerned with the world as such and not with those who live in it, and that freedom begins when preoccupation regarding their private lives ceases to compel men to behave in a specific manner. And we have seen that these concepts of freedom and politics are the antitheses of modern social theories. This state of affairs is an invitation to attempt to go back beyond the modern age and its theories and to put our faith in older

traditions. The real difficulty in the handling of our problem lies in the fact that this is by no means a simple thing to do. For my assertion that freedom is, in essence, a political phenomenon, that it does not flourish primarily in the realms of will and thought, but in the sphere of action, that therefore it requires a sphere appropriate to such action and that the appropriate sphere is the sphere of politics, is in direct contradiction to some concepts which are both very ancient and very much respected. Neither the silver age philosophical conception of freedom as a phenomenon of the process of thought, nor the Christian and modern concept of freedom of the will, are political in nature; indeed, both contain a strongly anti-political element, which is by no means the outcome of the freakish folly of philosophers or *homines religiosi*, but is based upon human experiences of the highest authenticity in the field of politics. To elaborate here on these experiences is neither necessary nor possible. Suffice it to say that, in answer to our query regarding the relationship between politics and freedom, tradition is all but unanimous in saying that freedom begins when a man withdraws from communal life, from life cheek by jowl with his neighbours – from the sphere, that is, in which the political process is active – and that he finds freedom in intercourse with himself and not in intercourse with others – either indulging in that type of dialogue with himself which, since the time of Socrates, we have identified with the process of thought, or in conflict with himself, in the struggle between volition and ability, in which Christianity after St. Paul and St. Augustine thought to discern the inadequacy and questionable value of human freedom. As regards the problem of freedom, it is natural that we should examine it and seek our answer within the framework of Christian tradition. That we must do is indicated by the very simple fact that for the most part, and quite sub-consciously, we understand freedom, as such, as freedom of volition, as an ability that was unknown to the ancient world. It was Christianity that first discovered that volition was an ability which had little or nothing to do with cupidity or the desire to possess some eagerly longed-for objects, and that, indeed, it could often come in direct conflict with such impulses. If freedom were really exclusively a phenomenon of volition, we should have no option but to assume that the ancients

did not know what freedom was. Such an assumption is, of course, absurd, but in support of it, it could be pointed out that the subject of freedom receives no mention in the works of any of the ancient philosophers before St. Augustine. The explanation of this remarkable omission lies in the fact that in the classical era freedom was regarded exclusively and radically as a political concept; it was the personification of *πόλις* and of political life – the *βίος πολιτικός*. But our own philosophical tradition, in so far as it stems from Parmenides and Plato, was originally based on the antithesis of *πόλις* and its political concept. That the ancient philosophers should have been quite non-plussed by the subject of freedom – that most political of all the concepts of the classical world – is, incidentally, quite understandable. Indeed, it could not be otherwise – until Christianity discovered in freedom of volition a freedom which had nothing to do with politics, which could be attained in communion with oneself and which therefore was not dependent upon intercourse with the many.

In view of the exceptional potential power inherent in volition, we are apt to forget that the *wish* did not originally take the form of I-want-to-and-I-can, but rather of a conflict between desire and ability; and it was this conflict that the ancients failed to discover. The I-want-to-and-I-can concept was, of course, quite familiar to them. It was Plato, my readers will remember, who enunciated the maxim that only the man who could both command and obey himself should have the right to command others, but be under no obligation to obey the behests of other men. This self-control, or alternatively, the conviction that self-control alone justifies the exercise of authority, has remained the hall-mark of the aristocratic outlook to this very day. And it is, in fact, a typically political virtue, a phenomenon of virtuosity, in which volition and ability are so closely linked as to become virtually one and the same thing. But when we thus again separate volition and ability, we are speaking in contradictory terms from the viewpoint of the Christian conception of freedom of volition. Had the ancients had any idea of the existence of this difference, they would undoubtedly have regarded freedom as the predicate of ability rather than of volition. Wherever ability founders, be it as the result of extraneous circumstance or of

individual inadequacy, there can be no question of freedom. I have chosen the example of self-control because here we are dealing with a phenomenon which can be explained only in terms of the power of the will. The Greeks, as my readers will know, gave much thought to the question of the retention of a sense of proportion, to the desirability of taming and controlling the fiery steed of the soul; yet among all those phenomena which to us are a manifestation of strength of will, they never realised that the will, volition, was an attribute quite independent of all other human attributes and was, indeed, a very special quality in man.

It is a historical fact, over which we should do well to ponder, that man became specifically aware of the existence of his will when he became conscious, not of its strength, but of its weakness, and began to say with St. Paul: the spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak. For us, the essential point is that it was not the impotence of the will, as such, that was here coming to light, not the fact that it had foundered when confronted with the superior forces of nature, of circumstance or of the many against the individual, but that it was solely a case of the impotence of the will in the individual man. All volition springs from this fundamental state of inner conflict in man between his will and his ability to do what he wills; this means, literally, that the 'I-wish' strikes back at the ego, goads it on, incites it to action or founders in the attempt. This *Ich-bezogenheit* persists, even when a man sets out to conquer the whole world and, as a matter of principle, it draws a distinction between the 'I-wish-to' and the 'I-think', which, admittedly, implies a *Selbstbezug*, a dialogue with oneself, but not, however, on the subject of this self. Since it was its impotence that first made us aware of the existence of volition, it may well be that it has now become so completely avid for power that volition and the desire for power have become almost identical in our eyes. Be that as it may, a tyranny which has its origins in the 'I-wish' complex is something infinitely more horrible and rapacious than the utopian rule of reason to which the philosophers sought to make men adhere and which is modelled on the 'I-think' concept. I have already said that it was only when it came to be realised that freedom was no longer to be attained in corporate action and intercourse with others, but in volition and communion with oneself,

that philosophers began to take an interest in it. That freedom had thus been transformed from a factor that was primarily political into a philosophical problem of the first order did not prevent it, in its new problematical and philosophical form, from re-asserting its importance in the political field. But now that the emphasis had shifted so decisively from ability to volition, the being-in-a-state-of-freedom, as an ideal, could no longer be regarded as that virtuosity which displays itself in corporate action with others; the ideal became, rather, an idealisation of sovereignty, of independence of all others and of the ability, if necessary, to assert oneself against them.

Politically, no other component of the traditional philosophical conception of freedom has proved to be so disastrous as this identification of freedom with sovereignty that is inherent in it. For it led either to a denial of freedom – when, for example, it was realised that men were by no means sovereign beings – or to a point of view, which is only an apparent contradiction of this denial, namely, that the freedom of an individual or a group is attainable only at the expense of the freedom and sovereignty of all other men and groups. What is so extremely difficult to understand in the whole problem is the simple fact that it is a characteristic of human existence that freedom is conferred upon it solely on condition that it is not held to imply sovereignty; and that to deny freedom for the sake of this sovereignty would be just as unrealistic as it would be disastrous to believe that we can only be free – as individuals or as communities – when we are at the same time sovereign. Even the sovereignty of a political entity is only a myth, and one, moreover, that can be maintained by no other means than by force.

In any case, fully to appreciate how unreal and disastrous this association of freedom with sovereignty is, one must free oneself of the old prejudice, which goes back to the Roman stoa, that non-sovereignty was the same as dependence and that the reason why human existence was not a sovereign state was the fact that men had need of each other to be able to live at all. But this inter-dependence of men in all questions of the mere act of living is obvious; it is confirmed by the manner in which we are born *ἐξ ἀλλήλων*, as the Greeks say, out of one another. But this inter-dependence in human existence applies in actual fact only to the individual; it need not apply to a

group, provided that it has an absolute superiority of force over all other groups or is powerful and self-contained enough to exist in complete isolation from all other groups. Of far more vital significance than this dependence is the fact that it is impossible to imagine men existing as separate, independent entities, that the whole of their existence depends upon there always being others of their own kind. If there existed only one man, in the way in which we say there is only one God, then man, in the sense in which we use the term, would not exist at all; if there were only one nation or people on earth, then no one would understand what a nation or a people was. This corporate existence among those of his own species ceases, as far as the individual man is concerned, only with death, or, as the Latin so aptly puts it: *inter homines esse* to denote life, and *desinere inter homines esse* to denote death. Only in death is human existence completely and utterly individual.

As in the case of the individual, the sovereignty of a group or a political entity is, in essence, also a myth; it can only come into being if the majority behaves as if it were not only one entity, but also the only one of its kind. The assumption of such an attitude is quite possible, as we know only too well from the many manifestations of it that mass communities have given us: but it is also proof that in such a community there is no such thing as freedom. Where all act in unison, no one can act freely, even when he is not being subjected to any sort of coercion. Under the conditions of human society, then, which are governed by the fact that society is formed not of man, the individual, but man, the collective species, that it is organised not as *one* people but as many peoples, freedom and sovereignty have so little in common that they cannot even exist side by side. Wherever men, either as individuals or when grouped in communities, seek to gain sovereignty, they must first abolish freedom. But if they wish to be free, they must renounce their aspirations to sovereignty.

As an example of how difficult it is, within the structure of our philosophy, to arrive at a satisfactory interpretation of the term political freedom, or alternatively, to formulate a definition of freedom that is in harmony with political experience, I should like to refer to two thinkers who, as far as political theory and philosophy are

concerned, are perhaps the greatest and most profound that the modern age has produced – Montesquieu and Kant.

Montesquieu is so fully aware of the inappropriateness of philosophical tradition in this connection that he draws a sharp distinction between political freedom and philosophical freedom. Philosophical freedom, he says, demands only 'l'exercice de la volonté', the exercise of volition – is independent, that is, of conditions in the world and of the aims which volition sets itself. Political freedom, on the other hand, 'consists in security' ('la liberté politique consiste dans la sûreté'), which is not to be found everywhere and at all times, but is present only in political communities governed in accordance with specific laws. Without such security, there can be no such thing as freedom, since freedom means 'to be able to do what one ought to wish to do' ('la liberté ne peut consister qu'à pouvoir faire ce que l'on doit vouloir faire'). Obvious, from this formula, as is Montesquieu's tendency to confront the philosophical freedom of the individual will with the political state of being-free as a concrete and universally understandable reality, it is equally obvious how very dependent he remains on the philosophical tradition of the freedom of the will. For from Montesquieu's formula it rather sounds as though political freedom is nothing more than an extension of that philosophical freedom, which is indispensable if freedom of the will is to become a reality. To interpret correctly what Montesquieu intends to convey, we must read the sentence with care; we shall then realise that the emphasis is laid not upon the word *pouvoir*, but on the word *faire*, not, that is, '*to be able to do . . .*' but '*to be able to do . . .*'; and we might add that to do and to act, in this connection, denote considerably more than the mere implementation of the dictates of the will. To be free means to possess freedom of action, while the ability to put this freedom of action into practice is guaranteed by others in the form of security. Freedom does not consist of an 'I-want-to', which the 'I-can' may or may not implement, according to circumstances, for that, surely, would be a negation of the whole concept of human freedom. A man begins to *be* free when he possesses the freedom to act as he thinks fit; 'inability-to-act', therefore, and 'lack of freedom' are one and the same thing, even though the (philosophical) freedom of the will remains un-

impaired. In other words, political freedom is not 'inner freedom' and can find no refuge in inner reservations; if, in a free nation, political freedom is to be operative, it must be granted latitude in which both to act and to be seen to be in operation. The power of volition to assert itself and to impose its will upon others has nothing to do with this state-of-being-free.

In Kant, the only one of the great philosophers to accord the same dignity to the question: 'What ought I to do?' as to the purely philosophical questions: 'What can I do?' and 'What may I hope?', the strength of the anti-political tradition in philosophy is exemplified less by any inadequacy of postulation, as is the case with Montesquieu, than by the remarkable fact that he expounds two political philosophies which differ sharply from one another – the first being that which is generally accepted as such in his *Critique of Practical Reason* and the second that contained in his *Critique of Judgement*. That the first part of the latter is, in reality, a political philosophy is a fact that is seldom mentioned in works on Kant; on the other hand, it can, I think, be seen from all his political writings that for Kant himself the theme of 'judgement' carried more weight than that of 'practical reason'. In the '*Critique of Judgement*' freedom is portrayed as a predicate of the power of imagination and not of the will, and the power of imagination is linked most closely with that wider manner of thinking which is political thinking par excellence, because it enables us to 'put ourselves in the minds of other men'. It is only in this context that it becomes clear, from the philosophical point of view, why Kant felt able to say with such emphasis: 'External force, which denies a man the liberty to express his own thoughts publicly, deprives him also of his freedom of thought.' Here, being unfree reacts on the inherent capacity to be free and destroys it. Freedom of thought, of self-communion, as Kant puts it, if it is to give birth to ideas, is dependent upon others and on the opportunity to 'state our opinions publicly, in order to see whether they appeal to the minds of others'.

But to this conception of a freedom that is entirely independent of the freedom of the will little or no importance has been attached in subsequent assessments of Kant's philosophy. In his own philosophical writings, too, it is overshadowed by the importance attached

to 'practical reason', which ascribes to the will all power – for good or for evil – in human affairs, while action itself, as will be recollected, does not come within the scope of human power and ability, but is dictated by necessity and the laws of cause and effect. That a man can be free only if the 'I-want-to' is not opposed by an inner 'I-cannot', and that he loses his freedom as soon as he begins to act – concerning these two fundamental principles of his purely political philosophy in the narrower sense, Kant harboured hardly any doubts.

IV

Those of us for whom the whole question of freedom stands in the shadow of Christianity and a philosophy that is fundamentally anti-political by tradition find it hard to understand how action can possess a freedom that is independent of the will. In an effort to define more precisely this state of freedom which is achieved only in the course of action, let us return once more to antiquity – not from any desire to display our erudition, and certainly not with the object of maintaining continuity of our tradition, but simply in order to re-capture those experiences of which, admittedly, we all have some idea, but which in latter days have never again manifested themselves in such classical purity.

The first thing that strikes us is the fact that both Latin and Greek have two words, strictly different in application, to denote 'to act' or 'to do'. In Greek we have *ἀρχεῖν* (to start something, to give a lead, to control) and *πράττειν* (to carry something through to its logical conclusion). The equivalent words in Latin are *agere* and *gerere*; the action of the latter culminates in the *res gestae*, the deeds and events which we call *faits accomplis* and which pass into history. In both cases, the initial phase of action is that it makes a beginning, sets something new in motion. The fact that freedom is originally experienced in this initiation of something new, the action which, since Kant, we have come to define as spontaneity, is directly implicit in the very wide meaning conveyed by the Greek word, in which the sense of initiating is linked with leading and finally controlling – in other words, with the characteristic qualities of a free man. Implicit, too, in the wide meaning of *ἀρχεῖν* is the sense that only

a man who is already a leader can initiate action; in Greek that meant a man with a houseful of slaves at his call, who was free of any anxiety regarding the necessities of life and was at liberty, therefore, to lead the life of the πόλις with those of his own class. Initiation, however, also implies leadership of others, without whose help the initiator could not carry anything to its ultimate conclusion (πράττειν). To be free and to initiate are also closely linked in Latin, though in a different way. To the Romans, freedom is a heritage for which they have to thank the foundation of Rome and hence the beginning of their history, the beginning which their forefathers initiated and which their successors are called upon to transform into *gerere* and the *res gestae*, to administer and to expand. For this reason Roman historians, unlike Thucydides and Herodotus, cannot content themselves with commending just a few great historical events and occasions to the attention of their fellow citizens, but are compelled to start at *urbe condita* and specifically to link events back to that beginning.

To go a step further, we can say that in antiquity the fundamental sense of the political concept was most closely linked with this ability to initiate. There are very good reasons why the world of antiquity found it literally impossible to imagine political activity except in connection with the city. It was only in the founding of a city that initiation, the setting in motion of something, the ἄρχειν and the *agere*, stood any real chance, because the help of others, which was essential for the completion of the task, the πράττειν and *gerere*, was always ready to hand in the organised society of citizenship. In this way, the citizens of a πόλις were in a position, as were all others who were free of material cares, not only to act more or less as they deemed fit, but were also permanently free to *be*. From the very nature of this linked development of city and State it was inevitable that, in the course of time, completion and continuation should acquire a greater significance in the life politic than the mere act of initiation (or foundation); and the net result has been that in both Greek and Latin there eventually survived only one verb with the meaning to do or to act, namely, πράττειν and *gerere*. The other verbs, ἄρχειν and *agere* did not, of course, disappear from the language, but they ceased to have their former full political

meaning. Nevertheless Aristotle who, in his political philosophy, with the exception of this one instance, invariably used the verb *πράττειν* in connection with the whole field of human affairs and activities, says that the *πόλις* was composed of *ἄρχοντες* and not of *πράττοντες*, and in this term both meanings are touched upon – ruling, that is to say the ruling of slaves which made it possible to be free, and also the positive freedom of initiative.

I have already remarked that the conception of freedom held by the world of antiquity, because it was so exclusively political, plays no part in the Socratic school of philosophy. The Romans, too, who, except for sporadic rebellions against the anti-political tendencies of the Greek school of philosophy, neither expanded nor materially altered the doctrines and the way of thought handed down to them, never for a moment thought of defining the freedom which they had experienced politically and establishing a philosophic basis for it. Christian philosophy offers even less hope, and least hope of all comes from the great Christian thinker, St. Augustine. It was probably St. Paul who first realised the existence of the freedom of the will in 'the inner man', and it was St. Augustine who transformed his own interpretation thereof into one of the basic principles of western philosophy. But side by side with his acceptance of the *liberum arbitrium*, upon which tradition has to such a large extent been founded, St. Augustine enunciated another and quite different theory of freedom, which, characteristically enough, emerges in the only truly political treatise that he wrote, the *Civitas Dei*, in which, naturally, his views are based primarily upon his experiences in Rome. In *Civitas Dei* St. Augustine propounds the theory that freedom is not an inner, human concept, but a token of the way in which human existence came to be in the world, and the basis of this freedom, he says, is the fact that man himself is a 'Beginning', an *initium* and, since he had not existed for as long as the world and had not been created at the same time as the world, he represents the beginning of a new manifestation in a world that had already been created. This, he says, is confirmed by the fact that when a man is born he comes as something completely new into a world which existed before him and will continue after him. Because he is *himself* a beginning, St. Augustine says, every man can begin something new

– in other words, is free; and it was in order that there should be in the world something that was a beginning that God created man: *'Initium ut esset homo creatus est, ante quem nemo fuit.'*

In view of the anti-political tendencies of early Christendom, it may seem paradoxical that it should be a Christian thinker who should have developed the philosophical implications of the ancient concept of freedom, which originally was purely political. This conception of freedom, too, left no mark on Christian or modern philosophy, and it is not until we turn to Kant's writings that we again come across traces of it. Kant, like St. Augustine, recognised two completely independent concepts of freedom – pure freedom, which he defined as: 'spontaneous freedom from constraint through the impulses of the sentient faculties' – a negative freedom, and that spontaneity which, in his philosophy, is so essential in thought and appraisal and which he defines as the ability 'to initiate a series of events entirely independently'. How closely Kant's spontaneity is related to St. Augustine's beginning is shown by the fact that he himself also describes it as 'a freedom in the cosmological sense'. If, for him, it were first, foremost and exclusively a manifestation of the will, it would be difficult to understand why appraisal should not be possible without spontaneity of the concepts of the mind, and why he speaks with such emphasis regarding 'the spontaneity of thought'.

Be that as it may, the fact that the first philosophical concept of freedom experienced in the field of politics should have been founded by a Roman Christian thinker will seem strange only if Christianity still conveys to our minds that anti-political attitude of early Christendom, and in particular the doctrine of the will, as enunciated in the epistles of St. Paul. But our ideas would, I am sure, be modified, if we were to concentrate on Jesus of Nazareth himself, his personality and his teaching. His sermons show an extraordinarily profound understanding of freedom and of the power that is inherent in human freedom; but the human faculty which gives rise to this power and, in the words of the gospel, can move mountains, is not the will, but faith. Faith is a miracle our comprehension of which is in many ways ambiguous and hard to define. Let us, however, disregard the ambiguities and concentrate on those aspects in which a miracle

is by no means solely something that is the result of supernatural intervention, but something which, in all cases, interrupts the natural, automatic sequence of events in favour of the unexpected.

Now I would assert that, if action is in essence beginning, then the power to work a miracle is one of its attributes. And to make the assertion more palatable, let me invite attention to the fact that every new beginning, judged from the viewpoint of what has gone before, bursts upon the world as something unexpected and incalculable. Fundamentally, everything that happens is a miracle; and the assumption that a miracle is exclusively a religious phenomenon seems to me to be based on prejudice. Further to illustrate the point, let me point out that the whole framework of our material existence – the earth itself, the organic life on it, the human race in the midst of a whole range of animal species – is the result of a series of miracles. From the point of view of the sequence of events in the universe and the probabilities inherent in them, which can be assessed statistically, the genesis of the earth itself is, in the phraseology of natural science, ‘an infinite improbability’, or, as we should say, a miracle. The same applies equally to the genesis of organic life as the result of the sequence of the inorganic process, and to the genesis of the human race as the result of the process of organic evolution. In other words, every new beginning is a miracle, if it is experienced and regarded from the viewpoint of the processes which, of necessity, it interrupts: and in this connection the decisive factor is that this insight is not due to any special or particularly elevated point of view, but, on the contrary, is based on that which is nearest and most humdrum.

I have quoted this example in order to illustrate that that which we call real is always a plexus of natural, organic, human reality, which quâ reality has come into being as the result of the intervention of a series of infinite improbabilities. But if we take this example as a picture of what really happens in the sphere of human affairs, its inadequacy becomes, of course, at once apparent. For the processes with which we are concerned in the political sphere are, as I have said, of a historical nature, by which I mean that they do not operate in accordance with the normal rules of cause and effect, but are a continuation of events in which the miracle of chance or infinite

improbability nevertheless occurs with such frequency that it seems strange even to speak of it as a miracle. The sole reason for that, however, lies in the fact that the processes of history are set in motion as the result of the initiative of man and, equally, are being continually interrupted by man. If we regard this process purely objectively, *quâ* process, then everything that begins, be it for good or evil, is so infinitely improbable that all major events assume the guise of miracles. Seen objectively, from the outside, as it were, the chances that to-morrow will run its course in exactly the same way as to-day are overwhelming. They are certainly not quite so overwhelming, but, in terms of human measurement, they are just as great as the chances that there should have emerged from the cosmic process *no* earth, from the inorganic process *no* life, and from the process of evolution of the animal species *no* human race.

The essential difference between the 'infinite improbabilities' from which all life on earth and all natural, material phenomena stem, and the miraculous happenings that occur in the field of human affairs is, of course, that in the latter case there is a miracle worker whom we know, and that man in some most mysterious way seems to have been endowed with the gift of performing miracles.

V

If, from these philosophic arguments regarding a concept of freedom based on political experience, there is some conclusion to be drawn which would help us towards a correct assessment of the current political situation, it is that the extreme danger of totalitarian rule for the future of mankind lies less in its tyrannical nature and its refusal to tolerate any sort of political freedom, than in the fact that it threatens to kill all forms of spontaneity – the element of action and freedom, that is, in every sphere of human activity. It is an essential characteristic of the most terrible of all forms of tyranny that it seeks to remove from the field of political activity the possibility of any miracle – or, to put it in a more familiar way, of any spontaneous action – and so to deliver us into the hands of those automatic processes by which we are in any case surrounded – and

by which, too, in so far as we are organic by nature, we are also governed.

To believe that within these automatic processes the 'infinitely improbable' could occur would denote less a healthy faith in the possibility of miracles than a morbid tendency towards superstition. But to count on the incidence of the unforeseeable in politics, to be prepared for it, and to expect miracles in the circumstances under which they may constantly be expected to occur – that is very much the reverse of superstition.

For the state of being free is not less a concrete fact than the automatism of those processes within which and against which it asserts itself, and not merely a metaphysically accessible statement of fact. On the other hand, those processes which are brought into being as the result of human action also have a tendency to become automatic, and this means that there can be no deed or event which can redeem humanity or a people once and for all and give them eternal happiness.

It is a characteristic inherent in the automatic processes to which men are subjected in some measure and the absolute slaves of which they would become without the miracle of freedom, that they are always disastrous as far as man is concerned – as disastrous as the biological process which controls his whole existence and which, biologically, can only and invariably lead him from birth to death. From the miracle that can occur in political affairs – so long as man's freedom, his ability to interrupt the disastrous march of events, remains intact – it is only the world at large, humanity *as a whole*, that can expect to derive fulfilment, and never the individual man, who is destined to die as an individual. The disastrous processes can be interrupted only as far as the world, with which we are all familiar and which will survive our passing, is concerned, and with which politics, in the strict sense, have to do. From this it follows that although the ability to initiate is a gift of man as an individual, it is an ability which he can exercise only with regard to the world at large and with the co-operation of others.

In contrast to his ability to think independently and to make something by his own unaided efforts, a man can only act with the help of others and in the open arena of the world. In this 'acting in concert',

as Burke says, the freedom of the ability to initiate resolves itself into a state of *being* free. The difference between acting on the one hand and thinking or making something on the other lies in the fact that in the latter it is only the beginning that is free; the completed process, if it is successful, is nothing more than the realisation of the thought with which the process began or the article which the power of imagination had originally conceived. Action, on the other hand, however small its achievements may be, strives, when it has reached its goal, to ensure that freedom receives ever fresh impetus and that new beginnings are constantly injected into the stream of things already initiated. For the result of action is not some thing, which, once it has been conceived on the drawing-board, can be manufactured. It has, rather, the characteristics of a story, which continues to unfold as long as the action continues, but the end of which no one, not even he who started it, can either conceive or foresee. In the case of action, therefore, the differences between beginning and completion are not so great that he who initiates the action knows in advance exactly what the completion will be, while those who assist him are called upon merely to implement his pre-knowledge, carry out his orders and put his decisions into practice. In action, beginning and completion merge into one another, and this, applied to the sphere of political activity, means that he who takes the initiative and by so doing assumes the role of leader must act towards those who come forward to help him always as a man among equals, and never as a ruler among his servants or a teacher among his pupils and disciples. That is what Herodotus meant, when he said that in freedom a man neither rules nor is ruled and can therefore be free only in an isocracy, as one in the midst of his equals.

From the state of being free, in which the gift of freedom, of the ability-to-initiate, becomes a concrete reality in the world, there emerges, side by side with the narrative which action creates, the field of political activity itself. It exists wherever men live in unison, unfettered by despotism or serfdom; but it disappears at once – even though the institutional framework which encloses it remains intact – the moment action ceases and preservation of the status quo and administration start to function, or even when initiative falters

and fails to inject new beginnings into the processes which have been initiated by action. Then the processes which have been set in motion by freedom become transformed into automatic processes, and this man-made automatism is no less fatal to the world at large than is the automatism of nature to the life of the individual man. In the study of history we refer in such cases to petrifying or declining civilisations, and we know that the process of deterioration can continue over a period of many centuries, that, in a purely quantitative sense, it can, indeed, occupy the major portion of history as it has been handed down to us.

Because in human history the epochs of freedom have been of comparatively short duration, and because, on the other hand, during the whole period of petrification and decline the ability to initiate – that element of freedom that is inherent in all human activity – has remained intact, it is not surprising that men have always been inclined to regard freedom as something which can exist only outside the field of political activity, as being, indeed, synonymous with freedom from politics. This assumption, however, is a misconception, which stems from a situation in which everything that is specifically political has either become stagnant and inert or has degenerated into automatism. Under such conditions the state of being free, as a positive state with its own exclusive virtuosity, can no longer exist. It becomes dependent upon the gift of freedom, that heritage which, in the whole of creation, man alone appears to possess, which can express itself in other fields of activity as well as in the political, but which can achieve its true and proper stature as a reality in world affairs only by means of action.

That the state of being free, as a reality in the world, is destructible, that only seldom in history has it been able to unfold its full virtuosity, are facts, incidentally, that the peoples of Europe have always known. But that not only this state of being free, but also the gift of freedom – the thing, that is, which was not created by man, but came into the world with him – can also be destroyed is something we have learnt or have come to fear only since we have made the acquaintance of the totalitarian form of despotism. This knowledge or fear is a burden that lies more heavily upon us to-day than ever before. For on human freedom, on man's ability to fend off the

disaster which advances like an automaton and seems therefore inevitable, on man's ability to implement the 'infinitely improbable' and transform it into a reality, may well depend more to-day than ever before in our history, namely, the survival on earth of the human race.

WERNER KÄGI

Zürich University

FEDERALISM AND FREEDOM

During the last few decades, in lectures and discussions, it has become almost a commonplace to hear the speaker utter the assurance: 'Je ne propose rien, je n'impose rien – j'expose'. When, as a young student, I heard this formula for the first time from the lips of a distinguished foreign scholar, its effect upon me was akin to that of a solemn antiphon. Was it not, I thought, an admission in the spirit of critical science, which recognises the limits of our knowledge and seeks with all humility to preserve the bounds within which human intelligence can function? At a time when political expediency and a boundless desire for power are a constant threat to truth, was this not a noble endeavour to preserve at least some small measure of objectivity? Very soon, however, my admiration of this attitude became tinged with a misgiving that has grown stronger as time has passed.

Is it *really* necessary to say it at all? If it is intended as an avowal of objectivity, then, surely, it is a commonplace that has no need of utterance. When – as in many more recent works – it occurs with obtrusive frequency, it gives rise to the suspicion that the author is in reality less concerned with the purity of objective reasoning than with a desire to secure undisputed precedence for his own doctrine. Be that as it may, if one's object is to claim a monopoly of scientific outlook and objectivity or from the very outset to demonstrate that one's own doctrine is 'pure' doctrine (and by implication to brand the tenets of others with the stigma of unscientific quackery), this is certainly the best way of going about it. But it is also the method by which, in recent years, scientific discussion has been reduced to a state of rigidity and sterility that can be produced only by discussion or, more accurately, by the static warfare between infallibles.

Misgiving goes further. *Can* one really say it? Of recent years, critical appraisal of the science and study of intellectual function has led to the opinion that objectivity, in the sense of a total absence of prejudice, does *not* exist. Even a fine piece of descriptive writing, 'wholly devoid of premise', is an impossibility. To achieve a penetrating comprehension in any sphere demands more than cool detachment. At a time when the neo-Kantian theory of perception (which has little or no justification for associating itself with Kant's name) was still exercising considerable influence, Emil Staiger wrote: 'The organs of perception, without which no true reading is possible, are reverence and love. Even science cannot do without them: for science can understand and analyse only what love possesses; and without love science is empty.'

Finally, in view of the current situation, we must ask ourselves: Has one, to-day, any *right* to say such a thing? The radical menace under which we at present live is a clear and dual challenge to our faculties of perception; it demands thinking which will lead to responsible action, and it demands thinking which will pay due heed to responsibility for the whole. 'Je ne propose rien, je n'impose rien - j'expose.' Even if this attitude of mind were possible in theory, it would still, to-day, be an untenable attitude. In this formula of such becoming modesty there remains, then, only one statement which implies any obligation - je n'impose rien, provided, of course, that by 'imposer' we understand the imposition of an opinion or doctrine *by force*, or by one of those substitutes for force, such as suggestion and the like. Even the very great, though fugitive, success of indoctrination - a frightful word for a devilish procedure - in the totalitarian countries cannot and must not for a moment be allowed to mislead the free world. Such methods are of no use to us. On the other hand, the real point at issue lies in the 'proposer'. Here it is a mistaken sense of diffidence which acts as the deterrent. And as a rule it is not respect for the freedom or dignity of others which holds us back, but our own uncertainty, the feeling that everything is relative, and the lack of any firm and definite standpoint. *For there is no doubt* that the weakness of the West is to a large extent attributable to the fact that *the free peoples no longer really champion and proclaim the values, the basic merits, that lie in their various forms of*

constitutional government, that all too often they seek defensively to protect those things which can, in reality, be defended only by attack – *the concept of law and order in freedom*. Among the waverers and the open-minded, who hesitate between the two blocs of the ‘totalitarians’ and the free peoples, the dogmatic intolerance of the Kremlin – even though the brutality of its violence may constantly shock them – is far more convincing than is the insipid type of tolerance which makes no effort to defend its own values and which no longer has the strength to champion and uphold its own concepts of good government.

The object of this treatise is to help to give greater clarity and strength to this *fundamental western concept* of good government which, to a considerable extent, has now been transformed into a comfortable *slogan*. Not only must it be defended against denudation and distortion of meaning by its enemies, but it must also be constantly re-aroused to a sense of its own obligations in the face of weariness and indifference among its adherents. And a further cause which this treatise hopes to serve is the endeavour to make clear *the relationship between federalism and freedom* which, in this connection, too, is indivisible. We will try quite frankly to enumerate the *enormous objective difficulties* with which the politico-social steps towards the implementation of federalism are confronted. We will not seek with pretty phrases to disguise what is *the main weakness* – the existing lack of faith in federalism. Nor – for this, too, would be an illegitimate type of ‘imposer’ – will we recommend federalism in the way in which, in both medicine and politics, so many feel called upon to clothe their recommendations – as a panacea. Nevertheless, we are convinced that the federal concept of government – not in the form of an expedient, dictated by temporary exigencies, but most certainly as a fundamental principle – is a concept of government that is imperishable. *A political entity remains free and human only for as long as it preserves, even in the face of radically altered circumstances, at least something of its federal structure*. For my own country, Switzerland, this is a *conditio sine qua non*; but it is a principle which applies equally to each and every political entity.

THE FEDERAL IDEA

What does federalism really mean? Although the modern usage of the word has diverged quite a bit from its original, primary meaning, the old word '*foedus*', in the sense of alliance, treaty, oath of allegiance, the right to make decisions, nevertheless still, after a lapse of some thousands of years, adequately expresses all that is essential in this imperishable form of a group of communities.

Juridical thought has for centuries been endeavouring to define the federal concept in readily understandable terms; and in many respects it has succeeded in producing a clear picture. On the other hand, it has *narrowed* the scope and freedom of the federal concept by adherence to a dogma which regards federalism as being, in essence, purely the problem of a federal State and which lies completely under the spell of the dogma of sovereignty. As long ago as the middle of last century, Otto von Gierke declared that to try and grasp fully the idea of the federal State with the help of ideas based upon the normal form of centralised State is like trying 'to square the circle'.

We must do our best to free the federal concept from the Procrustean bed of this dogma. In later paragraphs we will define federalism *in a very wide sense*, giving due consideration to the phenomenon of so-called decentralisation. Indeed, *differentiation between federalism and decentralisation* is in many respects by no means devoid of significance; and there is a clear criterion of the difference between them: In the case of decentralisation, the wider community can decide upon the form of government of the narrower, component communities without obtaining the latter's acquiescence and, indeed, in the teeth of their opposition; in *the federal system of government*, in the operative sense, this is not possible. Autonomy, then, in the case of the former is purely concessionary and not legally binding, whereas in the case of federalism it is guaranteed by the narrower communities' equal rights of franchise – in extreme cases, even, of veto – and is therefore not a concession, but a legal right.

Nevertheless, for the purpose of this investigation, let us pay less attention to the formally legal aspect of the guarantee contained in the federal conception and turn rather to the actual federal structure

itself. Two examples will suffice to explain briefly what I mean. Great Britain, in the accepted terminological sense, is not a federated State – and certainly not a Federal State. The exclusive right of the Parliament of Westminster to exercise power is dogmatically – indeed, emphatically and uncompromisingly – affirmed by the formula, Parliamentary sovereignty. Local government – the chain of administrative counties, county boroughs, county districts, parish councils, the special rights of the City of London, Scotland, and so on – is regarded by modern doctrine as a manifestation of pure decentralisation. However unstable (and potentially unitarian and centralised) the legal structure may be from the formal point of view, Great Britain nevertheless has *in practice* one of the most stable *federal* structures in the world. Autonomy and the various special rights are better maintained in Britain than in most of the Federal States. As our second example let us take a glance at the regional organisation of the Grisons Canton. In terms of the currently prevailing doctrine, this again is merely an order based on decentralisation. *Legally*, any community in the Canton can be deprived, against its will, of its local autonomous powers. *In reality*, however, its position is incomparably more secure than that of its counterpart in the German *Laender*, where, legally, an unconditional guarantee of continuity of autonomous rights is in force. Once again, then, we are forced to the conclusion that, in the regional organisation of the Grisons Canton, the structure is as impervious, *in actual fact*, to the rights of the majority, as it is insecure *from the purely legal aspect*.

Any enquiry which seeks to delve more deeply into the true state of affairs as regards federalism must, therefore, ignore the legal aspect and particularly the ‘purely’ legal aspect. The juridical viewpoint, however – and this is something which, as a student of political institutions, I must emphasise – undoubtedly retains its validity. It remains both necessary and binding – as well it should and must be in these days of comparative lawlessness. But it must also recognise its own limitations if it is to become more elastic.

I propose in the following paragraphs to review the salient features which characterise the federal conception of government. These features do not stand in any strictly logical relation to one another, like the component amounts of a net aggregate, but are inclined

rather to overlap. This overlapping causes me less concern than would the sharp tabulation of systematic thinking. For, as Denis de Rougement rightly says: 'Le fédéralisme est le contraire absolu d'un système.'

(a) Federalism is an order of '*multiplicity in unity*'. To the federal school of thought the elasticity of its organisation is not merely a fortuitous fact, but a highly significant factor and aim. Freedom can only exist in a community in which the individuality of each member of it and the particular characteristics of the group are given free play – but always within the framework of the whole. This elasticity, in both provincial organisation and cultural activity, gives breadth and, in spite of the poverty of its soil, wealth to this little country of ours.

(b) Federalism is an *order that is based upon the autonomy of the narrower communities*. In the autonomy which it enjoys, each group is free to fashion and develop its own particular characteristics, ethnical, lingual, cultural and denominational – *and* economic and social. The scope of this autonomy, which, in accordance with the premises of federal autonomy, is invariably an autonomy within the framework of the whole, varies considerably from province to province. But in each case the particular type of autonomous legislation and administration makes it possible for the smaller communities to set up and put into practice an order which suits their requirements. It is only under a federal order of this nature that the much vaunted right of self-determination is thus freely granted.

(c) Federalism is an *order in which the smaller circles and communities are granted the maximum possible power to direct their own affairs*. Under the federal conception of decentralisation, the broader communal entities should assume only such functions as the smaller communities are unable to fulfil or, anyway, to fulfil efficiently. Federal order will continue to exist only for as long as there remains alive some measure of that obstinate pride which is so well illustrated by the English credo: 'Better self-governed than well governed!'

(d) Federalism is an order *which makes it possible for minorities to live together in freedom*. It is based upon the tolerance of the majority towards the minority that differs from it and upon mutual respect between minorities. It is not the mere living-side-by-side of co-exist-

ence, but a living-together in a federal community. Individual minorities are not protected by special statute, but by the *common right* of the federal order. This is what Anton Philipp von Segesser meant, when he said: 'It is precisely in the federal principle that we (i.e. the Swiss Federation) who, in fact, are composed of a mass of minorities, find the best guarantee against oppression.' By insisting on tolerance towards minorities and safeguarding their rights, the federal concept has introduced a wholesome modification of the (democratic) absolutism of the principle of majority rule.

(e) Federalism is an *order built upwards from the smaller communities, in which the conditions can, to a certain degree, be seen at a glance, and in which relationships have, to a certain degree, remained on a personal footing.* For the Greeks, the standard gauge was the *autarchy*, which recognised limitations both upwards and downwards. The πόλις, they held, should be as big as the 'requirements of life' demanded, but should at the same time be kept within the limits imposed by democratic constitution. 'In order to be able to direct their affairs with justice and to bestow office according to merit,' Jakob Burckhardt affirms, 'citizens must know each other and know what sort of people they and their fellow citizens are.' (Griechische Kulturgeschichte. Vol. I, page 77.) Both in their political writings and as their utopian ideal, the Greeks regarded a community of 10,000 citizens as being 'about the right size'.

Rousseau, too, saw things in much the same light. We tend all too easily to forget that his conception of democracy – which presupposes that absolute sovereignty lies directly with the people as a whole and rejects with dogmatic severity any form of representation – has in mind the small commune, in which 'cette douce habitude de se voir et de se connaître' guarantees stability.

At a time when political science found itself confronted with a great variety of problems, much ingenuity was expended in discussing whether there was any minimum to what constituted a State. Was Robinson Crusoe's island a State, for instance, when he was the sole inhabitant, the one-man-State on the analogy of the one-man company, the extreme case in company law, or did it only become a State with the advent of Man Friday?

A more serious problem is whether there is also *a limit to the size of*

a *State, a maximum* at which a State, in the sense of 'civitas' or 'res publica', ceases to be a State? (This, incidentally, is rather like the other problem, with which St. Augustine wrestles in Chapter 21 of his 'Civitas Dei' and which is extremely apposite at the present moment – the difference between a 'State' and 'Bands of Robbers!') This is a question to which Rousseau repeatedly returned, particularly in his 'Considérations sur le Gouvernement de Pologne', which, like his 'Contrat Social', enjoys far too little attention. Rousseau asks whether a great Power can be regarded as a State. And on this subject he says: 'The size of a nation, the expanse of the State, is the first and primary source of the misfortunes of the human race . . . Nearly all the small States – republics and monarchies alike – prosper solely because they are small, because all their citizens know each other and supervise one another, and because the Heads of the States are themselves in a position to form a picture of what is evil and of what tasks lie before them (what good they have to do) . . . God alone can rule the *world*, and to govern great nations requires superhuman qualities.'

In recent years, one aspect of this question has assumed considerable practical importance – *the smaller States and the question of their membership of the United Nations Organisation*. Under Article 4 of the U. N. Charter, which defines the qualifications for membership, member States must be 'peace-loving States which accept the obligations imposed by the Charter and which, in the opinion of the Organisation, are able and willing to fulfil these obligations'. Regarding size, the Charter is silent. In paragraph 2 of the preamble, however, 'the equal rights of men and women, of small and large States', are solemnly re-affirmed. Equal rights for men and women, an aspect which does not concern us here, have been granted in the whole of present-day Europe – apart from Liechtenstein and Switzerland; but the equality of States in the United Nations has been put into practice rather on the same lines as the principle of equality has been applied in George Orwell's *Animal Farm*. Here, too, the principle is solemnly affirmed: '*All animals are equal*'. Then, as a bolt from the blue, comes the significant qualification: '*but some animals are more equal than others*' – a fact the truth of which the smaller States, anyway, have learnt to their cost. Liechtenstein and others, some of them repeatedly,

have applied for membership of the United Nations. So far all these applications have been rejected, although the applicants undoubtedly qualify, under the terms of Article 4, as 'peace-loving peoples' very much better than many of the States in whose hands the acceptance or rejection of their application lies. Rejection has been justified on grounds of expediency; but, granted a measure of good will, a solution could very easily be found. In the last resort, of course, acceptance would have been torpedoed by the use of the veto. That the Great Powers of the 'free' world should have thus lightly betrayed a fundamental principle is nevertheless a very disturbing thought. I have quoted this example as a typical sign of the times – *of how slight the sense of responsibility for the vital rights of small nations has become; and that, of course, means equally the sense for federalism.*

Incidentally, from Alexis de Tocqueville and Anton Philipp von Segesser to the present day, the relationship between *the smallness of the community and the implementation of democracy* has been a constantly recurring feature of the problem. Previously, the size of a democratic community was measured in terms of *the range of the human voice* in the national assembly; now, however, from the purely acoustic point of view, this no longer applies, since modern technology has increased that range to a vast (and truly horrifying!) degree. These technical advances have placed in the hands of the dictators a power that is as unlimited as it is indispensable to them. Thanks to technology, they are omnipresent, in word and picture, in the ears and eyes of the nation. In a *democracy*, on the other hand, the gifts of technology are of very limited value. In any case, it is still a fact to-day that true democracy can only flourish in a community in which the citizens – or, more accurately, the great majority of the citizens – can more or less form their own opinions both as regards the candidates soliciting their support and as regards the points at issue in the election. But if democracy is to flourish in a Great Power, it must be based upon a series of analagous foundations, in the form, say, of self-contained, democratic local government within its various component communities.

(f) Federalism is an *order of decentralised authority*. The natural tendency of all authority is to progress towards monopoly and concentration. Whereas a monarchy places but few barriers in the path

of such a tendency, any form of federative structure ensures, on the contrary and as a general rule, a very effective form of *distribution of authority*. It has sometimes been described as a 'vertical' distribution, in contrast to the 'horizontal', classical trinity of 'legislation, executive and justice'. The distribution of authority, however, and the limitations imposed upon the exercise of power, are a safeguard of justice and constitutional government.

In the federal order there are one or more intermediate bodies between the individual and the corporate entity – bodies such as the community and the canton. It is the inter-play between these 'corps intermédiaires' that first creates and then maintains the federal order. One typical example will suffice: In paragraph 44 of the Zurich Game Protection Act of March 12th 1929 it is laid down: The introduction of non-indigenous game is admissible only by permission of the (cantonal) finance authority. This permission will be granted after consultation with the *federal* authorities and the *parish* council concerned.

I have deliberately chosen this example of a cantonal law, because it is so completely typical of many of our cantonal laws. It shows, far more clearly and precisely than many a wretched declaration of principle, the position of the federal intermediary bodies. Each is in duty bound to act in consultation with, and with the concurrence of, both the more comprehensive body above it and the smaller entity below it. This consultation is designed to ensure as far as possible both the right of self-determination and the emergence of a decision based upon expert knowledge.

The nature of the legislative structure in a federal State becomes very clear when it is contrasted even with that in a State with centralised authority – let alone in a totalitarian State. In the latter, the quite legal authoritarian order goes – without scrutiny – from the top to the bottom. At the best, it passes like a cascade over a series of intermediary authorities. But the supreme authority, civil as well as military, is at all times at liberty to issue his orders direct, *omnisso medio*, to the rank and file of the nation.

(g) Federalism is an order *which permits resistance* – indeed, it might well be called *resistance in constitution form*. This has become particularly clear in this age of totalitarian regimes. In the catacombs of

la résistance, federal thinking was re-born with enhanced vigour, and the resistance movement was, perforce, organised on federal lines. Experience has shown that one of the great weaknesses of a unitarian, centralised State lies in the fact that seizure of power *in the capital* – whether in war or in the course of a rebellion – as often as not decides the fate of the whole country. That has been abundantly demonstrated not only in the many revolutions and counter-revolutions that have taken place all over the world and over-night in the younger and more unstable democracies, in which political immaturity and the lack of ‘know-how’ have precluded the possibility of revolt on the part of the people themselves, but also in the case of many of those older democracies which have a high degree of centralisation.

In a federal State, on the contrary, the seizure of the switchboard in the capital is as a rule by no means decisive. The high degree of autonomy enjoyed by the members of the federation not only prevents the disruption of law and order in the event of communication with the capital breaking down, but also has the power itself to wield authority if the central, federal authority falls.

This resistance, however, is not called upon to function only in the extreme case of *jus resistendi*, but at all times in the form of *an opposition* – a constructive opposition – on the part of the smaller civic entities against the policy of the larger communities of which they form part. In certain circumstances, federal responsibility can be fulfilled by merely saying ‘No’. For many years, one or two cantons – a small one in the east and a larger one in the west of my own country – rather prided themselves upon rejecting most of the proposals emanating from Berne. In many instances this may well have been a nuisance and very irritating, but even so, seen from the angle of the nation as a whole, it had a rather comforting effect, as proof that there was such a thing as *rational, federal opposition*. In more recent years, things have changed somewhat: these federal cantons have fallen more and more into line with the ‘governmental’ group of cantons. The weakening of the federal opposition, however, stems primarily from the fact that in lots of places the will to help oneself has waned, and people have become much more ready to exchange freedom for security.

(h) Federalism is an *order 'à la taille de l'homme'*. It is, admittedly, first and foremost an order based upon *the autonomy of its component groups, as such*. But the freedom of the individual is in the last instance preserved only because of the fact that the person is regarded as an individual entity within the group. In the process of its evolution, the federal school of thought has become and is becoming more and more concerned with the freedom of the person, or rather, with the *personal aspect* of the community. From the point of view of this *personalised federalism*, of primary importance is not the maintenance of inherited autonomous powers and regional prerogatives, but the community itself, *in terms of human beings*, in which, on principle, it seeks to see preserved to as great a degree as possible the right of the individual man to judge and decide for himself. Political thought is very fond of antinomy and the (polemic) exaggerations to which it gives birth on such widely discussed issues as the dichotomy between federalism and individualism, and between federalism and democracy. In these antinomies, which, in reality, exist only between mutually opposed radical extremists, it is the unifying element which, above all, must be borne in mind. And that – whether in a direct democracy, a unitarian constitutional State, or a federation – is the human person, the community, as a collection of individual, living people. And it is for this reason that the great political controversy of the age is: 'The State Omnipotent' versus 'the human community, based upon federal, constitutional and democratic principles'.

FEDERALISM BETWEEN ANARCHY AND TOTALITARIANISM

In the present age and, fundamentally, for quite a long time, the federal concept of 'unity in multiplicity' has been threatened from two mutually opposed directions:

(a) On the one hand, by the *tendency towards unification*. In this context, let me invite the reader's attention to an aspect with which I have dealt at greater length elsewhere¹, namely: 'The strongly unifying and centralising effects which result from the development of technology, commerce, travel and all the various forms of planning.

¹ Vide: 'Masse und Demokratie' (1957) pp. 85 et seq. and pp. 97 et seq.

This tendency towards unification is just as effective, however, (thanks to their own powerful egalitarian leanings) in the modern democracies and the modern socialist States.

In particular, the great increase in internal migration operates very unfavourably from the viewpoint of federalism. The flight from the land to the towns has everywhere loosened the old, domestic roots. An analysis of the last Swiss census, taken in 1950, shows that there are a large number of communities in which only very few, and in some cases, indeed, not a single one, of the present inhabitants were born and bred in the community. Even after giving due consideration to the fact that many a newcomer often fulfils his duties to the community with devotion and a high sense of responsibility, and that there are many who do nothing to help the community in which they were born, the development is still alarming enough. But the ultimate and deciding factor is *the lack of federal sense and the weakness of the will to see federalism prevail*, for it is only when the will is weak that sociological tendencies assume the proportions of coercion.

In the space of one short article, any outline of the development of these tendencies must, of necessity, be purely schematic. A more detailed analysis would involve examination of a considerable number of subsidiary aspects and counter-tendencies, which, while they undoubtedly exist, do not in any material way alter the broad outline I have given. The extreme example of this tendency towards unification is the State Omnipotent, an order in which uniformity and centralisation are absolute and complete. Conformism in a totalitarian State is nothing more than the natural corollary of the uniformity that has been imposed and maintained by every available means.

(b) On the other side – and, to-day, less dangerous – are *the pluralistic tendencies*. Here the political unity that is essential in any community is menaced – drastically by the anarchical and anarcho-syndicalistic efforts of those who profess to see in the State the root of all evil and who wish to see it abolished; and less drastically by particularism, which, with curious self-contradiction, is so often only too pleased to accept the blessings conferred by a unity which it opposes. It is between these two conflicting but equally dangerous extremes that a constructive federal policy must find a way.

THE PRESENT-DAY TASKS OF FEDERAL POLICY

In the political, cultural and juridico-sociological literature of the XX century there are a great many critical studies which enumerate, sometimes with considerable acumen and often very convincingly, those factors in constitutional development which point to the superiority of unitarianism and centralisation over federalism. Indeed, in some instances the impression left is that the 'owl of Minerva' – of which Hegel said it took wing only at dusk – always returned from its forays with the same message: *that federalism was a lost cause, doomed to extinction*. Though it is seldom said in so many words, there are facets of the sociological argument from which it would appear that it is an *all but natural* and in any case *irreversible* process of politico-social development. The more expectation becomes depressed by its prognostications (which are based on a fatalism devoid of faith, rather than on scientific appraisal), the more frantically fervent becomes the ideological appeal. This ideological flight into outer space is very often a flight from realities which the ideologists are no longer able to overcome. Utopia, in many ways, is the last refuge and sheet-anchor of despair. That it is so was made abundantly clear by the post-war struggle between unitarianism and centralism, primarily in France. To the federalists, the centralism of Paris seemed to be something so utterly unassailable, that their own federal demands – in accordance with the laws of compensation – became further and further divorced from reality, until, with their 'fédéralisme intégral', they were advocating a dissolution of all unity into a state of extreme pluralism. This vacillation between reality and Utopia is a characteristic of so many federal ideologies. Not only was no proof put forward of how they could be put into practice, but there was also no evidence even of any attempt to furnish any such proof.

To-day, however, we are confronted with the question: *What can we do?* It is a question to which an answer must be found, and one which will have the salutary effect of compelling us to think politically in concrete and rational terms.

(a) The *first essential* is to make a *clear appraisal of the current situation as regards federalism*.

It must, on the one hand, give a clear picture of the difficulties which confront the putting into practice of a federal order. That has already been briefly touched upon. On the other hand, it must make clear to the protagonists of federalism the need for constant and critical self-appraisal. Greatly to the detriment of the cause, a somewhat apologetic literature has so far failed in this respect. The pathology of the small community has been the subject of very little scientific research. All too often in discussions the praises of autonomy, of communal freedom and of federation itself have been sung, but no serious attempt has been made to delve into its shortcomings and the causes of its failure. In this respect, our great writers, with Jeremias Gotthelf and Gottfried Keller in the forefront, have been more zealous and more consistently assiduous than our students of political science.

The 'small area' and the 'little group' are not of themselves any guarantee of the perfect community. 'Restriction breeds narrow-mindedness.' It is the 'parish pump politics' and the 'provincial spirit', with their limited horizon and narrow outlook, that constitute the real danger. The solipsistic reticence of particularism, the 'isolationism of the obstinate thus-and-thus-only' (Karl Jasper), political nepotism and clique live-and-let-live – there are the abuses which, in a number of cases, have led to the establishment of quasi-dictatorships in many of our communities. The expression 'pressure group' is only a new term for something that has existed for a long time and of which our own democratic communities can furnish all kinds of examples – some of them drastic in the extreme. Sometimes it was the larger bodies – the Cantons and the Federation itself – which protected the freedom of a community against the onslaughts of its own members!

Criticism and self-criticism, provided it is *constructive*, is an essential pre-requisite in any free community.

(b) *A second essential is to make full use of existing autonomous powers.* When we complain of increasing centralisation, we are apt to forget that under the present constitution the Cantons and all the other, smaller corporations enjoy, within the framework of the Federation, *a very large measure of autonomy.* It is unfair on any and every occasion to blame 'the wicked bureaucrats' and the 'Federal Authority', when,

in fact, the real cause is a lack of creative initiative, of new ideas and the will to help themselves on the part of the smaller social entities.

(c) A *third* essential is *an alert resistance to any further unification or centralisation*.

This does not mean that every new step in this direction must, on principle, be met with an uncompromising 'No'. As in the past, so also in the future we shall sometimes have occasion to hand over to the larger corporations those duties which the smaller entities cannot fulfil – or cannot fulfil adequately. But I do think that, *where the fundamental question is concerned*, each new proposal should be more closely and more harshly examined. Is it not a fact that, while in the introductory debate on any measure many a deep obeisance is made before the high ideals of federalism, by the time the committee stage is reached, most of this lip-service goes by the board? But this is a vitally important question, which must not be allowed to remain purely rhetorical, but must be regarded as a question of conscience. A long-term appraisal of the possible results of this development will make clear the dangers that are inherent in it. The slow, step by step transfer of authority to the more comprehensive bodies political will lead eventually to a complete emasculation of the smaller entities. *And when authority becomes atrophied, political interest wanes and withers*. Past history affords plenty of examples of that; but it applies with equal force to the present. When a smaller political entity no longer has the power to decide upon matters which are of *real* concern to its individual members, political interest is either transferred to the activities of the larger, more comprehensive bodies, or it disappears altogether; and that is something that neither the obligation to vote nor the obligation to take office can alter.

EDUCATION FOR FEDERAL FREEDOM

Something in the way of *institutional reform* could still be done to strengthen the position of federalism – by means, for instance, of the broadening of constitutional jurisdiction. But here again, the *limitations* are clear-cut. The really vital question, as far as the future of federalism is concerned, is *the question of education*.

There is, of course, no such thing as 'federal education', in the sense of a separate method of instruction designed to inculcate the principles of federalism. All too frequently in recent years the successive officially proclaimed aims of education have been at variance one with the other, and priority has been given at one moment to the concept of democracy, at another to the principle of personal freedom, at one moment to the concept of a constitutional State, at the next to the doctrine of a welfare State. This great and very urgent question of political education must be viewed *as a whole*. It is essential that every endeavour should be made to inculcate a sense of responsibility – by force of example, be it added, rather than by precept – and that *these efforts should always be directed at the individual*. That is the crux of the whole problem. When and wherever this appeal to the individual's sense of responsibility succeeds, all human affairs, including the political, will begin to move along the right lines.

Although, then, there is no such thing as 'federal education' as a specific form of instruction, the subject, surely, is worthy of deliberate and more emphatic incorporation in the curricula of both civic and normal education – and particularly so in Switzerland.

The inculcation of the federal concept is an education which *teaches respect for the multifarious structures of society and tolerance towards those of different outlook*. In the face of the mighty wave of egalitarianism that threatens to engulf the world, to awaken and preserve a sense of individuality, of the value of certain individual prerogatives, is no easy task. But the one conviction which must be kept alive at all costs is the conviction that *sum cuique* and *not* universal equality is the fundamental principle of the federal concept.

The inculcation of the federal concept is *an education which teaches appreciation of the small and the apparently insignificant*. This, too, in an age that worships the cult of the colossus, is a difficult task. Of what importance, after all, is the little man (or State) and his determination to preserve the prerogatives of his own tiny environment, at a time when the fate of all humanity is at stake on this earth, and man is preparing to try and conquer the whole universe beyond it? Yet it is only by adhering to these principles that federalism can hope to survive in the future.

The inculcation of the federal concept is also *an education which teaches the renunciation of power*. Heinrich von Treitschke once said of the State: The State is firstly power, secondly power and thirdly power. Though this sentiment is no longer voiced to-day with the same cynical candour, political thought and action are nevertheless still strongly infected with the virus of the desire for power. Federal policy is, of course, fully aware of the need for power and of the obligation to use it with equity and justice; but it is also a policy which *voluntarily imposes limitations upon itself*. It is a fact of which our great thinkers and writers have reminded us time and again, from Niklaus von der Flue, Heinrich Pestalozzi, Jeremias Gotthelf, Gottfried Keller, Alexandre Vinet, Anton Philipp von Segesser and Jakob Burckhardt down to Gonzaque de Reynold and Max Huber at the present time – and what a wonderful legacy they have left us!

The inculcation of the federal concept is *an education that teaches self-reliance and self-help*. To-day, when the individual or the small community finds itself confronted with some difficulty, their first thought, as a rule, is to cry to the State for help, to submit a petition for help or – and we have already gone a step further – a ‘claim’ or even a ‘demand’ for help from the superior corporate entity of which it is a member. The federal doctrine teaches that in circumstances such as these the *first* thought should be a search for ways and means *of helping oneself*. It is a point of honour with autonomy that it always tries to bear the consequences of its own mistakes or the hardships of lean years without outside assistance; the *will to help oneself* is the corollary of the *will for freedom*.

The inculcation of the federal concept is an *education which teaches loyalty to other communities in the federation*. To teach a proper appreciation of freedom is always infinitely more difficult than to apply any form of indoctrination, just as the inculcation of a sense of civic responsibility has always been incomparably harder than the straightforward grooming of the political rank and file. And federalism is faced with the additional difficulty that it has to ensure not only loyalty to *one* order or authority, but also obedience, in the form of voluntary loyalty, to *a number* of orders and authorities.

One of the most important tasks of federal education – of this effort

to resuscitate the federal idea – is the eradication of the fatalistic conviction that the spread of unitarianism and centralisation is inevitable. The conviction that federalism is doomed is widely held. But even in the changed sociological circumstances – and, in particular, in spite of urbanisation and the flight to the towns – federalism still retains its old significance. In spite, too, of all the (alleged) ‘sociological pressures’, experience is constantly presenting us with fresh and agreeable proof that *federalism can flourish in the asphalt of a metropolis* in just the same way as it prospers under the ‘ideal conditions’ of our far-flung hills and dales.

Democracy, in a great political entity, can continue to exist only if the small and intimate communities which form its foundations – and by this I do not mean only those legally constituted as such – are preserved, strengthened and expanded.

CONCLUSION

‘Le vingtième siècle ouvrira l’ère des fédérations, où l’humanité recommencera un purgatoire de mille ans.’ In the middle of the XX century – in view of the strong unitarian and totalitarian tendencies that prevailed – there was an inclination to lump Proudhon’s prophesy with all those other prophesies to which this century has – in some cases most emphatically – given the lie. All the same, Proudhon was quite right. Having succumbed to all sorts of illusions, the world is gradually becoming clearly conscious of two things: Firstly, that there are a host of problems which cannot be solved *merely by passing the responsibility for their solution from the smaller communal authorities to the more comprehensive communities above them*; and secondly, arising out of this, that *in the world there is no such thing as a political miracle* – with the possible exception of the miracle of the acceptance of responsibility. The complete antithesis of a totalitarian State is not democracy, as such; but a democratic State which is constituted, however loosely, *on federal principles*.

Mankind now faces the great task of *creating a peace that will embrace all the peoples of the earth*. In reality, there are but *two possibilities*: A World State, which, in the prevailing political and social conditions, would inevitably degenerate into a World Police State; or some

sort of *federal order*, in which the major responsibility must be vested as 'low down' as possible in the smaller communal authorities.

The federal concept envisages a governing of the people by the people, which will do its utmost to combine the requisite degree of unification with the indispensable freedom of the individual.

HELMUT SCHOECK

Emory University

INTELLECTUALISM
AND POLITICAL IMPOTENCE

THE COURAGE TO CHOOSE THE WAY TO FREEDOM

How can we educate a man to believe in freedom, when at the same time we deprive him of his conviction that he has every right to live and to survive? In connection with this task of educating our youth (and some of our colleagues, too, who stand in even more need of instruction) to espouse the cause of freedom, the masochism of the western world, which seems to possess a diabolical attraction for some of our contemporaries and which I have described in a previous article, plays the sinister role of an antithesis. Whatever concepts and schools of thought we may evolve or resuscitate in order to arm ourselves for the intellectual fight for freedom, no sooner do they come into contact with other ideas propagated by western masochism than an insidious type of relativity intervenes which loosens the link between thought and the realm of action – the bond that personal decision alone can forge and preserve.¹

In the field of political action, it is not merely a question of the relationship between the idea and the thing, of the interpretation placed by the intellect on inanimate, inorganic matter, but rather of the impact and effect of our own way of thinking on the intellectual and spiritual entity of others. But if we allow our actions and thoughts to be dictated by the opinions of others and by the mistaken interpretation they place upon our justifiable intentions, then – regardless of whether these misconceptions arise from our own failure convincingly to state our case or whether they have been reached indepen-

¹ Vide 'Der Masochismus des Abendlandes' in 'Europa – Besinnung und Hoffnung' pp. 221-256. Published by A. Hunold, 1957. Cf. also Herbert Butterfield: *Christianity and History* p. 20 et seq. 1949.

dently – we shall ourselves be opening the trap door beneath our own position.

The campaign to explain the nature and origin of western masochism, this stylised lack of faith in oneself, is therefore an academic duty of the highest order. It is a duty that can be successfully performed only if all the resources of the historians, the sociologists, the psychologists and even of the 'Press pundits' combine to provide an uninterrupted flow of information regarding the identity of those who plant the seeds of this moral and spiritual paralysis of the western will to be true to itself, and what means they use to do so. We must further try to find out why in some countries it is harder, in others easier, to carry out this investigation, and what arguments are being used to check this tendency before it becomes strong enough to exercise real influence.

Fortunately, a host of scholars are devoting themselves to this duty, which is of such vital importance to the west, in much the manner which the author is advocating. In 1958, the Dutch emeritus professor of history, Pieter Geyl (citing by name some of his own colleagues whom he criticises), and the present President of the American Sociological Society, Howard Becker, to name two authorities on widely differing subjects and from widely separated parts of the world, have pointed out in speeches, articles and in conversation with the author, how deadly a menace to freedom in the western world has arisen from the fact that certain types of intellectuals feel themselves constrained to undermine the material and moral position of the west by means of the relativating and injurious spate of verbal diarrhoea which they emit in the political sphere.¹

SUMMIT MEETINGS WITH THE HUMAN MONSTERS AS A PERMANENT INSTITUTION?

On February 28th 1959, the American radio and television commentator, Edward R. Murrow, prototype of the (non-academical) intellec-

¹ Howard Becker (University of Wisconsin) in his lecture, 'What Liberals Miss in Communism', delivered at Emory University in February 1959. Pieter Geyl in his farewell address in Utrecht. (Published in English in 'Delta', 1959).

tuals of this ilk, produced a programme, seen by millions of viewers in the United States and Britain, of a conversation between Barbara Ward (Lady Jackson), Adlai Stevenson and Edward Crankshaw. In it, the first two, and particularly Miss Ward, with the assistance of the producer's scissors, more or less cut out Mr. Crankshaw, because he issued a warning about 'the road to serfdom' on which we should find ourselves if we allowed our policy to be dictated according to Miss Ward's and Stevenson's appeal for responsible, central planning. Several times Barbara Ward shouted angrily: 'How can we ever achieve anything if we are afraid of responsible planning?' (By 1959, then, it would appear that the lessons of 1938-1947 had added nothing to her vocabulary!) And Mr. Stevenson solemnly declared that we should, of course, have to plan our future centrally, in order to prevent 'ourselves (the west) from becoming richer and richer and the neutral nations from becoming poorer and poorer.'¹

At the end of the programme, Stevenson and Barbara Ward agreed that the west must institute, as a matter of routine, an obligatory annual summit meeting between the west, the Kremlin and, perhaps, Peking (as if the intellectual decline in the UNO sessions in New York had not year by year provided proof enough of the futility of indulgence in this type of periodical loquacity!), so that, by 'just plain talking', we can settle our differences year by year with the Russians.² The artlessness of such ideas is well illustrated by the following extract from an interview with Mikoyan in the radio feature, 'Meet the Press.'

'CONSOLIDATION' A LA KREMLIN

On January 18th 1959, viewers were treated to the following spectacle.

¹ Broadcast series 'Small World', Columbia Broadcasting System. Cf. also contributions by Peter T. Bauer, Gottfried Haberler, Alfred G. Smith and the author in 'Foreign Aid Re-examined - A Critical Appraisal' (pp. 92 et seq., 130 et seq., 147 et seq.), published by James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck, Public Affairs Press, Washington 3, D.C., 1958.

² To protect myself against the charge of being anti-intellectual when I query the manner in which Adlai Stevenson confuses foreign policy and Logorrhöe I would invite the reader's attention to Salvador de Madriaga's critique of 'Maxime, lasst uns mit den Russen reden' (Neue Zürcher Zeitung, overseas edition, No. 38, February 8th 1959).

E. Spivak, one of the shrewdest journalists in America, asked Mikoyan how he had the temerity to compare the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian rising of 1956 with the American support of Lebanon in the summer of 1958? Spivak ran over the well-known relevant facts (the casualties, the streams of refugees, the periods of occupation and so on), and then received the following retort from Mikoyan:

The United States had not vacated Lebanon voluntarily, but under the pressure of public opinion (why Moscow should always be able to shrug off this same public opinion, like a duck shaking water from its back, was not explained!). And as far as UNO resolutions on Hungary were concerned, they were simply a theatrical performance, of which the United States made good use. At the present time (said Mikoyan), Hungary was making splendid progress. The social atmosphere in the country was excellent. The whole country was in the process of implementing a magnificent consolidation. (One is inclined to ask how the neutrals and co-existentialists would feel about a Mikoyan type of 'consolidation' in their own country.) And all this had been achieved without American aid and in spite of the United Nations Organisation. . .

So the interview continued. At last Spivak cried in despair: 'Mr. Mikoyan, if, as is perfectly obvious, words have different meanings for you and for us, how can we ever possibly come to a reasonable and lasting understanding with you? You say Russia went to Hungary's assistance; the rest of the world says you attacked her. You call our society capitalist slavery; we know it is a free society – we live in it. You call your form of government democratic; the rest of the world calls you a Police State. How can we ever make any agreements with you which mean a thing?'¹

At this point the interview came to an end. It did nevertheless show that in American public life there are distinguished people who still have the courage to tell the truth, even though the truth may prove most painful to their opponent. Hyper-sensitive intellectuals like Adlai Stevenson, however, believe as before that mere talking

¹ Taken from the transcript of the broadcast Meet the Press, National Publishing Co., Washington 2, D.C. Vol. 3 No. 2, January 18th 1959. The full text will also be found in The New York Times, (p. 10) January 19th 1959.

at the summit can point out to the Kremlin the way to salvation. It is also a significant fact that it was this same Stevenson who not only introduced his guest, Mikoyan, to the élite of Chicago society, but also asked his friends to 'receive the Soviet Commissar with a standing ovation'. And in the end it was left to a few trades union leaders, unadorned by any bogus halo of intellectualism (to whom, indeed, such an adornment would have been a hindrance rather than an advantage), to show Mr. Mikoyan exactly what they thought of him.

BLASPHEMY AS THE INTERNATIONAL CRITERION OF THE SANCTITY OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS?

That weakness of the west, extolled by some as a virtue – the ever-recurring advice not to exacerbate the east (the Kremlin, Pekin, New Delhi, Cairo, Indonesia, etc.) by undue insistence upon our own western ideology, since, after all, it is a complete anachronism – is a form of stylised appeasement that is constantly making its appearance. Time and again Khrushchev has not shrunk from the blasphemy of trying publicly to bring moral pressure to bear on Herr Adenauer by means of a fictitious conversation between the German Chancellor and his Maker.¹ But what western statesman – or, indeed, what publicist who values his reputation – would have had the courage quite quietly to say to the ruler of the Kremlin: 'You may not believe in the God of the Christian faith, and you may laugh as much as you like at the conscientious torments of a Christian statesman. But we *know*, and so do you, that for people of your ilk there is no such thing as a predictable and legitimate successor, that the man who succeeds you may well be your murderer, who, to prove the legality of his political position, could derisively tear up any agree-

¹ In his speech in Moscow at the end of February 1959, Khrushchev, according to the transcript published in the New York Times of February 26th 1959, said: 'According to your Christian faith, Herr Chancellor Adenauer, you will one day stand before the seat of judgement of the Almighty. Who will pass judgement upon you? Obviously God Himself or His own Son will judge you, because you are the leader of a Christian Party. How will you justify your policy (the arming of the Federal Republic with atomic weapons) at this moment in the world's history? After all, your policy is contrary to Christian teaching.'

ment we had concluded with you. Why in heaven's name should we make even the slightest concession in return for your signature on a treaty which in a few days' time might well be used by one of your successors as posthumous evidence against you?'

Why is it that we cannot bring ourselves to talk thus bluntly? Is it because we feel we must allow the ruler of the Kremlin some measure of that licence that is granted to fools and jesters? Is it the indulgence shown by a grown-up towards a child? But forty years, surely, is enough, even for a government, to grow up and prove that it is prepared to adhere to its treaty obligations? And how utterly illogical is the argument of the co-existentialists, who say: We mustn't take exception to anything the Kremlin says or does, because their standards are not our standards; but we are quite sure that, once both parties have put their signatures to a scrap of paper, they will apply just the same standards as we ourselves do.

BEING OBJECTIVE UNTO DEATH

For many years past, various observers have pointed to a remarkably favourable type of objectivity in the west with regard to the Soviet rulers. In the constitutional field this is nothing unusual. In 1956-57 the Supreme Court of the United States permitted every type of communist activity, not excluding even the call, presented in theoretic form, to overthrow the government, because it was felt that any other attitude would expose the country to the reproach from Moscow of being a Police State.¹ The constitutional protection of democracy against subversive activities, the avowed aim of which is the institution of a pluralistic society, is still inadequate. Apart from this, however, a parallel to this constitutional and legislative impotence is also to be found in the fields of science and intellectual discussion. This is well illustrated by the results of the International Congress of Historians, held in Rome in September 1955.

¹ At the beginning of 1959, the American Bar Association addressed the public through the medium of a voluminous document, castigating twenty of the most recent judgements of the Supreme Federal Court which, in the words of the resolution, were nothing less than an incitement and an encouragement to the Communists to indulge in internal subversion and anti-American activities.

Professor K. Thieme of Mainz University wrote a report on the Congress for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.¹ Quite independently, Professor Pieter Geyl (Utrecht), in a symposium in 1958, wrote in exactly the same vein regarding the miserable, pseudo-objective helplessness displayed by western historians in their discussions with the Russians at the 1955 Rome Congress.²

This eternal, intellectual type of sympathy-in-advance (based, pre-

¹ Professor Thieme: 'The (Historians') Congress - a Strange Report' *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, No. 229 August 21st 1957:

'How extremely difficult the task of the historian can sometimes be, is brought home to one when one finds a gross offence against historical truth in, of all places, the officially published minutes of a Historians' Congress. The report published in the official 'Atti del X Congresso Internazionale, Roma 1955' on the four and a half-hour discussion between Western and Soviet historians is a case in point.'

Professor Thieme gives an account of the efforts made by himself and Walther Hofer (Berlin) to take the Soviet historians at their word and find out whether they were, in fact, prepared to put their promised assurance of friendly co-operation into practice. Astonishing though it may sound, it was the Chairman, Professor H. A. Schmid (Vienna) who, by calling the meeting to order, prevented the western historians from compelling the Soviet representatives to differentiate between history as propaganda and history as an objective science. Schmid behaved as though he regarded such a question as a personal insult to the Russian historians. But Thieme found even far more astounding the account of these exchanges published in the official report:

'All three particularly illuminating and instructive intermezzi of the debate between the Soviet historians and those from the western world', he writes 'were omitted from the official report, except for two fragments on p. 104 et seq. and p. 117.' *From beginning to end, as a policy of deliberate appeasement, everything which might have been embarrassing in any way to the Soviet historians was jockeyed out of the report.*

Since the same tactics had been employed during the Congress itself, the question may well be asked whether some secret fellow travellers had not had a hand in the game. Without completely ruling out this possibility, from my own experiences at the conference I am inclined to think that, by and large, it was simply an exhibition of *complete helplessness* on the part of philosophically untutored positivist western book-worms, who were no match at all for the dialectically thoroughly trained Soviet representatives and who consequently invariably succumbed in the face of the challenge: Your adherence to objectivity imposes upon *you* the obligation to allow *us* the partisanship to which we admit adhering, without casting any doubt on our own higher objectivity, though we reserve the right to question yours. Or: You yourselves believe in the principle of free and unfettered research; we therefore demand the right, in accordance with *our own* beliefs, to disregard and, if necessary, to cast aside this freedom.'

² Pieter Geyl: 'Scientism in the writing of History'. (In preparation: 'Scientism and the Study of Man'. To be edited by Schoeck and James W. Wiggins.)

sumably, on the maxim that to the pure all things are pure), and of condonation of the brutalities and contradictions of the Soviet system was also very much in evidence in the case of Pasternak and the Nobel Prize. The Austrian historian, Friedrich Heer, declared that it was the reaction of the free west which caused Pasternak to decline the honour. This attitude towards the representatives of the Soviet Union is a phenomenon with many facets. Factors of personality are linked with factors of historical interpretation. The old and trusty Marxist gambit of always referring to your own side as being 'scientifically minded' and to the others as being hidebound bourgeois ideologists has also very probably played a part.¹ Another factor may well have been a species of aesthetic diffidence. In contrast to the scholar and writer in the pluralist west, his counterpart in the Soviet Union or Red China, as we see him, is a member of a rigorously organised system; and even those who are by no means convinced of the objective validity of the Marxist theory of history are made to feel, by the very rigours of that system, that it is incumbent upon them to pay to those caught up in its toils that same measure of respect which they pay to any savant whose views they do not share, whose style is repugnant to them, but who is an adherent of a different school of thought and is stoutly doing his best, in accordance with the obligations placed upon him.

The lamentation of some western intellectuals that the west has nothing to compare with the unanimity, the rigid discipline and the realism of Soviet totalitarian ideology may well, I think, be attributable to some sort of inferiority complex. They feel ashamed of their own eclecticism, of the heterogeneity and the internal contradictions of their own civilisation and its economic foundations, because they feel that the form of society and philosophy that emerges from the Procrustean stretcher of a Khrushchev is far more dynamic and determined. But they forget the difference that exists between the founder of some new school of art, whose depredations, at the worst, are to paper, canvas and, sometimes, the feelings of his pupils and admirers, and the disciple of Marx and Lenin, who slashes

¹ For a classical identification of the scientific and the Marxist standpoint, vide Oliver Cromwell Cox: 'Caste, Class and Race, a Study in Social Dynamics'. Doubleday & Co., New York 1948.

the whole existence of entire peoples to the pattern of an arbitrary theory and keeps it for ever stunted.

Finally, it may well be that, in a spirit of *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*, this sympathetic attitude towards social experiments of the Marxist brand is a species of theological confusion of those realities, to which we all, admittedly, have access, which are clearly demonstrable, but which in the end might lead us to conclusions that are painful. They console themselves with the thought that if they leave well alone, if they accept everything with good-natured tolerance, the inherent goodness in man will eventually prevail, regardless of such things as forms and systems of government.

LANGUAGE AS A CLOAK FOR HUMAN NATURE?

The theologian, Paul Tillich, to whose research work I have referred elsewhere,¹ attributes the dangerous optimism of American statesmen and amateur politicians to the comparatively utopian progress made by human society. He points out how Americans delude themselves, as regards the difference between man as he is by nature and man as life compels him to be, by the interpretation they put upon a quotation from the New Testament. The text in question is the proclamation of Christ's birth by the angel, in which the latter refers to 'men of good will'. This Tillich regards as 'the most fantastically utopian concept' he has ever known, and he believes it to be the origin of that American inclination quite simply to believe that in the long run control of our human affairs will pass into the hands of a sufficient number of men of good will to ensure eternal peace upon earth.¹

I have to thank Adolf Grote for drawing my attention to an amalgamation of theological and political semantics. (Luke II. 14). The word *εὐδοκίας* was first introduced into the text round about 400 A. D. by St. John Chrysostomos (345-407 A. D.). Erasmus retained the expression in his Editio Princeps of the New Testament. But this genitive, as Grote pointed out, does not qualify the word *ἄνθρωποι*,

¹ The quotation from Tillich will be found on pages 309 et seq. of the author's 'U.S.A.: Motive und Strukturen', Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1958.

but is a subjective genitive that refers to God. It means, therefore, one who is *worthy* of God's approbation, and a permissible translation, perhaps, would be 'one chosen of God'.

Nowhere, then, is it written that certain of our modern dictators, dedicated to the principles of Marx and Lenin, could ever, no matter how much one talked with them, be made into men deserving such approbation. We must have the courage to recognise that in the human species there are men to be found who would liquidate us without scruple, even though they go round the world kissing film-stars' hands and making presents of white horses and troikas to eccentric tycoons of industry. It is neither unchristian nor irrational to believe that there are some men who are inspired by irremediably and implacably diabolical intentions.

Mistranslations from the pens of theologians, the results of a misinterpretation of the author's meaning, of differences in linguistic construction and of the translator's own emotional impulse, indulged at the expense of a truly objective rendering, have all, very probably, often played their part. There comes readily to mind a comparison between the strictly limited meaning, sociologically and ethnically speaking, of the word 'neighbour' or 'brother' in the Old and New Testaments, and the extremely broad meaning popularly attributed to-day to the word throughout the world. In the geography books, the most recently discovered fragmentary tribes in the Himalayas or in some jungle fastness are described as neighbours.¹ I am taught that I must love my (own, genuine) neighbour (the man really nearest to me) as I love myself, because he, and he alone, is the man with whom I can daily compare myself and whose safety and well-being could therefore be jeopardised by my possible dislike or envy.

Specific prayers for the protection of the man sociologically nearest to me – my real neighbour, who must be protected from *my* evil eye – are to be found in both non- and pre-Christian civilisations

¹ Cf. my article 'Das Problem des Neides in der Massendemokratie', published in 'Masse und Demokratie', A. Hunold, Eugen Rentsch Verlag 1957. An interesting variation, incidentally, is afforded by the Salish Indians on the north-west coast of North America, to whom the word neighbour means a member of the tribe living some distance away, whom one does not see every day.

and, indeed, among the simplest and most primitive tribes. But it is questionable whether the word 'neighbour' or 'the man nearest to me' should be retained as a meaningless formula when, from the purely technical point of view, the possibilities opened up by jet aircraft make some man in the farthest corner of the earth my neighbour and consequently, in terms of cosmic coherence, a man for whom it is my duty to ensure a standard of living equal to *my own*. This, surely, is a complete reversal of the original ethical intention. I must love *my* neighbour like myself, in order that *he* should not fall victim to *my* envy. To-day, however, many theologians tell us that, *because* the inhabitant in the interior of some 'under-developed' country or other (thanks to *my* aircraft) has now become *my* neighbour, I must send him conscience-money, because, if I do not, *he* will become envious of *me*. In other words, envy on the part of those far afield is regarded as axiomatic, and the blame is placed squarely on my shoulders. But in the original Christian precept, the very reverse was the case: Love thy neighbour, so that thou shalt not envy him. A great deal of the confusion in international politics is caused by theologians who forget the locally limited framework and the practical sociological limits to which the original Christian precept refers.¹

SELF-DEFENCE 'UNTHINKABLE'?

Among our contemporaries there is evidence of a disinclination even to make use of their powers of rhetoric in order to expose some move on the Kremlin's part as the provocation and menace that it is. I am thinking here of those efforts, often sub-conscious, that are being made to discount the powers of retaliation which the west possesses and could use as a means of self-assertion, or, if that cannot be done, at least to prove that the determination to use them if necessary is lacking – that their use is 'unthinkable'.

¹ In this sense, it would be interesting to examine what the left-wing theologian, Professor John C. Bennett, really means when, in the style of Karl Barth, he warns the west against regarding itself as superior, even morally, to the communist world. ('Ethics and Foreign Policy', Union Seminary Quarterly Review, Vol. 14, January 1959, page 12.)

Some time ago, Professor Schweitzer, the editor of *Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik* ¹, quoted a passage from a statement on the use of the hydrogen bomb made by John C. Bennett, the influential and very left-wing American theologian: 'I am convinced that I speak in the name of many Christians . . . when I say . . . *that it is quite impossible to imagine what it would be like to decide to use them*' (i.e. H-bombs). The italicised portion Professor Schweitzer translated as follows: . . . 'dass es ganz unmöglich ist, sich vorzustellen, daß man sich einmal für ihre Anwendung entscheiden könnte' (literally: . . . 'that it is quite impossible to imagine that we could ever decide to use them'). Although the Professor had added the original English passage in brackets, to anyone conversant with the two languages the discrepancy in meaning is obvious. Bennett merely said it would be quite impossible to imagine *what it would be like* . . ., and that, surely, is a glimpse of the obvious, since no one, so far, has ever taken a decision which has led to the use of H-bombs in war. (But we can well appreciate the feelings of an Einstein, an Oppenheimer, a Roosevelt or a Truman, who did not regard the use of nuclear weapons in any way as 'unthinkable' – provided they were not used against the Kremlin.) In contrast to Schweitzer's translation, which implies an absence of *determination*, even that left-wing theologian, Bennett, did not feel justified in trying to dope his fellow countrymen with the nonsensical assertion that they would never have the moral and material self-confidence to use the weapons they possess. When I myself invited Professor Schweitzer's attention to the mistranslation, he issued the following correction: 'Finally, I must invite my readers' attention to a mistranslation, kindly brought to my notice by a correspondent, in J. C. Bennett's contribution to the discussion, 'War in the Atomic Age'. In Issue No. IV, page 185, the original English text, quoted in brackets, was mistranslated. The correct German translation should read: . . . 'es ist ganz unmöglich, sich vorzustellen, was es heissen würde, sich zu ihrer Verwendung zu entschließen'. Imagination, then, boggles at the thought of such a situation. We can only hope, with John Bennett, that the politicians

¹ *Zeitschrift für Evangelische Ethik*, Issue No. 4 1957, page 185, and Issue No. 6 page 302.

and the soldiers, in the west and in the east – and so each and every one of us – will be spared from so terrible a situation.’

From the point of view of this proclivity to fall into error, which manifests itself in various forms in certain intellectual circles and which I have discussed in the previous sub-section of this article, the interesting thing about Professor Schweitzer’s statement is that the mistaken sense which he read into these words would have seemed much more natural and in keeping, had it been expressed by Professor Bennett himself. This shows very clearly how easily anxious misgivings, emotional in origin, regarding the moral right of the west to fight for survival with every means at its disposal, can later insinuate their way into the realms of rational thought. The chain reaction to which such mistakes can give rise in the forming of public opinion is equally easily appreciable. How many Christians, one wonders, listened to sermons couched in the sense of this mistranslation, before even a small portion of them heard the corrected version?

DISENGAGEMENT AND THE ARCHITECTS OF CO-EXISTENCE

The human mind, which is always at great pains to preserve the harmony and equipoise between the pro’s and con’s of any argument, is unfortunately inclined to recommend almost any proposed political decision solely on the criterion whether it will permit the intellect with a few strokes of the pen to ‘clear up’ or ‘put in order’ a situation that has frankly been regarded as uncomfortable. This is also what I mean when I refer to the intellectualisation of political action. (In the purely military field, of course, in the preparation of an amphibious invasion this physical ‘softening-up’ process by means of preliminary bombardment is far easier to carry out than it is in the political sphere, in which no one can use physical force to compel his opponents to vacate a field that has been completely softened-up (in the way he wants it) – except, of course, the Russians and the Chinese, who invariably insist quite firmly that he should do so!)

For this type of policy, the spoken word has, unfortunately, from time immemorial provided a vocabulary culled almost exclusively from the sheer mechanics of liquids and solids, which does not even call to its aid the physics of the gases. Even eloquent and erudite

journalists and professional political writers seem to shrink from the intellectual effort required to produce a factual account of the infinite variations of the politico-psychological sphere of activity. Not infrequently does a leader writer or a Member of Parliament allow himself to become intoxicated by the pregnant significance of his own utterances, because (on a lower level, often, than in a game of chess!) thanks to their two-dimensional simplification of the circumstances and potentialities of the psychological balance between advantage and disadvantage, in view of the long- and short-term decisions open to those concerned, they lull him into a false sense of security.¹

As regards this hypothesis, let us for a moment examine the leading article, 'Choice of Risks', in the *Manchester Guardian Weekly* of February 5th 1959, a prominent liberal advocate of disengagement, for examples of that mechanistic rhetoric and metaphor for which we have to thank both our political impotence and the hazardous position in which we find ourselves.

... A withdrawal of Russian troops from their East German stronghold would take the stays out of the Ulbricht regime. More, it would mean a Russian withdrawal also from Poland, since the Russian divisions stationed there are only supposed to safeguard communications with East Germany. Without that shield the political regimes of Poland and Eastern Germany would have to become more responsive (willingly or unwillingly) to the wishes of the people over whom they rule. The Russians, of course, know that this would be the result of their departure and therefore, while themselves putting up proposals, they may always avoid agreement.'

Even without the confirmation afforded by Khrushchev's speech in Moscow on February 27th 1959, the leading article, up to this point, might well be regarded as a routine analysis of fact. But the sentences which follow are couched in the terms of that mechanical rationalism, the influence of which on the minds of western

¹ George F. Kennan, too, (*Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1958-1959) again put his views on disengagement before the public in oversimplified terms, borrowed from the field of pure mechanics.

statesmen and western public opinion is dangerous in the extreme: 'But that is no reason why the West should not press for such an agreement. There is at least some chance that the Russians may be carried into agreement by the velocity of their own proposals.' (The use of the word 'velocity' is indicative of my meaning.)

The Manchester Guardian, then, looks upon politics as a sort of ice revue, in which the western statesmen tear round and round on skates, seizing Khrushchev by the hand and striving with ever increasing speed to drag him towards their goal. And the kinetic energy of the corpulent ruler of the Kremlin eventually pushes him, willy-nilly, over the line. This, however, overlooks one fact.

In contrast to the Heads of western States, the Head of the Soviet Government can always change his mind – not only at the last minute before he signs an agreement, but also later, at any time he may feel so inclined, after having signed it. To push him thus, *just once*, over the line (which is of such great importance and significance only to us), is of no use at all. On the contrary, were our diplomacy to score some success by the use of these bustling tactics, his resentment, his fear lest he may have exposed himself to some vaguely-sensed criticism in his own country, could well turn him into a trickier and more bitter opponent than ever.

But the grounds on which the leading article advocates a policy of this nature afford an even clearer instance of the influence exercised by a line of reasoning that is based on the principles of mechanics:

'The dangers in continuing with the present policy are clear. In Poland, in Eastern Germany, and all over Eastern Europe, the Russian grip *will remain tight*. The division of Germany will become so *hardened* that hopes of an eventual reunification must be gradually abandoned on both sides. Tensions between the two camps will continue, and before long they will be facing each other with nuclear arms. None of the defenders of the status quo has yet shown a way out of this vicious circle.' The italics are mine.

The argument put forward by the Manchester Guardian turns certain politico-military and institutional facts into a simple function of time. The moral blame for the continuation of the iron-fisted

rule of Moscow over Eastern Europe is placed directly on the western world. The increasing improbability of a unification of Western and Eastern Germany is described simply in terms of the theory of sedimentation and solidification (reminiscent rather of geology, or of a baker putting sugar icing on a cake!). Not even the remotest consideration is given to the possibility that selective flight from Eastern Europe, and particularly from Eastern Germany, the migration of technical experts and the younger elements of the population to Western Europe, might in the end compel some modification of the communist regime – not in a few years, of course, but in a few decades – perhaps.

‘Tensions will continue’ . . . The image on which this idea is obviously based is that of two systems, each with its own source of internal pressure, which, like two pipes joined together and blowing steam into each other, achieve a sort of mutual neutralisation and are then able, in the ensuing pressure-free atmosphere, to reach some sort of understanding. Unfortunately, there is no evidence of any such tendency when groups of men are mutually opposed. In other cases, politically incomparably more promising, there is still, after decades of endeavour, no sign of any final and complete abolition of tension – South Tyrol, Sicily, the regional tensions in the United States, the uncommonly bitter and stubborn tension between British and French Canadians, to name but a few instances. Nowhere has the opening of the channels of communication led to a ‘relaxation of tension’.

It may well be that the very term itself is misleading when it is applied to the dynamics of politics. By incision a surgeon can bring relief to his patient suffering from pressure caused by an abscess. But how can such methods be applied to tension that has been created by a deliberate policy? When one side, either fortuitously or as the result of a plan, finds itself in that advantageous state of tension upon which the whole of its long-term policy is based, it is hardly likely to allow itself to be deprived of this felicitous advantage by accepting ‘concessions’ offered by the other side. At the best, it will probably accept the concessions and then replace *one* state of tension by another, as soon as the former has served its purpose.

But we have still not come to the end of the Manchester Guardian's leader, the line of reasoning of which may well be regarded as a reflection of the views held by such purveyors of advice as George F. Keenan, Adlai Stevenson, Barbara Ward, James P. Warburg and others.¹

'Disengagement, on the other hand, offers the chance to soften the harsh outlines of the two opposing systems in Germany. The new arrangement need apply to military commitments only. Even after the establishment of some common political institutions, the Governments of the two parts of Germany could still follow their own policies in domestic matters and seek, or retain, international political or economic associations of their own choice. Why is it so often assumed that such an interregnum of 'peaceful competition' will work to the advantage of the Communists?'

Well – there are various reasons. Gresham's law, I suggest, gives one answer. But it would be better still if Khrushchev himself provided the answer to these dreams of disengagement.

Once those who disagree with us in this debate on the possibility of redeeming the Kremlin come to the end of their semantic acrobatics, they almost invariably switch over to another line of argument: It is the neutrals, one third of mankind, the 'non-committed', 'emergent' nations, they say, whose evolution will settle the future of us all – the western world, the Soviet Union, China alike. And, since it is obviously impossible to say anything certain about the future of Africa and India, the historical impulses discernible in these countries are of a nature admirably suited to fit in with the solemn watering-down of any even approximately realistic and terminologically sincere discussion regarding the political decisions of the western world. Is it not quite remarkable that the very strategists who never cease to proclaim how unimportant bases are, how very easily a withdrawal from Central Europe by the United States could be accepted (in exchange for a nod of smiling approval from the Kremlin), change their line of argument completely, when it is a question of granting financial aid to the national socialist bosses in Africa and

¹ Cf. Kennan, op. cit. Barbara Ward, 'Five Ideas that Changed the World', 1959.

Asia and are averse to any form of harsh or even firm treatment of them, because 'in that case, they would fling us out.'

MOB-RAISERS OR ARCHITECTS OF WORLD HISTORY?

My own observations have led me to the conclusion that here we are faced with a case of the intellectualisation of the relevant, realistic spheres in which political decisions are taken, which makes it a simple matter to project emotions and opinions into these spheres. I would sound a note of warning against this form of intellectualism, if for no other reason than that it leads to a false sense of security. Those who indulge in this form of intellectualism believe that the whole political chess-board is exposed to their gaze, and they fail to notice how, thanks to the consideration they show for the sentiments which they attribute to the pieces, they are themselves being deprived of their liberty of action.

Present-day journalists and expert commentators on international affairs are content to devote themselves to diagnoses, to such intentionally simulated aspirations as nationalism, the right of self-determination, the desire for security, et cetera, as though it were possible to accept such abstractions as pointers of current trends and to give them due consideration in the formulation of a political policy.

The diagnosticians of our age seem to think that, from the mere existence of such expressions as nationalism, self-determination, progress, standard of living, anti-colonialism and so on, and the frequency with which they are used by a few hundred, or at the most thousand, western intellectuals (most of them brought up on the Marxist doctrine), it can be assumed that they must represent irresistible trends, vast movements of universal historical significance in Africa and Asia. That is absurd, and there is no evidence whatever to support such an idea. Hitler, Goebbels and Rosenberg proclaimed their ideologies – which were revered by many more millions than are the ideologies currently proclaimed in territories that are 80% illiterate – with immense intensity and persistence; and yet, in spite of it all, these national socialist ideals, the power of infection of which spread far beyond the frontiers of the Third Reich, were very quickly swept out of existence. It is surely ridiculous, then, to allow oneself

to be persuaded that ideologies such as nationalism, self-determination (always of the type that suits the coloured statesman, of course, but never of the type that would appeal to the articulate and educated elements of his followers!), progress and so on have suddenly assumed the propulsive power of space rockets and can never again be halted, when it is so perfectly easy to prove of what minute significance such ideas really are – except among the subscribers to the *New Statesman & Nation* and in New Delhi and Ghana.¹ I would go further. According to the extent to which such countries as these have constitutionally suppressed the English language (in India practically no English is now taught in the secondary schools) there is growing up, in a coloured world daily becoming linguistically more heterogenous, a class to whom the ideological conglomerations of their leaders mean little or nothing. And because illiteracy is being combated primarily on the level of tribal dialects, investigation shows that the link between grafted western ideology and popular movement is bound to remain tenuous and weak in the extreme. Why, then, should we go on allowing ourselves to be influenced by these fictitious trends of history? Are we not confusing inciting to mob-action with the history of progressive thought?²

¹ Harry D. Gideonse (*Harper's Magazine*, 1953), and others who have toured India, have somewhat ironically pointed out how sincerely Nehru and his circle persist in citing *The New Statesman and Nation* as the ultimate authority.

² As a result of the constitutional Commission of 1950 and thanks to the general feeling of anti-western resentment, English has now practically disappeared from the curriculum of primary and secondary schools in India. Its place is to be taken by 14 regional languages, which are enumerated in the Indian constitution. As a result, higher education in India has been placed under a very considerable handicap. (In point of fact, apart from these 14 languages, there are a further 740 dialects and 50 languages in India.) The sacrifice of English – dictated by sentiment and not by reason – has robbed many Indians of any chance of higher education. ('Language Shift decried in India', *New York Times*, February 17th 1959) In view of this multiplicity of tongues (and the preservation of their status at the dictates of anti-British resentment), the extent to which 'All-Indian Nationalism' exists as a live and concrete conception among the masses is very problematical. Unfortunately, our friends touring India could never get away from the national-socialist intellectual circles. That Lippmann's utopia of an India freed of poverty stands but a slender chance of becoming a 'show-case exhibit' against Moscow is also due to this lingual multiplicity. In contrast to India, in Japan, at the beginning of the Meiji period in 1868, all the Japanese could understand one another. This may well be one of the reasons for Japan's particular position in the field of economic development.

Unfortunately, present-day instruction in history does not teach us adequately (if even at all) to draw the following important distinctions: As in the XVIII century or in ancient days, I can, of course, attribute to my opponent, as a person, certain fears, anxieties and intentions. I can picture to myself a King or a Chancellor looking at his map, arriving at certain conclusions of a geographical, economic or ethnological nature and then – impelled by his own fear – becoming an extremely unstable element in my own calculations. We still indulge in much the same type of imputations to-day. Now we say: As a result of such-and-such an event, Syria (or Iraq, Egypt, India, China) found herself confronted with a dilemma which adequately explains her present attitude.

But certain adjustments have to be made. A legitimate Monarch, with his attention fixed on his own dynasty and his successors, is, as it were, very much more part and parcel of his kingdom than are many of the Heads of States in this XX century, in whose time-perspective 'security' means something very different. To a legitimate Monarch, and even to a President elected for a strictly constitutionally fixed term of office, security can well mean that strategico-geographical equipoise which still plays an important role in our historical thinking. But for the leader of a 'revolutionary' State (of the communist or national socialist brand), for a man who has to justify his existence not only in the eyes of a frighteningly nebulous number of his own countrymen and is unable to assess the total number of his adherents by means of free elections, but also in the eyes of his colleagues, who would gladly wring his neck – in short, for the modern dictator, security lies in his ability to keep the international situation in a state of indeterminate, smouldering fermentation.

If then we are old-fashioned and naive enough to believe that we have only to grant him a few geographical and strategic modifications, which on the map seem obvious enough to us, to transform him into a sweet-natured lamb, a man whose word is his bond, then we have failed completely to appreciate the dynamics, the essential foundations, of his political existence.

Or let us take a look at that consideration which, we are told, we must nowadays show towards nationalism in certain countries,

which we simply dare not even try to temper, and to the pressures and explosive qualities of which we have to pay earnest, great and ever increasing attention in all our political calculations. How would it be if we cast our minds back twenty years or so? At that time, any foreign observer in Germany or Austria, listening to broadcasts and speeches or reading reports of the appeals being made to the people, would inevitably have conjured up a picture of implacable nationalism. But the same observer, travelling once more through these countries in 1950 or 1955, would have no little difficulty in finding even a few isolated adherents to the ideas of those earlier days. Anyone who witnessed the ecstatic joy in Austria at the time of the Anschluss in the spring of 1938 could hardly have imagined that ten years later the old Austrian republic and civilisation would be re-born.

Looked at in this context, is it then not probable that in the year 1938 a nationalist leader in some non-western country who, like Hitler, possesses the gift of inciting impressive mob demonstrations, even beyond the confines of his own frontiers, is in reality nothing more than a kind of theatrical producer of purely superficial manifestations? Once he and his clique have been swept away by the stream of time, it is quite probable that after a few years that same country, having reverted to its traditional structure, will become once again the home of a peaceful people, concerned solely with the conduct of their own affairs and the leading of their own private lives. I find it inconceivable that correspondents and leader writers who are old enough to have covered a Nürnberg Rally, or Hitler's entry into Vienna, should now suddenly lose their nerve at the sight of some mob demonstration in Cairo and report that they have just heard history emerging from the microphone! ¹

¹ Cf., for example, E. W. Kennworthy in the New York Times of August 17th 1958 (S.E. 5, Sunday Review of the Week): 'Indirect Aggression difficult to counter.'

It is obvious that almost any revolution, if it is not interrupted, can develop into a historical trend; but initially mass society and the 'stream of history' follow different courses. What little thought had been devoted hitherto to these phenomena is well illustrated in George Rudé's: 'The Crowd in the French Revolution', Oxford University Press, 1959, a book which sets out the sociological impulses in the initial phase of a revolution.

THE TABU-ING AND CANONISATION OF IDEOLOGIES

In the case of the syndromic symptoms which we have just described and which we have called intellectualism and political impotence, there exists a technique which it is singularly difficult to see through. It is the technique of tabu-ing and canonising certain political, economic or social ideas and opinions, the salient feature of which is its ability to evoke an implacable urge to social action, to reform, to action for action's sake. Ideas of this kind often emerge originally in circles and in the works of authors who are so well known to be out and out socialists, trade-unionists or communists, that to have them as sponsors for the propagation of the idea would be a handicap. It then becomes the task of those ideological middle-men, the Fabians, to insinuate these ideas into the mouths, the speeches and the leading articles of prominent men whose personal standing or the importance of the office they hold can thus be enlisted to ensure that the ideas come to be regarded as 'newsworthy' by the world Press. From then on it is comparatively easy to surround the idea with a tabu, which means that any criticism of it is at once branded as historically faulty, unethical and anti-intellectual. After ten years or so under the aegis of such a tabu, the idea as often as not achieves the dignity of full canonisation. This was the plan that was drawn up for the idea of full employment.¹

But anyone who in 1959 presumes to look askance at the idea put forward by the developed countries that assistance to the 'under-developed countries' – the point-four ideology, the duty so ardently espoused by Barbara Ward, Gunnar Myrdal, the whole left wing of the Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States, and the Labourites in Great Britain – is a world-wide obligation, whoever examines meticulously the history of *this* idea, can be quite sure that he will be bitterly criticised and, indeed, held up to ridicule in the non-socialist European Press. He would be tampering with a tabu. Rational criticism is no longer welcome; it makes things uncomfortable. He is almost made to feel that he would be responsible

¹ Vide 'Vollbeschäftigung, Inflation und Planwirtschaft', A. Hunold, Eugen Rentsch Verlag – David McCord Wright, 'Mr. Keynes and the 'Day of Judgement'', Science, Vol. 128, November 21st 1958, pp. 1258-1262.

for a world war, for the collapse of the whole western world, if he was not prepared to give as quickly as possible to the under-developed countries everything that the advice of the Barbara Wards and Myrdals of the world has taught them to regard as their right and just due.

In 1958, two of my books,¹ which, among other things, contained a criticism of the myth of the under-developed countries, evoked somewhat remarkable repercussions, which show how firmly established this idea is among the canonical axioms of our age. It may perhaps be worth while to draw a comparison between falsifications contained in reviews and supposed historical untruths:

In one of my books, published in 1958, I said:

'It must not be forgotten that the dangerous Point-Four ideology betrays a certain lack of knowledge in the economic, psychological and anthropological fields. Since Truman's Point-Four Declaration (whispered into his ear by a journalist who, just previously, had approached the State Department with the same idea and had been dismissed as a dreamer!), the United States (and, since 1958, the Federal German Republic) have felt obliged to enter upon a race with Russia in the development of stagnating territories.'²

It is a significant fact that this passage in the book evoked a reprimand from even well-disposed reviewers. Giselher Wirsing, editor-in-chief of *Christ und Welt*, for example, wrote:

'The assertion that the Point-Four programme was invented by an American intellectual and forced upon the President . . . is, of course, a distortion of fact.'³

Hermann Dexheimer of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Mainz, wrote:

'As he sees it, the Point-Four programme, which envisages the granting of economic aid to under-developed nations, was suggested

¹ Cf. footnote 1 to p. 240 of the present volume, and footnote to p. 246.

² 'USA: Motive und Strukturen,' Stuttgart, p. 306.

³ *Christ und Welt*, November 13th 1958.

to (the then) President Truman by a journalist . . . In view of the documents produced in evidence in more recent historical research, this opinion must be regarded as a distortion of fact.’¹

Both these critics, incidentally, incorrectly link the fact stated on page 306 of my book with the detailed and documented account on page 233 of the support offered by American Jewry to a world-wide assistance policy, and they do so in a manner which suggests that I had said the journalist had influenced Truman solely in the interests of Israel. No such assertion is made in the book. The imputation, nevertheless, is typical of the rhetoric by means of which certain ideas achieve the protection of a tabu. But now a word about this ‘more recent historical research’.

Jonathan B. Bingham, the first Director of the American Point-Four Programme, in his book, *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy*, writes:

‘The Luce journals (*Life*, *Time*, with their circulation of millions) and John Foster Dulles called upon the United States to launch a great moral offensive, but nobody had any idea how to set about it . . . In January 1949, a certain Ben Hardy, an ex-journalist from Georgia, was in the State Department. He was convinced that he had hit upon a magnificent idea. He did not succeed in selling the idea to anyone in the State Department. He therefore got in touch with a young assistant in the White House, named George Elsey, who promptly saw to it that the idea was brought to the President’s attention. When the next proof of President Truman’s inaugural address was sent to the State Department for approval, Hardy’s idea – the idea which then became known as ‘Point-Four’ – was in the draft. Senior officials of the Foreign Ministry, among them Under-Secretary of State Robert Lovett and Charles S. Bohlen, urged most strongly that this passage should be cut out because it was vague and premature. But the obstinacy of the President prevailed. On January 20th 1949, Harry S. Truman announced to the whole world that the United States . . . would accept the economic and social

¹ *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Mainz. December 12th 1958.

development of the under-developed territories on earth as a binding obligation.’¹

It is easy to understand why Truman at that time became enthusiastic about an idea that was as astonishing as it was absurd. Contrary to all forecasts, he had been elected to the White House. The icy blast of premonition may well have struck him. Could not the envy of the gods at this unmerited stroke of luck be placated, he might have said to himself, by promising to devote the alluring riches of the country to the poor of the world? But that, of course, is a quite irrelevant hypothesis. Much more significant is the fact that the originator of the idea, Ben Hardy, whose first memorandum, dated November 23rd 1948, had been ignored by the State Department itself, now became first Director of Propaganda for the Point-Four Programme in the State Department.

And who, incidentally, is this Bingham? This lawyer, born in 1914, had studied at Yale University, and in the 1940's had already worked twice in the more senior branches of the Washington bureaucracy; and in 1951 he was appointed Director of the Point-Four Programme. As far as this investigation is concerned, the important point is not the easily proven fact that this idea of an obligation on the part of the west to provide a bottomless Afro-Asian barrel had first cropped up very much earlier. It was supported by the British Fabian socialists, in the dairies of Beatrice Webb, by Lenin and, more particularly, by some of Roosevelt's advisers, like Harry Hopkins.² Western masochism dates much further back than the break-through to Truman, achieved at the strategically right moment by an obscure journalist. The only really important point is: There are certain ideas which, to attain world-wide recognition, to exercise

¹ Jonathan B. Bingham: *Shirt-Sleeve Diplomacy, Point Four in Action*. The John Day Company, New York 1953, pp 10. et seq.

² Cf. J. Fred Rippy's article in 'Foreign Aid Re-examined' (vide footnote 1 to p. 240), pp. 10 et seq., and 23. Vide also Joseph Stalin: *Marxism and the National Colonial Question*, which emphasises that western aid in development is a pre-requisite for world-wide victory of socialism (Soviet style). Willar Range in his dissertation 'Franklin D. Roosevelt's Theory of International Relations' (1958: Library of Congress Card No. Mic 58-5963) points out that Roosevelt already had grandiose ideas about a 'global New Deal'.

their magic spell and to achieve canonisation, require the background of official crystallisation. It is the symbolic hook to which all those can hang on who have been waiting perhaps for years for the chance. What would have happened to this idea of the development countries, would Nasser ever have been able to play off East and West against each other, if that reporter in a subordinate position in the State Department and aspiring to better things, and President Truman, who had need of some bold idea to justify the position to which the votes of the electorate had acclaimed him, had not been brought together by a middle-man?

And President Truman's proclamation might perhaps not have been sufficient to canonise the development aid idea as the West's *sole* remaining instrument of foreign policy and defence against Moscow and Peking. It required the additional support of an increasing publicity bombardment. At the head of these alleviators of the world's burdens stands Barbara Ward, whose article in the New York Times magazine of November 14th 1948, 'Marshall Plan is not enough', may well have inspired Ben Hardy's memorandum. From 1948 onwards, Barbara Ward has maintained an uninterrupted bombardment of the American intelligentsia through the medium of the New York Times Sunday Magazine, (in all some 70 leading articles) on the subject of a world-wide egalitarian Welfare State. And for those who may perhaps regard the New York Times with a certain measure of reserve there is always the London Economist, 10% of whose issue goes to leading political and economic circles in the United States. (200 copies are sent weekly by air mail to the United States Central Intelligence Agency alone.) And in the anonymous columns of the Economist we once again find Barbara Ward as the arch-protagonist, declaiming on the guilt and sins of the West.¹ Before bowing down to the alleged historical imperative of some idea or other that happens at the moment to be *à la mode*, it is as a rule worth while to find out who is responsible for its launching and propagation. And thanks to the bibliographical assistance available nowadays, there is no excuse for failing to do so.

¹ Regarding the influence exercised by the London Economist on American leaders and individual prominent personalities, vide 'Center of the Center', Newsweek, December 29th 1958, p. 44.

It might perhaps be argued against me that the pressures of increasing populations in the under-developed territories would, in any case, ultimately have given prominence to the idea. That is doubtful. On the other hand, there is documentary evidence to show that, by succumbing everywhere to the practice of making a start with public health (because it is the easiest way and the field in which success can most swiftly be attained), but doing nothing to curb the birth-rate, the Point-Four idea has done a great deal towards making the poor of the world poorer than ever before. In other words, Point-Four has contributed to the setting in motion of the vicious circle, which it is now re-quoting in justification of an expansion of its activities.

Now in this myth of the development countries there is something truly remarkable about the manner of speech in which it indulges for its own propagation. With monotonous similarity, first in the United States and latterly in Western Germany as well, the obligation of the West towards the 'under-developed' races is sponsored as a species of penance, which must be made – 'even if our own comfort and standard of living suffer as a result.'

ARE THE GODS REALLY STILL ENVOIOUS?

Gradually one finds that one cannot resist the impression that many of those who wish to take over the task of relieving the world's burdens as an instrument of policy, seem to feel that they stand arraigned before some kind of World Court of Justice and that they can ensure the sparing of their own lives and their own countries and can, indeed, ensure some sort of guarantee for the success of this policy – vis-à-vis the Soviet menace – by thus appealing for 'sacrifices' and 'austerity'. Exactly the same impulse existed in the ancient world and still exists among many primitive peoples who, when they go off on the warpath, must preface their campaign by sacrificing some object or person they greatly value. As depth psychologists have demonstrated, the same sort of idea survives to-day. It almost seems as though the fixation of the highly developed countries represents the sacrifice by means of which the West hopes to gain the favour of the gods in any passage of arms with the East, from which it

recoils and which, indeed, it believes it can prevent, provided that the sacrifice it makes is on a sufficiently large scale.

In the case of some European publicists and politicians, there may be this additional motive: if, they argue, the United States assumes responsibility for the under-developed peoples for an unrestricted period of time, there will be no need for us to feel ashamed at our reluctance to be grateful for the Marshall Aid Plan. For of what account are the few thousands of millions given to Europe, when compared with the ten or a hundred times greater amount that is being given to the coloured races? That, however, is an aspect which I mention in parenthesis, as an auxiliary explanation of the sensitiveness with which certain circles in Germany, France, Italy and Britain react to any kind of criticism of the Point-Four ideology.

Of far more vital importance is the question: Whose comfort, whose standard of living, can and should be sacrificed? Certainly not the comfort and incomes of those who are loudest in demanding such sacrifices – the Banks, which make profits from loans guaranteed against the will of the tax-payer; the big industrialists and their employees, who only too obviously are very interested in seeing that India or, for that matter, the Soviet Union itself, should order just as many steel tubes and tractors as they can possibly produce. The journalists? Certainly not! just think what exciting and rich fare is provided by reports on development projects and conferences in every country under the sun! The only people whose comfort will very soon suffer as a result of this plan to relieve the world of its burdens are the people who are certainly not vociferous in supporting it in the world Press or at erudite conferences, but are doing their best to exist on their incomes, into which inflation has already made handsome inroads.

This fascination which the under-developed peoples hold for the West can, perhaps, be tolerated as a political luxury in which we must indulge as a side-line, to salve people's consciences. After all, what does it matter whether the United States spends thousands of millions on research on Venus (not because it has the slightest military value, but to ensure that Moscow does not make a greater

¹ Cf. J. Fred Rippy, *op. cit.* pp. 20 et seq.

impression on the Indian peasant than the United States), or whether she shoots off an equal sum in the shape of steel goods and the like into under-developed countries instead of into space? The real political and strategical problems will not be brought any nearer to solution by methods such as these.

Of considerably greater danger, however, is the opinion, which is almost paralysing in its effect and is gaining ground in the western capitals, that, as a result of the triangle The West – the under-developed countries – Moscow-Pekin, the West must always shape its policy *according to the image of themselves* that the *Communists* conjure up in the eyes of the under-developed peoples. There is, for example, the tendency statistically to present Soviet foreign trade or the economic expansion of the Soviet Union in terms of the completely arbitrary and unrealistic rate of dollar-rouble exchange fixed by the Kremlin, and the resultant percentages come as such a shock that there is an immediate outcry at home for the collectivisation of science, economy and foreign trade.¹ Thanks to the naiveté of these intellectuals of ours, the Kremlin, by means of a little statistical juggling, has a free hand to manipulate the social objectives which the West sets itself.

COLLECTIVISATION OF THE FUTURE?

For the past ten years or so the author has persistently been drawing attention to the tendency, of itself shameful, and corrosive in its effects on western policy, to allow the pattern of the future to be dictated by the Communists. The most grotesque imitation of communist theory and practice to date has been given by those who inspired the message to Congress which President Eisenhower read in January 1959. As some of the American papers were quick to note, what, in fact, the message advocated was the application of the Five-Year-Plan idea to the future of the American nation.

¹ Years ago, the late lamented Russian expert, Franz Borkenau, issued a warning against the naive manner in which the west was inclined to accept Soviet or UNO statistics regarding the Soviet Union, its trade, etc. In the American best seller, 'The Ugly American', a trenchant critique, written in the form of a novel but factually documented, for instance, the author points out how Soviet agents in South-East Asia have time and again succeeded in representing goods and foodstuffs supplied by the United States as gifts from the Soviet Union.

Herein, perhaps, the corruptive influence of Nehru's India is discernible. Since the emergence of India as an independent nation, the governments of both Truman and Eisenhower, and the intellectuals of both Parties, have been consistent in their encouragement of, and their advocacy of an American guarantee for, the Indian Five-Year-Plan. The assertion that the success of this Indian imitation of the Soviet and Chinese experiments was absolutely vital to their own, American, political survival became, among certain American politicians and publicists, an absolute fetish, the auto-suggestive influence of which has not failed to produce very considerable effect.¹

A note of warning was sounded by a few sober-minded men, who saw in this completely uncritical, ignorant and bemused enthusiasm for India's ambitions (hatched in the seminaries of Harold J. Laski and not in the anthropological seminaries of India!) the beginnings of a development, at the conclusion of which the United States itself would find itself subjected to the socialist pattern of the future. How right they were is proven by the January 1959 message to Congress. Exactly ten years previously, President Truman had fired off his Point-Four ideology, under the aegis of which every conceivable type of quackery in the fields of economics and foreign policy was able to gain a hearing. And in 1959, thanks to an ideological regression and domesticisation, things had come to such a pass that the President was demanding a kind of Point-Four ideology for the United States itself.

If the American nation, through the medium of some Government Commission on which the intellectuals can bestir themselves to their hearts' content, prescribes for itself norms and quotas in every branch of human activity, or even allows such a proposal to be put before it, it will be setting forth along a path towards a centralisation of power more complete than anything that has been seen since 1933.

¹ Recent literature: Joseph S. Berliner: 'Soviet Economic Aid', New York, 1958. A. N. Agarwala and S. P. Singh: 'The Economics of Underdevelopment', Oxford University Press, 1958. Planning Commission of India: 'The New India, Progress through Democracy.' Macmillan, 1958. But then compare these auto-suggestive works with the devastating criticism of development aid as a weapon against Communism in Asia in Lin Yutang's new book, 'The Secret Name', New York 1958, pp. 236 et seq.

The whole idea of a five-year plan is that it is a whip, a species of 'form at a glance', which enables the central executive to extract the last ounce out of everyone. The idea of a 'must' calculated by the Central Government is based on the assumption that all the individuals, corporations, families and undertakings in the country do not yet realise or no longer appreciate what is necessary, reasonable and practicable, but require the goading whip of an arch slave-driver. And that means the collectivisation of the future.

ERIC VOEGELIN

Munich University

ON READINESS TO RATIONAL DISCUSSION

Exactly one hundred years ago, John Stuart Mill published his essay, 'On Liberty'. He deals with civic and social liberty, with the nature and the limitations of the power which society may legitimately exercise over the individual; and particularly with the freedom of conscience, thought and discussion. He has concentrated on the *freedom* to discuss, and in this treatise it is the *readiness* to discuss that is the subject of my scrutiny. This alteration of accentuation, when discussion itself is under discussion, is not arbitrary. Let me make clear the reasons which have caused me to approach the subject from a different angle to that from which Mill approached it.

Our current intellectual situation differs considerably in two respects from that of 1859, when the essay was written. Both these aspects are concerned with the English philosopher's belief in progress. The first concerns his concept of the order of western society and its immediate future evolution. Mill assumed that the situation of modern western society was based upon the freedom to discuss truth through the medium of rational discussion. He saw before him a society with a nucleus composed of responsible individuals, who not only felt that it was their duty to settle issues by discussion, but were also ready to do so; and though he may have felt that the freedom of this nucleus was to some extent in danger, he nevertheless thought that it was a danger that could be warded off through the medium of rational discussion. This was the purpose for which he wrote his essay. Mill, therefore, was no blind optimist; but in contrast to Tocqueville or Jakob Burckhardt, he was optimistic enough to believe that the dangers, which he recognised as such, could be banished by means of reason. He judged the condition of the social order by the picture he formed of the rational individuals whom he regarded as the relevant, civilising elements of the human

race – which means, by his picture of himself; and he regarded the great majority of society, which constituted the focal point of danger, as nothing more than a disturbing element in historical progress. This belief of the rationalists was shattered by the events of the last century, although there are still many who continue to share it. The second aspect concerns Mill's conception of the essence of mankind, his philosophical anthropology. The classical political philosophers, too, were of the opinion that the social order was based upon persuasion by reason – and Mill's idea of the social order was undoubtedly in the classical tradition. But Plato and Aristotle understood all about the tension between potentiality and actuality in mankind; it does not follow that, because man is by nature responsive to reason, he will, in fact, allow himself to be governed by it when faced with a concrete, historical situation. In the belief in progress of the XVIII and XIX centuries, which Mill shared, the tension in life between potentiality and fulfilment was dissected by a historical process, in which the essence of man comes close to fulfilment. And when existential tension becomes distortedly stretched by events, there emerges the remarkable picture of society which I have just outlined, a picture in which the type of man held at the moment to possess the essential salient characteristics of humanity is regarded as the socially and historically potent factor, while the rest of mankind sinks to the obscurity of a relatively inert mass of no account, or at best is granted the status of a disturbing factor. After a hundred years of philosophical thought and revision, neither Mill's picture of man himself, nor his social and historical picture built around him, remains theoretically acceptable to-day.

In the light of these changed circumstances, I propose to build up my investigation in the following manner: Firstly, I will depict the problem of the freedom to discuss as Mill saw it, together with the dangers that threaten it. This first part will lead to the theoretical side of the problem, with which Mill did not deal. The second part, following the example of Plato's Protagoras, will resuscitate the problem in the classical sense and will centre round the problem of the willingness to discuss. In the third and fourth parts, the two fundamental questions which are raised in Plato's work regarding the willingness to discuss will be examined separately and in detail.

I

In the essay 'On Liberty', three separate and composite ideas are linked in a remarkably novel way: (1) Wilhelm von Humboldt's idea on the development of individualism and liberalism, (2) the English idea of reform liberalism, and (3) a good measure of Comte's positivism of the first, so-called intellectual, phase.

From Humboldt stems the idea that the individual must mould and develop his own personality. In an absolute democracy of the type of the Greek *πόλις*, however, this, in Humboldt's opinion, could not be achieved, since man had to restrain his individuality and function primarily as a responsible citizen who, in unison with others, had to take the political decisions upon which the existence of the State depended. In view of the French revolution and its reign of intellectual terror, he came to the conclusion that a monarchy of the Prussian type, based upon the rule of law, was the regime best suited for the development of individuality. The monarch with his civil military apparatus, Humboldt thought, should control all political issues and thus leave the citizen free to develop his individuality. Mill agreed that the development of his individuality was man's greatest boon, but he believed that could be achieved equally well under the conditions imposed by the British type of constitutional life. The spaciousness, territorially, of a modern State seemed to him, in spite of the events that accompanied the rise to power of Napoleon III, a guarantee that social pressure would never prove to be as disastrous to the individual as it had been in the Greek urban States. This was the argument which seemed to afford the authors of the Federalist Papers an opportunity to implement their idea of a representative republic, without exposing the freedom of the individual to those dangers which would inevitably threaten it in a small, absolute monarchy. He further believed that the separation of Church and State, of the spiritually private and the temporally public spheres, ensured a measure of freedom such as the theocratic *πόλις* of ancient times could never have guaranteed. If, on principle, the Church were completely removed from State control, the State's primary reason for any onslaught on liberty would, he felt, cease to exist. In principle, therefore, freedom of the individual would

not appear to be incompatible with the British concept of a liberal, parliamentary constitution.

The third, Comte's, sequence of ideas is concerned with the history of civilisation. For the individual, as for humanity as a whole, the primary consideration is what Mill calls the 'improvement' of mankind – a word which combines the meaning of Humboldt's 'Bildung' and Comte's 'progrès'. 'Improvement' is the basic concept in Mill's anthropology. Although in his essay he concentrates on liberty as the central theme, in the order of importance in which he places our blessings his examination of liberty is conducted solely with the object of furthering the cause of 'improvement'. The primary blessing is 'the permanent interest of a man as a progressive being'. Everything that furthers that interest constitutes a legitimate political demand.

In the case of peoples with a low standard of civilisation, despotism is a legitimate form of regime, provided that, and in so far as, it serves towards 'improving' the barbarians. Until 'man has proved his capacity to improve himself by means of free and equal discussion', liberty, as a political principle, is out of place. The condition of 'the capacity of being guided to their own improvement by conviction and persuasion' has been attained, Mill maintains, by mankind – at least 'in all nations with whom we need concern ourselves here'; and, since this state has been achieved, liberty has become a legitimate political demand. Mill is at pains to emphasise that he is not making use of the argument of 'abstract rights'; as a practical political axiom, there is no such thing as a right to liberty, and certainly there is no such thing as the right of free discussion. Whether or not we share Mill's opinion regarding the level of civilisation, we must nevertheless accept the idea that freedom of discussion is not, of itself, an absolute principle, but becomes an instrument in the evolution of the individual and of society when the situation becomes historically ripe for its use as such.

To Mill, therefore, freedom of discussion and the liberty of the individual are institutions dependent upon a great number of things. In the city-State democracies of old, they could not unfold at all, because of social pressure and the cult of the *πόλις*; in a democracy governed by elected representation they can become effective,

provided that the spiritual sphere is kept separate and outside the field of politics; but they have no place in either if civilisation has not achieved a level at which society is composed of rational individuals. In any case, they are not principles, but simply instruments of social order.

And now to the dangers which, even under the most favourable conditions, threaten the liberty of a modern, civilised society. In a constitutional State on British lines, Mill regards the State itself as the least menacing of any political dangers. Its intervention, he thinks, need not be seriously feared, since the government is, traditionally, regarded as the enemy of the general good, and public opinion therefore is far too vigilant. Far more dangerous to both the individual and to liberty as a whole is, he asserts, the social pressure that is exerted, particularly by the British middle class. Mill was writing a little after 1850, at a time, that is, when the new morality of the middle class had reached the apex of its aggressiveness and was able to enforce conformity by the application of social (not State) sanctions. And he feared that things would become worse in the future, when the mass of the people from which this pressure emanated, became conscious of their political power and started to use the machinery of State to their own purposes. And finally, rising above the horizon, Mill saw the danger of ideological mass movement, in the shape of Auguste Comte and his *Système de Politique Positive*. Of this, he felt, the salient feature would be 'a despotism exercised by society over the individual, which would far exceed any demand ever made by even the strictest disciplinarian among the ancient philosophers'. (He probably had Plato in mind.) In its essential characteristics, then, the picture of the situation which Mill had formed was astoundingly clear and accurate: the comparative innocuousness of a national State of the old type: the great danger inherent in the mania for conformity among ordinary, everyday people; the even greater danger that under a parliamentary constitution the majority, eager to impose conformity on all and sundry, might gain control of the machinery of State; and the greatest danger of all that some ideological reformer of the Comte type might achieve social success.

In spite of all his political misgivings about liberty, Mill failed to

see the human problem, namely, that danger could threaten the individual only if the majority of the men in the society in which he lived were not 'individuals', in the sense in which he uses the term; nor did he appreciate the significance of the fact that a majority did not consist of the hated and despised middle class alone, but included also a number of intellectuals like Comte – an 'individual', that is, in his sense of the word, who constituted a danger to the freedom of others because he was himself a hidebound ideologist avid for power. Comte's doctrine of progress misled Mill into projecting the atmosphere of reform liberalism into the future of humanity and prevented him from appreciating the essentially human aspect in the dangers, though his eye was sharp enough to spot them as such. This may well explain his attempt, which to-day seems absurd, to map out, with the aid of rational argument and constitutional guarantee, the historical drama of a humanity whose desire for freedom and ability to achieve it were smaller than the measure of its determination.

II

Even the surest protection of fundamental rights and the right of freedom does not guarantee the presence of those blessings which ought to be protected. As far as the category of peripheral, personal blessings is concerned, the truth of this statement has demonstrably been confirmed by the history of liberal and social revolutions: we all know that the protection of property puts no money into the pockets of the have-nots. But its truth as regards the essentially personal blessings has made little or no impact on the consciousness of the general public. Only very few indeed appreciate the fact that opinion is not thought, that the rhetorical exposition of an opinion is not rational discussion on the point at issue. To pass from functional freedom to the essential, concrete attributes of thought and discussion, let us turn back to the classical treatment of the question in Plato's *Protagoras*.

Is it possible to teach virtue? That is the question discussed by Protagoras and Socrates, the protagonists in the dialogue. Protagoras takes his stand as the teacher of the *τέχνη πολιτική*, the art of politics.

The πόλις cannot exist if its citizens do not possess the virtues of justice, wisdom, piety and courage; and first and foremost, youth must learn the virtue of εὐβουλία, of wise judgement in private and public affairs. It is Protagoras' profession to teach virtue, καλοκαγαθία, to the young. The argument between the two runs on the following general lines: Protagoras takes the view that the virtues which he has undertaken to teach, can, in fact, be taught; Socrates is doubtful. To settle the issue between these conflicting opinions, Socrates tries to draw Protagoras into a discussion on the essential attributes of virtue; for, he says, the controversial question can only be answered when it is known what virtue is. Protagoras resists Socrates' efforts: the orator wishes to make speeches, not to be drawn into a question and answer argument. Socrates, however, forces him to enter upon a discussion and leads the argument to the conclusion that a virtue can be taught, provided it has its roots in ἐπιστήμη, knowledge. If knowledge is part of the essence of virtue, then obviously everything that can be learned can also be taught.

As far as the subject of this treatise is concerned, there are two phases of the argument that are of significance: (1) Protagoras' attempt to prevent rational discussion of the question; and (2) Socrates' insistence on the knowledge element in virtue as a pre-requisite to his acceptance that it can be taught.

To Socrates' request that he explains the extent to which virtue can be taught, Protagoras replies with one of his stock speeches.

In the Greek text, the speech is ten pages long and takes between twenty and thirty minutes to deliver. It is a brilliant speech, embellished with the Prometheus fable, richly interwoven with common-sense wisdom, and even a witty reference to one of the theatrical successes of the season is not lacking. It is the type of speech with which a sophist – to-day we would say an intellectual – is wont to scintillate in the eyes of his audience and at the same time, with the fireworks of his oratory, to discountenance the modest questioner and make his very question appear ridiculous. Socrates is enchanted; he hangs on the sophist's lips as though he could never hear enough; and only when he is quite sure that Protagoras has come to the end does he start his counter-blow – urbane in form, but merciless in its objectivity. That was the sort of speech, he says,

that politicians make in the Assembly when they want to overwhelm a questioner. Instead of a precise answer to a precise question there comes a new, long speech, and by the time it ends everybody has forgotten what the original point at issue was all about. It is impossible to pin the speaker down to the subject; it is submerged in a flood of amusing but quite irrelevant digressions, of authoritative quotations, of aptly chosen examples, and of pretentious verbiage. Scrutiny of an idea, discussion in the form of terse argument and counter-argument, which necessitates perhaps fifty exchanges of assertion and retort before the issue is settled, becomes impossible if one of the protagonists replies to every argument of the other with a speech lasting half an hour. Prolixity is one of the most effective ways of preventing rational discussion. Socrates makes all this so convincingly clear that Protagoras feels compelled for the time being to adhere to the rules of the game.

The next outburst of prolixity, however, leads to a crisis. Socrates again insists on brevity and precision, but this time Protagoras becomes irritable. He had taken part in any number of wordy battles, he says; but if he had accepted the conditions of argument proposed by his opponents, Protagoras would not to-day be a name to conjure with among the Greeks. Thereupon Socrates rises, regrets that he has another engagement and that time will not allow him to stay and listen to the interesting but somewhat lengthy dissertations of his companion, and prepares to take his leave. By means of this gesture, which is repeated in a similar situation in the *Gorgias*, Plato establishes the principle, all too frequently ignored to-day, that freedom of speech includes also the liberty to refuse to listen. Freedom of speech serves the purposes of rational discussion; whoever abuses it in order to prevent discussion is breaking the rules of the game as accepted by civilised society; such violation demands social sanctions; and when the milder forms of warning have no effect, one has no option but to turn one's back on the offender and go away.

In this dialogue, the situation is saved by the intervention of others. Protagoras promises to abide by the rules, and the argument can be continued and reaches its climax in the Socratic thesis that all virtue has its roots in *ἐπιστήμη*.

Virtue can be taught, provided that it is based upon knowledge that can be communicated. This Socratic thesis, which, unfortunately, is so frequently misunderstood, does not mean that a man can be improved by moral sermons. Rather is it based upon the argument that no man intentionally does an evil or despicable thing. But when passion or the desire of the moment dictates his actions, then reason for his lapse lies in his ignorance, in ἀμαθία, his inability to see clearly what is the right thing to do. He chooses the wrong course because his appreciation of the consequences of his action is faulty. Were he aware of the ultimate consequences, he would act not hastily, but with due consideration, and then he would choose the right course. In the same way as things appear in false proportion if the perspective is wrong, the desire of the moment distorts the thing desired and makes it appear to be more important than it really is, when seen in the true perspective of time. Right behaviour becomes a question of the art of measuring the benefits, as seen in the true perspective of time, and the art of measuring, in this sense, the τέχνη μετρητική, is the crux of the art of right behaviour: the power of the immediate perspective, as seen in close perspective, is overcome by the wisdom shown in measuring it in the true perspective of time. To allow oneself to be dominated by desire is therefore 'the greatest foolishness' (ἀμαθία), while the wisdom which is based on knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) is 'the highest of all human things'. And this art of measurement can be taught.

There is, however, more to this art than is contained in mere homely saws, such as 'honesty is the best policy' or 'mens sana in corpore sano', although such prima facie knowledge of the common-sense type is part and parcel of it.

Επιστήμη, in the Platonic sense, is concerned not only with the propriety of the isolated deed, but with the 'well-being (σωτηρία) of life' as a whole. Protagoras' line of thought, which culminates in the conditions under which virtue can be taught, points, indeed, to the second sophist dialogue, the *Gorgias*, and, later, also to the *Politeia* and *Nomoi*. For the widest perspective in which human activity can operate is the whole of life itself, which ends in death. Plato is concerned with the well-being of the living soul, which, in death, has to face the Last Judgement, the *mythos* of which is

developed in the *Gorgias* and the *Politeia*. The *τέχνη μετροτική* is the art of acting *sub specie mortis*. And in the *Nomoi* Plato counters the Protagorean principle of homo mensura with the principle 'God is the measure'. Knowledge (*ἐπιστήμη*), which is the foundation of right behaviour, and ignorance or foolishness (*ἄμαθία*), which leads to errors of behaviour, must not therefore be regarded as the possession or non-possession of rules of conduct that are definable and capable of being communicated, but as ways of living. This knowledge, this *ἐπιστήμη*, then, is in reality existential knowledge of the fulfilment of human destiny in eternal life: and *ἄμαθία* is the state of existing in ignorance of eternal destiny. Transcendental cognition, then, as the individual achieves it, is a pre-requisite of virtue.

On the question of rational discussion there follows a sentence which may well appear ridiculous to many of our contemporaries: Rational discussion on order in the existence of humanity and society is possible only when accompanied by knowledge of transcendental fulfilment. When this knowledge is lacking, discussion will be dominated by *ἄμαθία*. And the symptom of *ἄμαθία* is a lack of readiness to discuss, the fundamental reason for which is the unwillingness of the participants to be drawn into the realms of the transcendental.

I now propose to sketch some of the methods used by those who wish to avoid being drawn into rational discussion, and then to return briefly to the question of *ἄμαθία*.

III

Questions of social order can be discussed rationally only if the whole concept of the order of human existence, of which the social order forms a part, is viewed in its entirety and right back to its transcendental origin. If this condition of *ἐπιστήμη* is not fulfilled, the discussion degenerates into a mere rhetorical debate on the pro's and con's; and instead of the conclusions to which the debate should lead by means of analytical question and answer, we get the *τόποι* on which the debate is based. And it was Aristotle's appreciation of the difference between the two forms of thought that caused him to differentiate between his analysis (the logic of scientific discussion)

and the topic (the logic of the speaker.) The part of the topic with which we wish to deal here concerns the methods by which a participant in a discussion prevents questions of social order being carried into the realms of the transcendental. In our modern society, this technique of preventing rational discussion has been reduced to such a fine art that it would require a really comprehensive monograph to exhaust the subject – and, unfortunately, no such monograph has ever been written. Here I must confine myself to enumerating a few of the variations of the technique which are in daily use in debates on questions which could justifiably claim to be the subject of rational discussion.

The first group can be said to include all those sophist tricks with which Plato had to contend. They are simple, but effective. Their fundamental principle is that they must exhaust the time, which imposes a limit on verbal discussion, by means of verbosity, appeals to authorities and so on. In this way, any continuity of argument is rendered impossible; and if the speaker is really expert, the whole issue becomes so obscured that no one any longer has any idea of what it is really all about.

A second group of tricks, also known to Plato, but only recently developed into a fine art, can perhaps be classed together under the generic title of 'back-stair psychology'. The speaker using this technique does not in his argument pay any direct attention to the point at issue, but skirts round it and attacks his opponent from the rear with innuendoes regarding the psychological factors upon which, he suggests, his opponent's line of argument is based; and he seeks to discredit it by furnishing proof of a prejudicial attitude, which he attributes to the political or economic interests of his opponent. In totalitarian movements, this technique of personal attack has become a principle of political discussion to so complete a degree that, in the field of political science, its use is frequently regarded as a sure indication of the speaker's character as a totalitarian ideologist. This assumption seems to me to go too far; for it must not be forgotten that, thanks to Marxism and psychoanalysis, this back-stair psychology has become a society game among the mediocrities of the whole western world (and among them many of the great figures of our age must be included), so that its use by the individual

does not necessarily indicate anything more than a general standard of intellectual poverty.

A third method of preventing discussion, closely akin to back-stair psychology, is the tactic of 'classification'. The speaker evades the point at issue by asserting that his opponent's argument can be classified as being the result of a definite 'position' – be it of a political, religious or theoretical nature. And once an argument has been classified as 'positional', it is regarded as having been demolished, since the 'position' attributed to it is always selected with pejorative intent. The choice of the position selected is an expression of the personal antipathies of the individual critic; and the same argument can therefore be attributed to any one of a variety of 'positions', according to what comes most readily to the critic's hand. The wealth of variation afforded by such tactics is well exemplified by the variety of classifications to which I have myself been subjected. On my religious 'position', I have been classified as a Protestant, a Catholic, as anti-semitic and as a typical Jew; politically, as a Liberal, a Fascist, a National Socialist and a Conservative; and on my theoretical position, as a Platonist, a Neo-Augustinian, a Thomist, a disciple of Hegel, an existentialist, a historical relativist and an empirical sceptic; in recent years the suspicion has frequently been voiced that I am a Christian. All these classifications have been made by university professors and people with academic degrees. They give ample food for thought regarding the state of our universities.

The fourth method takes us into the field of evasion by means of systematic dogmatism. Here it is not a question of sophist tricks or psychological evasion, but of the principle that 'values' and the 'appraisal of values' belong to the realm of subjective dogma and do not come within the scope of rational discussion. The principle confers several advantages on its adherents: (1) Tenets of ontology, of philosophical anthropology and the doctrine of ethics can all be classified as 'appraisals of values' and brushed aside, and any attempt to introduce them into the discussion can be stigmatised as 'unscientific'. (2) The speaker's own values, which would not stand up to rational analysis, can be introduced as premises to be accepted without question, since, though they may well be subjective, they are no more so than any others. (3) Since the whole spiritual and

intellectual aspect of social order stands, on principle, as 'evaluation' outside the realms of science, there is no need to become a master of its theory. This saves a lot of trouble. There is no need to know anything about philosophy, to read Plato and Aristotle or to understand Greek. My own experience has led me to the conclusion that the prerogatives of ignorance on fundamental issues constitute one reason for the popularity, in certain circles, of this method, the importance of which must not be under-estimated. (And this applies even more to what follows.) In this way, rational discussion becomes impossible.

Finally, we come to the neo-positivist method of social sciences as a technique for the prevention of rational discussion. Its adherents contest the possibility of any scientific appraisal of 'values', but they admit that the subject of the historical and social sciences is based on their association with the field of values'. The positivists go a step further and maintain that this subject is based on a method, the scientific character of which they strive to prove by means of a number of more or less vague analogies with what they are pleased to regard as the methods of the natural sciences. The sphere of spiritual values, of *ἐπιστήμη*, which, in the other methods enumerated above, indirectly exercises a certain influence on the subject at issue, is excluded absolutely from discussion, on the grounds that the phenomena of spiritual values lie outside the field of empirical determination and qualification. Discussion of the fundamental questions even in the corrupt form of rhetorical debate on the *topoi* of values is regarded as inadmissible; by the positivists it is categorically rejected. I have enumerated these methods as examples designed both to bring home to the reader the wealth of variety of the forms in which this phenomenon manifests itself, and to demonstrate the degree to which willingness to discuss rationally has withered away in our modern society.

IV

In the Protagoras, *ἐπιστήμη*, knowledge of the wider perspective of life, stands in contrast to *ἀμαθία*, ignorance regarding the consequences of one's actions. In the later *Politeia*, the question is elaborated

in its wider aspect. *Αμαθία*, which, in the sophist dialogue, is held to be directly responsible solely for irrational behaviour in the individual case, is portrayed in its entirety as *ἄγνοια*, the ignorance of the soul regarding its relationship with God. The fundamental reason for the stupid behaviour of the individual is to be found in the stupidity of his soul, which, with demoniacal intent, turns a blind eye to the existence of God. Behaviour becomes irrational when it is prompted by a false picture of the order of things and man's place in it; conversely, rational behaviour depends upon the correctness of the picture of things which a man carries in his soul and by which his soul is influenced. Plato is of the opinion that the problems of volition and knowledge have their roots in this picture, in its truth, as it reproduces the pattern of all order. In the sophist dialogue, it was held that virtue could be taught, provided that it was based on knowledge; in the later dialogues, *ἐπιστήμη* itself is portrayed as the understanding of the essence of existence and its origin in an existence beyond. *Επιστήμη*, in this sense, could, indeed, be imparted – the whole of the *Politeia* is devoted to the imparting of this understanding of the order of things; virtue, therefore, is still regarded as something that can be taught. But the understanding of the order of things extends further to the correct relationship to the beyond; thus it becomes the means of rebellion against God and of closing one's self to Him.

If he wishes, a man can refuse to listen to the lessons being imparted to him, he can prefer to remain ignorant. In that case, however, the Socratic premise that every man desires to act correctly and that he acts unwisely simply because he is ignorant, becomes open to question. It is true that virtue can be taught – but of what use is erudition, if the pupil does not wish to listen? Or, in terms of the problem before us, of what use is rational discussion, if one of the participants shows inexhaustible ingenuity in evolving methods of preventing it? If he is firmly determined never to allow the discussion to reach a point at which it becomes evident that the root of the whole problem of the order of things lies in the relationship of man to God?

To this problem of foolishness there exist no simple solutions, either in theory or in practice. Only the difficulty itself can be more clearly

exposed than was possible within the framework of ancient philosophy, by a reference to the concept of foolishness in the Prophets:

‘For the vile person will speak villainy, and his heart will work iniquity, to practise hypocrisy and to utter error against the Lord, to make empty the soul of the hungry, and he will cause the drink of the thirsty to fail.’ Isaiah xxxii. 6.

In the eighth century, the Prophet narrowed the definitions of the fool (*nabal*) and foolishness (*nabalah*) to a revolt against God. Since, by virtue of their acceptance into the Christian tradition, these definitions have been used throughout the spiritual history of the western world, we will follow the same usage and designate spiritual revolt against the order of existence as that facet of foolishness which, according to Plato, disturbs the concept of knowledge and the teachability of virtue. In this way, we reserve the words irrationality and ignorance (which correspond to *ἀμαθία* in the Protagoras) to denote the pneumonopathic results of foolishness. When man foolishly revolts against God, he is plunged into confusion and becomes incapable of recognising the order of existence and of society. We might then use the word folly as the antithesis of common-sense – the ability of the normal, reasonable man to behave rationally in the ordinary affairs of everyday life. The positive series of faith, reason and common-sense would then correspond to the negative series of foolishness, irrationality and folly.

This would appear to clarify the situation regarding a willingness to discuss as precisely as time and space allow. Rational discussion on questions of social order is possible; and in a complicated modern society it is an essential condition of the social order – as Mill rightly foresaw. But discussion is possible only between men capable of using their powers of reason; a fool, as here defined in the technical sense, has lost this ability. This loss of the ability to reason logically was the danger which Mill saw looming over the horizon, though he seems to have under-estimated both its size and its historical significance. The decisive manifestations of this loss have been the mass and intellectual movements of our age. In this jungle of irrationality, rational discussion is confined to important but socially

comparatively ineffectual enclaves. After centuries of systematic confusion of reason, it will not be easy to render these enclaves once more effective. But that is the task that lies before us.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

CARLO ANTONI. Rome. Born Trieste 1896. Pupil of Benedetto Croce, in whose political footsteps he followed; actively engaged during the last years of the war as the author of leaflets advocating the re-creation of the Liberal Party; Commissioner for Foreign Cultural Relations (1944-1947); Professor in Padua and later Professor of Historical Philosophy in Rome; at present Professor of History and Modern Philosophy and Director of the Philosophical Institute of Rome University; Member of the Mont Pèlerin Society since its foundation in 1947, of the Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei and the Consiglio Superiore della Pubblica Istruzione; author of the manifesto of, and Vice-President of, the Associazione Italiana per la Libertà della Cultura; winner of the Einaudi prize for philosophy. Principal works: *Dallo Storicismo alla Sociologia* (1940); *La Lotta contro la Ragione* (1951); *Considerazione su Hegel e Marx* (1946); *Commento a Croce* (1955).

HANS BARTH. Born 1904. Dr. jur. (1928). Editor, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* (1929-1946); Professor of Philosophy, Zürich University, since 1946. Principal works: *Fluten und Dämme. Der Philosophische Gedanke in der Politik* (1943); *Wahrheit und Ideologie* (1945); *Pestalozzis politische Philosophie* (1954). *Die Idee der Ordnung* (1958); *The Idea of Order* (1960), published by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

HANS KOHN. New York. Born Prague, 1891. Dr. jur. Prague University (1923); during the first world war prisoner of war in Siberia; Reader at the New School for Social Research, New York (1933); Professor of Modern History, Smith College, Northampton, Mass. (1934-1941); Clark Parsons Professor of History, Smith College (1941-1949); Professor of Modern and Current History at the City College of New York (since 1949). Member of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Principal works (in German): *Propheten ihrer Völker*, Mill, Michelet, Mazzini, Treitschke, Dostoievski (Bern 1948); *Das Zwanzigste Jahrhundert, eine Zwischenbilanz der westlichen Welt* (Zürich 1950); *Die Idee des Nationalismus, Ursprung und Geschichte bis zur Französischen Revolution* (Heidelberg 1950); *Der Schweizerische Nationalgedanke* (Zürich 1955).

WILHELM RÖPKE. Born Geneva 1899, Dr. rer. pol., Marburg University. Doctor h.c. Columbia University, New York; Professor of National Economy, Graz University (1928-1929); Marburg University (1929-1933); Visiting Professor, the Rockefeller Foundation in the United States (1928); Member of the Government Commission on the study of unemployment and co-author of the 'Brown Report' on the overcoming of crises (1930-1931); compulsorily placed first on leave and then on pension on account of nonconformist (liberal) views (1933); Professor, Istanbul University (1933-1937); since 1937, Professor at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva. More recent works: *Die Gesellschaftskrise der Gegenwart* (5. Ed. 1948); *Die deutsche Frage* (3. Ed. 1948); *Mass und Mitte* (1950); *Internationale Ordnung – heute* (2. Ed. 1954); *Gegen die Brandung* (2. Ed. 1960). All works published by the Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenchbach-Zürich. *International Order and Economic Integration* (1960), published by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

DAVID McCORD WRIGHT. Montreal, Canada. Born 1909. Professor of National Economy and Political Science, McGill University, Montreal, Canada; formerly Professor of National Economy, Virginia University, USA; M.A. (1940); Ph. D. Harvard University (1940-1941); Economic Adviser to the National Resources Planning Board (1942); Fulbright Lecturer, Oxford University (1953-1954); Editor of *The Impact of the Labor Union* (1951); Member of The American Economic Association, The Royal Economic Society and the Mont Pèlerin Society. Principal Works: *Democracy and Progress* (Macmillan 1947); *Creation of purchasing Power* (Harvard Press 1942); *Economics of Disturbance* (1946); *Capitalism* (1951); *A Key to Modern Economics* (1954); *Future of Keynesian Economics* (American Economic Review, June 1945). RUSSELL KIRK. Mecosta, Michigan. Born 1918. B. A., Michigan State College; M.A., Duke University; Doctor of Letters, St. Andrews University, Scotland. Russell Kirk is the editor of the journal, *The Conservative Review*, and is at the same time Research Professor of Political Science at C. W. Post College of Long Island University. He has recently taken over the editorship of another journal, 'Modern Age'. His principal work, *The Conservative Mind*, is already in its fifth edition. Other works: *Randolph of Roanoke* (Chicago, 1951); *A Program for Conservatives* (Chicago, 1954); *St. Andrews* (London, 1954); *Academic Freedom* (Chicago, 1955); *Beyond the Dreams of Avarice* (Chicago, 1956).

F. A. HAYEK. Born Chicago, 1899. Dr. jur. and Dr. oec. publ. Vienna University; Director of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research (1927-1931); Hon. Professor, Vienna University (1929-1931); Professor of National Economy and Statistics, London University (1931-1950); Professor of Social Science, Chicago University, since 1950. President of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Recent works: *The Pure Theory of Capital* (London 1941); *The Road to Serfdom* (London 1944) (German edition Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlench-Zürich and Stuttgart, 1945); *Individualism and Economic Order* (London 1949.) (German edition Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlench-Zürich and Stuttgart, 1952); *John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor* (London, 1951). *The Counter-Revolution of Science* (The Free Press, Glencoe, 1958).

THEODOR LITT. Bonn. Born Düsseldorf, 1880. Teacher at Düsseldorf Gymnasium (till 1919); Professor of Philosophy and Pedagogics, Bonn and Leipzig Universities (1919-1947); Institute of Educational Science, Bonn University (since 1947). In 1950 the State Faculty of Science of Munich University conferred upon Prof. Litt the degree of Dr. rer. pol. h. c., and in 1952 the members of the Order Pour le Mérite elected him a new member of their Order. Corresponding member of the Academies of Science, Berlin, Leipzig and Vienna. His works are devoted primarily to cultural philosophy and the philosophical science of education. Principal works: *Individuum und Gemeinschaft* (1919); *Kant und Herder* (1930); *Die Selbsterkenntnis des Menschen* (1938); *Denken und Sein* (1948); *Wege und Irrwege geschichtlichen Denkens* (1948); *Naturwissenschaft und Menschenbildung* (1952); *Hegel* (1953); *Die Wiedererweckung des geschichtlichen Bewusstseins* (1956).

MICHAEL OAKESHOTT. London. Born 1901. Studied history at Cambridge; Fellow of Gonville and Caius College; Reader in the faculty of history; engaged in research at Nuffield College, Oxford (1949); Professor of Political Science, London School of Economics (1951). Principal works: *Experience at its Modes*

(1933); *The Social and Political Doctrines of Contemporary Europe* (1937); *The Character of Modern Politics*.

ALEXANDER RÜSTOW. Heidelberg. Born 1885. Studied at the universities of Göttingen, Munich and Bonn; Dr. phil.; Dissertation – *The Russell paradox*; scientific director, B. G. Teubner, Publishers, Leipzig (1908-11); on active service (1914-18); German Ministry of Economics, Berlin (1919-23); Adviser in economics and political economy to the German machine industry, Berlin (1923-33). Emigrated – first to Switzerland (1933); Professor Istanbul University (1933-50); since 1950, Professor of social and economic sciences, Heidelberg University, in succession to Alfred Weber; Member of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Principal works: *Das Versagen des Wirtschaftsliberalismus als religionsgeschichtliches Problem* (Zürich 1945); *Zwischen Kapitalismus und Kommunismus* (1949); *Ortsbestimmung der Gegenwart* Vol. I: *Ursprung der Herrschaft* (Erlenbach-Zürich and Stuttgart 1950); Vol. II: *Weg der Freiheit* (1952); Vol. III: *Herrschaft oder Freiheit* (1957).

HANNAH ARENDT. New York. Born in Hanover, 1906; studied philosophy in Marburg (under Heidegger and Bultmann), in Heidelberg (under Jaspers) and in Freiburg (under Husserl). Graduated Heidelberg 1928; after a period of arrest in the hands of the Gestapo left Germany in 1933 and lived in Paris 1933-1940; 1941 emigrated to the United States, worked for various political journals, became editor in chief of the Schocken Verlag, was entrusted with the production of the great Kafka Edition (1946-1948). 1951 her book 'The Origins of Totalitarianism' was published in America. 1952 awarded a Guggenheim Fellowship for her work in the field of political theory and science; lectured to the universities of Princetown, Notre Dame, Berkeley and Chicago. 1954 awarded the prize of The American Academy for Arts and Letters. Other works published: 'Fragwürdige Traditionsbestände im politischen Denken der Gegenwart.' (Europäische Verlagsanstalt, Frankfurt a. M., 1957), 'The Human Condition' (Chicago University Press, 1958).


WERNER KÄGI. Born Zürich 1909. Studied in London, Berlin and Zürich. Dr. jur., Zürich; Honorary lecturer, Zürich University (1943); Assistant Professor, Zürich University (1946); Professor of Constitutional Law, International Law and Ecclesiastical Law (1942). Principal Works: *Zur Entstehung, Wandlung und Problematik des Gewaltenteilungsprinzips* (Zürich 1937); *Die Verfassung als rechtliche Grundordnung des Staates* (1945); *Die Schweiz hält durch!* (1948); *Zur Entwicklung des schweizerischen Rechtsstaates seit 1848* (1952); *Rechtsstaat und Demokratie* (1953); *Der Anspruch der Schweizer Frau auf politische Gleichberechtigung* (1956); *Neutralität und Landesverteidigung* (1958).

HELMUT SCHOECK. Emory University, Georgia, USA. Born Graz, Austria 1922. Dr. phil.; Studied Medicine and Psychology in Munich (1941-1945); Assistant at the Philosophical Seminary of Munich University (1943-1945); voluntary contributor to the Süddeutscher Rundfunk, Stuttgart (1945-1946); studied at Tübingen University. Dr. phil. – thesis – *Karl Mannheim und die Wissenssoziologie bei Eduard Spranger* (1946-1948); Professor of Social Science and Psychology, Fairmont State College, Fairmont, West Virginia (1950-1953); Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut (1953); appointed to the department for sociology and anthropology, Emory University, Georgia (September 1954); Fellow of the American Anthropological Association and Member of the American Sociological Society and the Mont Pèlerin Society. Principal works: *Nietzsches*

Philosophie des 'Menschlich-Allzumenschlichen' (Tübingen 1948); Soziologie, Geschichte ihrer Probleme (Freiburg-München 1952); Das Problem des Neides in der Massendemokratie in 'Masse und Demokratie' (Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich 1957); Individuality versus Equality, a collection of essays by John Dos Passos, F. A. Hayek, Helmut Schoeck and others, published by Felix Morley (1958); Was heisst politisch unmöglich? (Eugen Rentsch Verlag, Erlenbach-Zürich 1959).

ERIC VOEGELIN. Munich. Born Cologne, 1901. Dr. rer. pol., Vienna University (1922); Assistant in the Faculty of Law (1923 and 1927-1929); Rockefeller Fellow (1924-1927); honorary lecturer (1929) and Assistant Professor (1936) Vienna University; 1938 dismissed by the national socialist government. Instructor and tutor, Harvard University (1939); Assistant Professor, University of Alabama (1939-1942); Associate Professor of Government (1942-1946); Full Professor of Government (1946-1953); Boyd Professor of Government (1953-1958) Louisiana State University; Professor in Ordinary of Political Science, Munich University (1958); Principal works: Über die Form des amerikanischen Geistes (Tübingen 1928); Rasse und Staat (Tübingen 1933); Die Rassenidee in der Geistesgeschichte (Berlin 1933); Der autoritäre Staat (Vienna 1936); Die politischen Religionen (Vienna 1938, Stockholm 1939); The New Science of Politics (Chicago 1952); Order and History (Vol. I: Israel and Revelation, Baton Rouge 1956; Vol. II: The World of the Polis, 1957; Vol. III: Plato and Aristotle, 1957).

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